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Federal Income Taxation of
Professional Associations
and Corporations
Many states have recently adopted legislation enabling
certain professional organizations to adopt the corpo-
rate form. In view of this situation the Internal Rev-
enue Service has amended the Federal Income Tax
Regulations dealing with classification of these profes-
sional associations and corporations (the Kintner Regu-
lations) in a manner which, if adopted by the courts,
will deprive most of these groups of corporate status
for federal tax purposes. This article offers compre-
hensive analysis of the classification problem by tracing
the development of statutes, legislative history, case
law, and the regulations. The article further analyzes
the policy considerations behind the federal tax program
as they bear on the classification issue and the newly
amended regulations. The author concludes that neither
historical developments nor policy reasons justify the
discriminatory treatment the amended regulations ac-
cord these groups. In fact, these same considerations
require the preferable course of allowing normal federal
tax consequences to follow from the local law form of
these professional organizations.
Stephen B. Scallen*
Over 30 states' have recently enacted laws granting certain
professions the authority to carry on professional practice as
corporations or as associations. These laws pertain to various
professions, but are largely intended for the benefit of doctors
and lawyers who heretofore have been precluded from using the
corporate form.2 Although these laws are intended to make avail-
*Associate Professor and Assistant Dean, University of Minnesota Law
School.
1. At latest count, the number was 33. For a list of the state statutes and
other authority enabling professional groups to practice as corporations, see
6 CCH 1965 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 5948.0973; 1 CCH PENSION PLAN GumE
(2d ed.) 9000-105 (1965).
2. See, PIRSIG, CASES ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 217-22 (1965).
Now, however, professional ethics no longer bar the possibility of practicing a
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able the corporate form to professional groups allowing them
taxation as corporations, the Internal Revenue Service has stated
that these groups are not to be taxable as corporations. The ques-
tion of the correct classification of these organizations for federal
income tax purposes is the subject of this article.
This problem of classification has its origins in the difference
in taxation of partnerships on the one hand and corporations
(and associations) on the other. At one time, the Commissioner
generally sought to classify all borderline organizations as asso-
ciations (taxable as corporations) - no doubt hoping thereby to
collect a "double" tax on the earnings of those businesses. Now
that use of the corporate form is generally thought to produce tax
advantages,' the Commissioner has reversed his field, seeking to
classify borderline organizations as partnerships rather than as
associations.
The Commissioner lost one early round of the battle when the
profession in the corporate form. In the Matter of the Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d
554 (Fla. 1961); CoLO. R. Civ. P. 265; Opinion 303, 48 A.B.AJ. 159, 160
(1962); Snyder & Weckstein, Quasi-Corporations, Quasi-Employees and Quasi-
Tax Relief for Professional Persons, 48 CoRnwL L.Q. 613, 659-71 (1963).
3. First, the "double" tax will not be imposed if the corporation's income
can be offset by enough salary and other expense deductions. Second, many
fringe benefits, with favorable tax consequences to employees, are available to
employees of corporations, but not to partners of a partnership. (Partners
are not considered to be "employees" under relevant sections of the Code;
consequently, the fringe benefits named are not available for them.) Corpo-
rate employees may spread their income over a lifetime, thereby avoiding
the undesirable tax consequences of bunching income into a few, high income
producing years. This spreading may be accomplished through an employment
contract. Besides the advantage of avoiding bunching, the employee also
has the advantage of actually paying the tax later; although he also has to
wait to use the money, he can rely on the existence of the contract as a
factor in decisions about spending his current income, as against saving some
of it; thereby he has some present enjoyment of the money he will later
receive. Deferral of tax and avoiding of bunching can also be accomplished
through pension and profit sharing plans. The corporation is entitled to a
deduction for the contribution to the trust under the plan. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 404(a). The employee, however, has no income for tax purposes at
the time of the contribution, even though his rights may be fully "vested."
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 402(a)(1). The trust pays no tax on its earnings
and realized gains. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(a). The employee is taxed
only when he receives distributions from the trust and this can be at capital
gain rates if he takes all his funds within one taxable year. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 402(a)(1)-(2). The taxpayer has the advantage of an investment in
a retirement plan without having to pay a tax on his enjoyment of the
realization that his retirement is being funded until he actually receives
funds upon retirement. The Code provisions regarding corporate pension and
profit sharing plans do allow considerable discrimination in favor of the per-
manent, highly paid employees, in spite of recitals to the contrary. Thus
1965] TAXATION OF PROFESSIONALS 605
Ninth Circuit agreed to classification of a medical group as an
association in United States v. Kintner." Thereafter changes in
the relevant regulations were proposed and adopted.5 Because
these changes, called the "Kintner Regulations," put added reli-
ance upon certain criteria applied technically under local law, it
became impossible for anything treated as a partnership under
local law to be treated as an association under these regulations.
The response of professional groups to this technical, local law
approach was to arrange a change in the local law. Professional
groups sought, and obtained, special laws, fashioned with the
Kintner Regulations carefully in mind, enabling them to do busi-
ness as corporations or associations. The response of the Internal
Revenue Service was to propose, and eventually adopt, amend-
ments to the Kintner Regulations which would, if followed, deny
classification of these professional groups as associations or cor-
porations for federal tax purposes, even though organized under
one of these professional associations or professional corporation
laws. Such, briefly, is the history and the context of the problem?
small corporation executives need not share "too much" of this tax advan-
tage with employees.
There are other fringe benefit tax advantages to the use of the corporate
form. The corporation may purchase group term life insurance for employees
up to $50,000 without the employees suffering a tax on the value of the
premium paid for them. IMr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 79; Treas. Reg. § 1.61-
2(d)(2) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6696, 1963-2 Cu-M. BULL. 23. Corporate
employees, but not partners, also enjoy the sick pay exclusion and the $5,000
exclusion for death benefit paid to a widow of an employee. INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, §§ 101(b)(2)(1), 105(d).
4. 216 F.2d 418 (1954); see text accompanying notes 162-74 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 347-56 infra.
6. A bibliographical list of works on the subject of this article should
include the following: 7 MERTENS, FEDERAL MEANs TAxATIoN ch. 38A (1956,
Supp. 1964); Quimby, Professional Corporations and Association, June, 1963;
Anderson, Tax Aspects of Professional Corporations, 15 U. So. CAL. 1963 TAX
INST. 309; Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation:
Some Questions and Comments, 17 TAx L. REV. 1 (1961); Brabson, What
Constitutes an Association Taxable as a Corporation, 1949 N.Y.U. 7TH INsT.
oN FED. TAx. 19282; Buchmann & Bearden, The Professional Service
Corporation-A New Business Entity, 16 U. Musin L. REV. 1 (1961); Bye &
Young, Law Firm Incorporation in Colorado, 34 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 427
(1962); Deering, Incorporation by Attorneys, 42 ORE. L. REv. 93 (1963);
Driscoll, The Association Problem in Joint Ventures and Limited Partnerships,
17 N.Y.U. INsT. oN FED. TAX. 1067 (1959); Driscoll, The Limited Partnership
and the Association Question, U. So. CAL. 1960 TAX INST. 539; Dunkel, Pro-
fessional Corporations, 22 Onlo Sr. L.J. 703 (1961); Eaton & Maycock, Pro-
fessional Corporations, Tax Benefits are not Lost in Today's New Hostile
Climate, 20 J. TAxATroN 150 (1964); Eaton & Maycock, Final Professional
Corporation Regs are Improvement-But Not Much, 22 J. TAxATIoN 208
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Three approaches were used to change local law so that corpo-
rate status for these professional groups might be obtained. It is
not within the scope of this article to describe each category in
great detail, giving differences and similarities from state to state.
However, the specific approaches used in three jurisdictions will
(1965); Eaton & Maycock, Proposed Kintner Begs Arouse Many Protests as
Being Inequitable and Discriminatory, 20 J. TAxATioN 222 (1964); Eber,
The Pros and Cons of the New Professional Service Corporations, 15 J. TAnX-
TION 808 (1961); Edwards, Taxation- Unincorporated Associations and the
Medical Profession, 30 Miss. LJ. 293 (1959); Frost, Some Comments as to
Professional Corporation Statutes, 4 AiuzoNA L. REV. 169 (1963); Fuller,
Taxation of Louisiana Professional Partnerships as Associations, 85 Tut. L.
REv. 728 (1961); Grayck, Tax Qualified Retirement Plans for Professional
Practitioners: A Comparison of the Self-Employed Individual's Tax Require-
ment Act of 1962 and the Professional Association, 63 Cour. L. REv. 415
(1963); Grayck, Professional Associations and the Kintner Regulations: Some
Answers, More Questions, and Further Comments, 17 TAx L. REV. 469 (1962);
Hart, Legislation by the I.R.S. and the Proposed Amendments to the Kintner
Regulations, 20 Bus. LAw. 23s (1964); Hewitt, Associations Taxable as Cor-
porations, 47 A.B.A.J. 215 (1961); Hughes, Associations After Stierwalt, 1963
TULANE 12TH TAX INSTITUTE 841; Johnson, Effect of the New Association
Regulations on Oil and Gas Ventures, SOuTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION
1962 INsTITUTE ON Oi, & GAs TAXATIoN 503; Joyner, Pemberton & Taylor,
The Tax Dilemma of the Self-Employed Professional, 28 Mo. L. REV. 161
(1963); Kahn, The Wisconsin Service Corporation Law of 1961, 1969 Wis. L.
REv. 65; Lyon, Action in Indiana on Kintner-Type Organizations, 39 TAXES
266 (1961); Lyons, Comments on the New Regulations on Association, 16
TAX L. REv. 441 (1961); Mackay, Professional Associations Instead of Part-
nerships, 1961 TULANE 10TH TAx INsTITUTE 409; Maier, Professional Corpo-
rations and Kintner Association Advancing; Box Score to Date, 17 J. TAX-
TION 2 (1962); Maier & Carter, Is the Commissioner's Authority Exceeded in
the Proposed Regulations for Professional Firms?, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 861
(1965); Maier & Wild, Taxation of Professional Firms as Corporations, 44
MARQ. L. REV. 127 (1960); Ohl, Corporate Practice of Law in New York, 40
TAXEs 263 (1962); Patterson, Current Tax Problems in Compulsory and
Voluntary Unitization, 1961 TULANE 10TH TAX INsTITUTE 249; Pesin, Pro-
fessional Associations Doing Business as Corporations, 21 N.Y.U. INsT. oN
FED. TAX. 565 (1963); Quinby, The Kintner Regulations, 104 TausTs & Es-
TATEs 197 (1965); Ray, A Comparison of Tax Benefits Available Under H-R
10 With Those Provided by Professional Associations, 26 GA. B.J. 269 (1964);
Ray, Corporate Tax Treatment of Medical Clinics Organized as Associations,
39 TAXES 78 (1961); Smith, Associations Classified as Corporations Under
the Internal Revenue Code, 34 CAir. L. REv. 461 (1946); Snyder & Weekstein,
Quasi-Corporations, Quasi-Employees and Quasi-Tax Relief for Professional
Persons, 48 CoRNEL L.Q. 613 (1963); Sarner, Associations Taxable as Corpo-
rations: A Review and a Look Ahead, 1962 N.Y.U. 10T1 INST. oN FED. TAX.
609; Stavole, Corporate Employee Tax Status for the Professional Man, 11
CIEv.-MAn. L. REV. 176 (1962); Vesely, The Ohio Professional Association
Law, 13 W. REs. L. REv. 195 (1962); Waisel, Attorneys' Federal Income Taxes,
66 DiCx. L. REv. 75 (1961); Williams, Medical and Dental Corporations: A
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serve to relate the discussion of various points in this article to
an organization in a particular jurisdiction.
First is the professional association, found in 10 states.7 In
this article the Georgia statute is discussed.8 It provides that
two or more persons licensed to practice a profession under the
laws of Georgia may form a "professional association," which is
"an unincorporated association"9 "governed" by an elected board
of governors who need not be members.'o The association may
hold property in its own name and sue or be sued in its own
name." Articles of association are to be filed with the county clerk
of court and can be amended by two-thirds of the members.'
No member has power to bind the association.' The association
shall be an entity independent of its members and will continue
notwithstanding the death, retirement, etc. of members; 4 no
member acting alone has the power to dissolve the association."
The association may issue stock or certificates of evidence of
ownership which shall be freely transferable, except as restricted
in the articles.' Only licensed professionals may own stock,'7
except an estate of a shareholder for a reasonable time.'8 The
association may render professional services only through em-
ployees who are licensed for the professional service to be per-
Step Toward Tax Equality, 15 ARK. L. REv. 366 (1961); Williams & Cowart,
Federal Income Tax Advantages for Professionals-The Georgia Professional
Association. Act, 12 MERCER L. REv. 888 (1961); Wise, Business Life Insurance:
Tax-Deferred Annuities for Employees of "Section 501(cXS) Organizations";
Association of Professional Men Taxable as Corporation, 18 N.Y.U. INST. ON
FED. TAx. 461 (1960); Zarky, Unincorporated Organizations Taxable as Cor-
porations, U. So. CAL. 1961 TAX INST. 277; Comment, Professional Associa-
tions and Professional Corporations, 16 Sw. LJ. 462 (1962); Note, 43 B.U.L.
REv. 107 (1963); Note, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 776 (1969); Note, 11 How. LJ. 188
(1965); Note, 46 IowA L. REv. 844 (1961); Note, 12 STAw. L. REv. 746 (1960);
Note, 31 U. Cimc. L. REv. 71 (1962).
7. Illinois, Alabama, Georgia, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia,
Ohio, Connecticut, Tennessee, Texas. The laws are collected in 1 CCH PEN-
sioN PLAN GumE (2d ed.) 9000-105 (1965). The Texas version is not
similar to the others.
8. GA. CODE ANN. ch. 84-43 (Supp. 1963).
9. GA. CODE AN. § 84-4302(b) (Supp. 1963).
10. GA. CODE ANw. § 844808 (Supp. 1963).
11. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-4816 (Supp. 1963).
12. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-4304 (Supp. 1963).
18. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-4308 (Supp. 1963).
14. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-4809 (Supp. 1963).
15. Ibid.
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formed. * If an employee or shareholder becomes disqualified to
render professional services in the state, he must sever all his
connections with the association;20 if he does not, grounds exist
for forfeiting the association's right to practice and the secretary
of state would have power to seek dissolution.2 ' Limited liability
is covered in a provision stating that the members are not indi-
vidually liable for "debts of, or claims against the professional
association unless such member or shareholder has personally
participated in the transaction."2 2 This provision, and some vague
language about not changing the relationship between a profes-
sional and client or patient, are discussed below more extensive-
ly.2 3 Groups organizing under the Georgia statute win style
themselves "professional association," or "P.A."4
The second type, the professional corporation, is provided for
by legislation in 24 states?" The Minnesota version" for doctors
provides that one or more persons licensed to practice medicine
(there is a similar law for lawyers)27 "may form a corpora,
tion" under the Minnesota Business Corporation Act?8 The cor-
porate name must end with "Chartered," "Limited," "Ltd,"
"Professional Association" or "P.A."' The group must obtain
a corporate charter in the normal way,30 but the corporation may
not provide professional services until a certificate of registration
is given by the State Medical Board.3' Shares of stock may be
owned only by persons who are licensed to practice medicine in
the state and may be transferred only to such persons.32 The
19. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-4306 (Supp. 1963).
20. GA. CODE ANN. 844311 (Supp. 1963).
21. Ibid.
22. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-4307 (Supp. 1963).
23. Text accompanying notes 395-403 infra.
24. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-4304 (Supp. 1963).
25. Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Loui-
siana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin. The laws are collected in 1 CCH
PENSION PrAN GUIDE (2d ed.) 9000-105 (1965). Note that Illinois also
has an association statute. See note 7 supra.
26. MINN. STAT. 1§ 319.01-.23 (1961).
27. Minnesota Attorneys Professional Corporation Act, MIxN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 319.26-.41 (Supp. 1964).
28. MInN. STAT. 3 301.01-.84, 819.03 (1961).
29. MiNN. STAT. 4 319.06. (1961).
30. MIN. STAT. 3 19.05 (1961).
31. Mum. STAT. § 319.07 (1961).
32. MINN. STAT. § 319.18 (1961).
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board may revoke this certificate of registration," (but only after
notice, hearing and opportunity for appeal)34 for such events as
the revocation of the license of an employee. The corporation may
render professional service only through licensed doctors.
Liability is limited. 6
The third approach is that adopted in Colorado where a rule
of civil procedure provides that attorneys may practice in the
corporate form provided certain requirements are met concerning
the persons who own stock, adequate malpractice insurance, etc.
The precise issue in this article is the formulation and applica-
tion of criteria for classifying these business organizations for
federal income tax purposes. The traditional sources of authority
- legislative history, judicial decisions, and treasury regulations
- bear examination to determine how they solve this problem.
Some criticisms of the solutions provided will be offered with a
suggested framework for resolving these cases.
In this investigation, it will be helpful to examine the impact
of the various tests and authorities on several models, or hypo-
thetical situations:
(1) Professional association-a group of about 10 doctors
organized and practicing under the Georgia statute discussed
herein.
(2) Professional corporation - a group of 10 doctors organized
in Minnesota.
(3) Colorado profession corporation-a professional corpora-
tion composed of 10 lawyers organized without any specific en-
abling legislation but subject to certain state supreme court rules.
(4) Personal service corporation - a corporation organized by
10 individuals in the business of management consulting.
(5) Manufacturing corporation - a small manufacturing cor-
poration with 10 shareholders and 20 employees.
I. THE STATUTE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
As one might expect, nothing in the words used in the present
statute, discussed below, or in the legislative history compels one
result or another in this controversy. But some history and some
indication of Congress' meaning is available.
3. MIN. STAT. 3 819.12 (1961).
84. MNK. STAT. 3§ 819.13-.14 (1961).
35. Mum. STAT. 3 19.15 (1961).
36. Mnw. STAT. § 819.16 (1961); see text accompanying notes 214-17 infra.
37. Coro. R. Civ. P. 265.
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A. PRIon REVE LAWS
The earliest revenue acts demonstrated some recognition of the
various forms of doing business."5 The partnership and corpora-
tion were treated similarly, although certain corporations were
given some collection or withholding duties not imposed upon
partnerships.
The revenue act of 1894,"' which imposed a two percent income
tax on individual40 and corporate income,41 is the beginning of
more significant history on the question of classification of busi-
nesses into different groups for purposes of federal income taxa-
tion. Individual income received a $4,000 exemption,? but not
corporate income. Consequently all of a corporation's income was
taxable. Since an individual received an exclusion for dividends
from a corporation that had paid the two percent tax, no "double"
88. The first income tax law, Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292,
imposed an income tax upon "the annual income of every person residing in
the United States," § 49, 12 Stat. 809 (1861). "Person" apparently meant
"individual" as that term is now used in the Internal Revenue Code. Corpora-
tions as such were not taxed, although a "person's" income from dividends
was.
The Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 89, 12 Stat. 478, repealed the act of
1861. Section 57 of the 1862 act imposed a license tax on every person, asso-
ciation of persons, or corporation engaged in designated trades or businesses.
12 Stat. 453 (1862). Congress thus referred to various forms of doing business
and apparently included partnerships in "association of persons." Section 82,
12 Stat. 470 (1862), imposed a "duty" of three percent on dividends of banks
and insurance companies as a type of withholding scheme. Section 91, 19
Stat. 473 (1862), supported Section 92, 12 Stat. 474 (1862), which imposed
an income tax on the "income of every person residing in the United States."
The Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223, imposed a license tax on
a "person, firm, company, or corporation." Section 71, 13 Stat. 248 (1864). In
1870 the income tax was reduced, ch. 255, § 6, 16 Stat. 256, and in 1872 it
expired and was not renewed. PAm., TAxATIoN iN Tna UNiTED STATES 27
(1954).
39. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509.
40. Ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 553 (1894).
41.
That there shall be assessed, levied, and collected, except as herein
otherwise provided, a tax of two per centum annually on the net profits
or income above actual operating and business expenses, including
expenses for materials purchased for manufacture or bought for resale,
losses, and interest on bonded and other indebtedness of all banks,
banking institutions, trust companies, saving institutions, fire, marine,
life, and other insurance companies, railroad, canal, turnpike, canal
navigation, slack water, telephone, telegraph, express, electric-light,
gas, water, street railway companies, and all other corporations, compa-
nies, or associations doing business for profit in the United States, no
matter how created and organized, but not including partnerships.
Ch. 349, § 82, 28 Stat. 556 (1894). (Emphasis added.)
42. Ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 553 (1894).
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taxation of corporate income resulted.43
The question of which business organizations were subject to
the two percent tax was important to an individual with income
of less than $4,000 and who also received dividend income from
a corporation which had paid the tax. He could not get a refund
of that tax, and, of course, exclusion of the income received from
the corporation meant nothing to him since his income was below
the $4,000 exemption level anyway.
On the other hand partnerships were not taxed, although in-
come from a partnership was." Therefore, anyone receiving
income from a partnership could take the full $4,000 exemption,
but an individual receiving dividends from "corporations, com-
panies, or associations" could not if his other income was less
than $4,000.
The decision to tax income of corporations and to exclude
income of partnerships from the two percent tax was quite de-
liberate. Some members of the Senate may have thought "asso-
ciations" referred only to organizations calling themselves associa-
tions and organized under a state law as such, but others who
thought the term "association" had a meaning broad enough to
include partnerships prevailed in carving out an exception for
partnerships by adding the words "but not including partner-
ships" to the section under consideration.45 Whatever the meaning
43. Ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 553 (1894).
44. See note 41 supra.
45. 26 CONG. REC. 6877 (1894) (remarks of Mr. Hoar and the Secretary).
Because § 32 as originally proposed did not include that phrase, the following
discussion occurred on the floor of the Senate:
Mr. HALE. It applies to almost every form of human industry. It
is the fashion now instead of making a partnership to form these little
associations and put in twenty-five, forty, or fifty thousand dollars.
They ought to be encouraged rather than discouraged.
Mr. HOAR. This does not include partnerships. It applies only to
companies, corporations, or associations, not partnerships.
Mr. HILL. It makes a discrimination against corporate investments.
Mr. ALDRICH. I should be glad to have the Senator from Mis-
souri state whether the interpretation given to this bill by the Senator
from Massachusetts in his opinion is a correct one, because if the word
"association" here includes partnerships, as the Senator from Massa-
chusetts stated, as I understand -
Mr. HOAR. I did not say that.
Mr. ALDRICH. That is what I understand the Senator to say.
Mr. HOAR. I said "companies."
Mr. ALLISON. I do not understand, and I should be glad to have
the Senator from Missouri state, whether he understands that this sec-
tion and the subsequent sections regulating this subject are intended
to deal with anything but associated corporations?
Mr. VEST. That is the meaning of it. I have not had any doubt
it. If I had intended to use the word "partnerships," I should have said
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"partnerships." For instance, take building and loan associations. That
is the way they style themselves. They are not called "companies";
they are not called "corporations" eo nomine, but they are called
"associations." Two or more individuals associate themselves, and we
have a chapter in the Revised Statutes of Missouri which provides for
these associations. They are quasi corporations.
Mr. HALE. That is not a private business partnership.
Mr. VEST. No; that is not a partnership.
Id. at 6833.
In spite of Senator Vest's assurances, obviously there was some doubt
whether partnerships were included. Later the following exchange took place:
Mr. HOAR. I should like to inquire of the committee, in order to
make clear what I understand they say is their meaning, whether there
is any objection to adding after the word "organized" the words "but
not including partnerships?" I am afraid that the phrase "companies
or association" . . . "no matter how created and organized," does include
partnerships.
Mr. VEST. This language is taken from the act of 1864. That act
uses the words "corporation or association."
Mr. HOAR. Not "companies?"
Mr. VEST. Yes, "companies, corporations, or associations."
Mr. HOAR. If the Senator has that clause in the act before him, I
should like to have him read it.
Mr. VEST. Here is the language to which I referred. It is in the act
of the Thirty-eighth Congress, first session, chapter 173 "manufactures,
articles, and products." This is not the income tax law, but it is what is
call [sic] the excise law, the manufactures law:
SEC. 82. Be it further enacted. That every individual, partnership,
firm, association, or corporation-
Mr. HOAR. Exactly.
Mr. HOAR. That act uses the word "partnership" and in terms it
includes individuals.
Mr. VEST. The words were "every individual, partnership, firm, as-
sociation, or corporation."
Mr. HOAR. It does not say "company." It is not the purpose of
this section to include partnerships. They are dealt with -in another
way, and the exemption belonging to the individual partner is to be
secured in another way.
I should like to ask my friend from Missouri, who is a good lawyer
and does not want to draw a bill and be responsible for an act that
has doubt in its meaning, whether it is not better to make his meaning
clear, and whether it is not, to say the least, a doubtful question
whether the clause "corporations, companies, or associations doing busi-
ness for profit in the United States, no matter how created and organ-
ized," does not include partnerships?
I say on my responsibility as a lawyer that I think it does. I should
give that opinion as at present advised to a client or to an officer of
the Government. I cannot conceive a more apt description of a partner-
ship than "companies or associations doing business for profit." If a
partnership is not a company or association of men doing business for
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of "association" in those days, clearly Congress did not want
partnerships treated the same as "associations." This amending
clause raises the classification problem, although neither the
statute nor its history provides a definition of a partnership.
Legislative history also provides some discussion of the uses
of corporations in that era. Small, closely held corporations were
very well known and businessmen generally could choose either
the partnership form or the corporate form for doing business.
Over and over again legislators recognized that corporations were
formed to provide limited liability and avoidance of dissolution
upon the death, retirement, etc. of a partner, although apparently
no one mentioned transferability of interests or centralization of
management.46
profit what in the world is it, however established or organized? The
clause is made clear to everybody by simply adding the words, "and
not including partnerships," and that is what I suggest to the considera-
tion of the Senate. I gave notice of that amendment. I shall not offer
it at this moment because I want to offer another.
Id. at 6835. (Emphasis added.)
46.
Mr. HOAR.....
In my State it is the almost universal practice, and it is a practice
which has grown up in England under what they call corporations or
associations of limited liability, to go into a joint stock company. Two
or three youngsters just out of their apprenticeship go into partnership
together and do some little portion of the work of a machine shop. I
could name several such establishments in my own city. One is a con-
cern manufacturing particular kinds of toys, and another engaged in the
manufacture of bicycles in a small way. And so it is in business of all
sorts and kinds, partly, I suppose, because it involves legal safeguards,
but the chief reason is that when one of the partners dies or goes out
of the company for any reason, the survivors in the corporation do not
have to liquidate the concern, and wait a year or two and go through
a process of law before they can go on with the business.
That has become, I say, the almost universal mode of doing every
kind of little business. There will sometimes be salaries. There will be
a frugal salary for the president and the vice-president and the treas-
urer, but they leave in the concern all they make and go on with it
except to derive from it sufficient for a frugal living.
Id. at 6866. "Mr. VEST. Men go in and make up a corporation in order to
escape individual liability." Id. at 6867.
Mr. HOAR. There are in my State, and I suppose in nearly all the
States now, an enormous number of persons who form themselves into
what are called joint stock companies, but which are corporations in
the law for two purposes, first to escape the personal liability for debt
beyond the limit fixed, whatever it may be, and, next, so that when-
ever a single partner goes out or dies or becomes insolvent on his private
account, or anything else which would dissolve the corporation, there
is not to be a legal liquidation of the whole concern. These two latter
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Aware of only small differences in form and the option by
business owners to choose one form or the other, Congress never-
theless enacted a tax law with different consequences, depending
on whether the owners used the form of a partnership or of a
corporation. The income tax of the 1894 act was held unconsti-
tutional by the Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co.47
In 1909 a tax was levied upon the privilege of doing business
under certain forms .4 A one percent tax on all net income over
$5,000 was provided for ". . . every corporation, joint stock com-
pany or association, organized for profit and having a capital stock
are quite as important as the former.
Id. at 6833.
Mr. PLATT....
.... This bill does not tax the income of a partnership; and the cor-
porations of this country, when you step outside of those which are
continually in the mind of the people and which are exciting the criti-
cism of people, are nothing more than commercial partnerships.
Mr. HAWLEY. If my colleague will permit me, we remember,
both of us very well, that some thirty years ago when our joint stock
corporations laws were enacted in Connecticut, it was then supposed,
and even is now, that it is an enormous advantage to the men of limited
means, three, four, or five in number, who, with a thousand dollars
apiece, can organize and safely conduct business. It is a special blessing
to the poor man.
Mr. PLATT. ...
Mr. President, when it comes to my own State it strikes an entirely
different class of people and an entirely different class of corporations -
corporations engaged in as honest and legitimate business as the mer-
chant who has a retail store or the individual who is printing a
country paper, or the mechanic who has been enabled to get a small
shop and carry on a small manufacturing business.
Id. at 6704. And then there was a prediction which did not quite come true.
Mr. PLATT....
We shall have no more joint stock corporations formed in the State
of Connecticut if business carried on in other forms is to be discrim-
inated in favor of and they are to be discriminated against. If on one
side of a street three persons carry on business as partners, making a
joint profit of $6,000, no income tax is to be paid upon such income or
profit unless the partners have other sources of income which, added
to their share of the partnership gains, makes their individual income
exceed $4,000. If on the opposite side of the street three persons, having
formed a corporation carry on the same kind of business and make the
same amount of profit, the $6,000 profit made by the corporation is
to pay an income tax of $120. Is this equal taxation?
Id. at 6705.
47. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
48. Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11.
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represented by shares . . . ."9 Partnerships were apparently ex-
cluded and associations clearly included by the language which
closely resembled that used in earlier tax statutes. The act was
sustained.o
Continued recognition of some different forms for organizing
to do business is shown in the revenue act of 1913."' A normal
tax was imposed upon the net income of "every person,"52 and
a graduated surtax was imposed on incomes over $20,000.s Pas-
sage of the sixteenth amendment made a national income tax
possible. The normal tax was also imposed upon "every corpora-
tion, joint-stock company or association, and every insurance
company, organized in the United States, no matter how created
or organized, not including partnerships . . ."" Different treat-
ment of partnerships appears again. The difference continued to
be slight, however. A deduction from income for purposes of
determining taxable income was authorized for "the amount
received as dividends upon the stock or from the net earnings of
any corporation, joint stock company, association, or insurance
company which is taxable upon its net income as hereinafter
provided . . . ."55 Partners were to be taxed upon partnership
income: "any persons carrying on business in partnership shall
be liable for income tax only in their individual capacity, and
the share of the profits of a partnership to which any taxable
partner would be entitled if the same were divided, whether
divided or otherwise . . . ."" Consequently partners and share-
holders were treated alike, in the end, unless their total income
was less than $4,000 (for a married couple). The shareholder
with income under $4,000 could not derive any benefit from the
49. Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 88, 36 Stat. 112.
50. The act was held constitutional as an excise tax on business done in
the corporate form, not as a direct tax. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S.
107 (1911).
51. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166.
52. Ch. 16, § II. A. Subdivision 1, 38 Stat. 166 (1913).
53. Ch. 16, § II. A. Subdivision 2, 38 Stat. 166 (1913). For purposes of
the surtax:
the taxable income of any individual shall embrace the share to which
he would be entitled of the gains and profits, if divided or distributed,
whether divided or distributed or not, of all corporations, joint-stock
companies, or associations however created or organized, formed or
fraudulently availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition
of such tax ....
Ibid.
54. Ch. 16, § II. G(a), 38 Stat. 172 (1913).
55. Ch. 16, § II. B, 38 Stat. 167 (1913).
56. Ch. 16, § II. D, 38 Stat. 169 (1913).
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tax paid by the corporation on its income, whereas the partner-
ship paid no tax as such.
In the Revenue Act, 1916, the difference for tax purposes be-
tween carrying on a business in one form or another took on
substantial importance. A normal tax was imposed on "every
individual"57 and a graduated surtax on incomes over $20,000.18
Instead of a deduction from taxable income for dividends on
which a corporation had paid a tax, a deduction for the normal
tax only was allowed for dividends from a corporation which had
been taxed. No such deduction, however, was available for the
surtax. Consequently, income from corporate dividends was taxed
"twice," once at the corporate level,59 and again at the share-
holder level for the surtax.
In all these revenue acts no definitions of the terms person,
individual, partnership, association, and corporation were given.
However, some "definitions" did appear in the Revenue Act of
1918: "The term 'person' includes partnerships and corporations,
as well as individuals; the term 'corporation' includes associations,
joint-stock companies . .. ."60 The War Excess Profits Tax, under
the 1917 act, had also defined "corporation" similarly: "The term
'corporation' includes joint-stock companies or associations and
insurance companies . . . .."6 The tax was imposed "upon the
income of every corporation, partnership, or individual ....
This marks the beginning of the practice of including "associa-
tions" under the category of "corporations" in drafting.
It is somewhat startling to find in the 1918 act a definition
for and special treatment of a "personal service corporation":
The term "personal service corporation" means a corporation whose
income is to be ascribed primarily to the activities of the principal
owners or stockholders who are themselves regularly engaged in the
active conduct of the affairs of the corporation and in which capital
(whether invested or borrowed) is not a material income-producing
factor . . . .6
Personal service corporations were treated as partnerships.e
57. Revenue Act, 1916, ch. 463, § 1(a), 39 Stat. 756.
58. Ch. 463, § 1(b), 39 Stat. 756 (1916).
59. Ch. 463, § 10, 39 Stat. 765 (1916).
60. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1, 40 Stat. 1057.
61. War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 200, 40 Stat. 802 (1917).
62. Ch. 63, § 201, 40 Stat. 803 (1917).
63. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 200, 40 Stat. 1059 (1919).
64.
(e) Personal service corporations shall not be subject to taxation
under this title, but the individual stockholders thereof shall be taxed
in the same manner as the members of partnerships. All the provisions
of this title relating to partnerships and the members thereof shall so
[Vol. 49: 603616
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Section 218(a) specified the treatment of partnerships: "That
individuals carrying on business in partnership shall be liable for
income tax only in their individual capacity. There shall be
included in computing the net income of each partner his dis-
tributive share, whether distributed or not . . ."" The personal
service corporation, however, had a short life span. The Revenue
Act of 1921 repeated the provision on personal service corpora-
tions, but stated that those sections would not be in effect after
December 31, 1921.60
far as practicable apply to personal service corporations and the stock-
holders thereof: Provided, That for the purpose of this subdivision
amounts distributed by a personal service corporation during its tax-
able year shall be accounted for by the distributees; and any portion
of the net income remaining undistributed at the close of its taxable
year shall be accounted for by the stockholders of such corporation at
the close of its taxable year in proportion to their respective shares.
Ch. 18, § 218(e), 40 Stat. 1070 (1919).
65. Ch. 18, § 218(a), 40 Stat. 1070 (1919). See S. Doc. No. 391, 65th
Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1919): '5A personal service corporation has been relieved
from the payment of tax as a corporation, and only taxed through the income
tax upon the stockholders thereof upon the basis of an actual distribution
of the entire income of the corporation." There was also a proposal in the
collected legislative history for something like the present subehapter S. Notes
on the Revenue Act of 1918 (pt. I), Submitted by the Secretary of the Treas-
ury Without Recommendation 5-7 (1919).
66. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 218(d), 42 Stat. 245. The reasons for
this quick turn about are obscure, but may relate to the following passage
in the Senate Report:
ALTERNATIVE TAX ON PERSONAL-SERVICE CORPORATIONS
Section 1332 provides that in case the present method of taxing
personal-service corporations (i.e., on the same basis as partnerships)
is declared unconstitutional such corporations shall be taxed for the
years 1918 to 1921, inclusive, upon the same basis as other corpora-
tions. . . .
This section is deemed advisable because the stock-dividend decision
has cast doubt upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the reve-
nue act which treat personal-service corporations substantially as
partnerships.
SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 67TH CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT ON INTERNAL
REvENuE BiLL OF 1921, at 34 (Comm. Print No. 2, 1921).
Probably the special treatment of personal service corporation was
dropped as less necessary because of the reductions in tax rates following the
war. Section 1832 was designed to protect the tax base during the period of
special treatment of personal service corporations in case of a judicial over-
turning of the special provision concerning personal service corporations. It
is also possible that the "doubt" concerning the constitutionality of these
sections contributed to repeal of the special treatment.
The Senate Report stated:
Section 218 is the same as the corresponding provision in existing law
except that proper provision is made for the repeal, as of January 1,
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The appearance for a short time of the personal service cor-
poration is significant since Congress thus recognized the exist-
ence of, presumably, a substantial number of personal service
businesses conducted under the form of a corporation. Apparently
it was thought that these businesses should be treated the same
as partnerships for one reason or another. Certainly no doubt
remains, if history is any guide, that there can be, for federal
income tax purposes, personal service corporations treated as
corporations.
The definitions provided by the Revenue Act of 1918 are just
as circular as the earlier lack of definitions.67 But this revenue
1922, of the tax on the stockholders of a personal-service corporation
with respect to undistributed profits in such corporation and the taxa-
tion [thereafterJ of such corporation in the same manner as other corpo-
rations are taxed.
SENATE CoMM. ON FINANCE, 67TH CONG., 1ST. SESS., REPORT ON INTERNAL
REVENUE BmL OF 1921, at 14 (Comm. Print No. 1, 1921).
67. The enactment of these "definitions" did provide the setting for
some more legislative conversation on the definitional problem. The question
of what is a corporation came up on connection with a discussion of charitable
contribution and what forms of organization were included in gifts to a
"corporation":
Mr. GARNER. The gentleman will find the definition of "corpo-
rations" on page 1 of the bill to include associations, joint-stock com-
panies, and insurance companies, as well as private corporations. The
term "corporation" embraces any kind of an association to which an
individual makes a donation.
Mr. BORLAND. I take it that the word "corporation" would in-
clude an organization which had a legal entity. It would not include an
association in the ordinary sense -a club or a society.
Mr. BORLAND. We have a board of public welfare which is con-
ducted by men who serve without pay. They are appointed by public
authorities. They do collect quite a fund.
Mr. CANNON. Are they incorporated?
Mr. BORLAND. No.
Mr. CANNON. Are they included[?]
Mr. GARNER. They would be if they are an association of people.
It makes no difference whether they are incorporated, if they are an
association of people. Let the gentleman turn to the definition of "cor-
poration" on page 1 of the bill which I just read. What is an associa-
tion? It is a number of people who are associated together.
Mr. CANNON. The gentleman is sure that would change it.
Mr. GARNER. We undertake to do it in the definition here.
Mr. BORLAND. The word "corporation" ordinarily means a legal
entity.
Mr. GARNER. I know, but we have changed it. We have under-
taken to determine what a corporation is by stating specifically what
it includes, and we say that it includes an association. Now, if you want
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to go to the dictionary and find out the definition of association, well
and good. I think it means a number of people, whether organized under
law or voluntarily.
56 CONG. REC. 10418 (1918).
That discussion is not very helpful since nowhere was there a discussion
of what is a partnership, and the effect of a gift to a partnership. It is un-
likely, however, that the partnership form would have been used for such a
purpose. The discussion does indicate a broad concept of "association" and
does provide the occasion for examining the dictionary, as was suggested in
the exchange.
BLACK, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 100 (1st ed. 1891), defines an association
as follows:
ASSOCIATION. The act of a number of persons who unite or join to-
gether for some special purpose or business. The union of a company
of persons for the transaction of designated affairs, or the attainment
of some common object.
An unincorporated society; a body of persons united and acting
together without a charter but upon the methods and forms used by
incorporated bodies for the prosecution of some common enterprise.
1 BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 269 (8th ed. 1914) states:
ASSOCIATION: The act of a number of persons in uniting together
for some purpose. The persons so joining.
An organized union of persons for a common purpose; a body of
persons acting together for the promotion of some object of mutual
interest or advantage. Cent. Dict.
Any combination of persons whether the same be known by a dis-
tinctive name or not. Stroud, Judicial Dictionary.
An unincorporated company is fundamentally a large partnership,
from which it differs mainly in the following particulars: That it is
not bound by the acts of the individual partners, but only by those of
its managers; that shares in it are transferable; and that it is not dis-
solved by the retirement, death, bankruptcy, etc., of its individual mem-
bers; Dicey, Parties 149.
In the United States this term is used to signify a body of persons
united without a charter but upon the methods and forms used by
incorporated bodies for the prosecution of some enterprise. Abbott,
L. Diet.
5 C.J. Associations § 1 (1st ed. 1916) has an extensive article on associations:
A. Definition. . . . As the term is commonly used, however, an
"association" may be defined to be a body of persons acting together,
without a charter, but upon the methods and forms used by incorpo-
rated bodies, for the prosecution of some common enterprise....
B. Corporation Distinguished. The term "association" frequently en-
ters into the names bestowed upon corporations by the legislature or
chosen by the incorporators themselves; and in its broad sense it may
include "corporation." So the term as employed in statutes is fre-
quently held, by reason of the object and scope of the statutes, to in-
clude "corporations," or to be synonymous therewith. Ordinarily,
however, the two terms are employed to denote different and distinct
conceptions; and the term "association" is generally used in a restricted
sense as relating to unincorporated societies. ...
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act does mark the beginning of the present way of "defining"
these terms, i.e., by having the word "person" refer to several
categories of taxpayers, whether persons or not, and by having
the word "corporations" include entities that are not corporations
under local law, namely associations.6
The Revenue Act of 1932" finally provided a "definition" for
the term "partnership":
C. Joint Stock Company Distinguished. The term "association" may
include "joint stock company," but it does not necessarily include that
term, and strictly speaking is not applicable thereto, since a voluntary
association cannot issue stock, and the right of membership is not
transferable, at least not without the consent of the association itself.
D. Partnership Distinguished. It has been said that the word "asso-
ciation" is a generic term which may properly comprehend a partner-
ship as well as a corporation. Strictly speaking, however, an unincor-
porated association is neither a partnership nor, it has been said, a
quasi partnership, although it is rated as a partnership so far as its
capacity to sue and to be sued is concerned. In any event, the members
thereof, whatever may be their relation and liability to third persons
dealing with the association, are not partners inter sese, since the death
of a member does not of necessity work a dissolution of the association,
and there exists no authority in a single member to bind the others....
Where, however, the association is organized for commercial purposes,
and operated for pecuniary profit, it is no more than a partnership,
and the rights and liabilities incident to that relation attach to its mem-
bers, as well between the members themselves, as between a member
and the association, and as between members and third persons dealing
with them or the association.
Corpus Juris goes on to point out that associations may be formed in some
states under specific statutes and generally, under the common law, by
contract, generally embodied in an instrument called article of association.
5 CJ. Associations ff 5-6 (1st ed. 1916).
Ruling Case Law contains nothing but cross reference to "Mutual Benefit
Societies; Religious Societies; Societies and Clubs." 2 R.C.L. 740 (1914).
4 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PRocEDuRE 299-316 (1902) contains some ma-
terials on "Associations." It begins with the Black, Law Dictionary definitions.
The articles states that a single member has no power to bind the associa-
tion, id. at 310, and each member of an association is liable for debts of its
association incurred during his membership, id. at 311, and for torts of the
association, id. at 312.
'All these definitions have in common both vagueness and lack of an
answer to the characterization question- for what purpose is the question,
"what is an association," asked. They all seem dependent upon labels, and
self-serving characterizations found in charters, or documents. It could be
concluded that there were no sophisticated distinctions in mind when the
words "associations," etc., were used in these "definitions." Probably the
Congress had no precise notion of what these concepts meant except as loose
terms referring to certain well known forms of doing business.
68. See text accompanying note 73 infra.
69. Ch. 209, 47 Stat. 169.
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(3) The term "partnership" includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint
venture, or other unincorporated organization, through or by means
of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on,
and which is not, within the meaning of this Act, a trust or estate or
a corporation; and the term "partner" includes a member in such a
syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or organization.o
This definition is just as circular as ever. Literally, all associa-
tions might be partnerships. The House Ways and Means Com-
mittee Report provides some meaning for the change:
Some confusion has existed over the requirements of the prior acts
as to the time and manner of returning income from the operations of
joint ventures, syndicates, pools, and similar organizations. If the
syndicate was not an association, partnership, or trust within the mean-
ing of the act, there was no express requirement in the act or regula-
tions for the filing of a syndicate return, and the sole responsibility of
making returns of the annual gains and losses of the syndicate was
placed upon the several members. Quite frequently, however, the mem-
bers of such a syndicate overlooked the necessity of their making
returns each year of their shares in the annual gains and losses from
syndicate operations and assumed that they were required only to
make returns of their shares in the ultimate gain or loss from the entire
syndicate operations in the year when the syndicate was wound up or
liquidated. Moreover, a strict observance of the letter of the prior acts
would have required each member to determine his annual share in the
syndicate gains or losses upon the basis of his own accounting period
and according to his own method of accounting, irrespective of the ac-
counting period or method of accounting upon which the books or rec-
ords of the syndicate were kept.
The bill does away with this uncertainty by placing all joint ven-
tures, syndicates, pools, and similar organizations, which do not consti-
tute associations or trusts, in the category of partnerships, and the
members of such syndicates, pools, etc., in the category of partners.
This provision will have the effect of requiring the syndicate to file an
information return similar to the return of a partnership and will thus
make it easier for the members to determine the distributive shares
in the syndicate gains and losses which are to be included in their own
returns. 1
This passage has some significance. Since the term "associa-
tion" appears to have had such a broad meaning, it now appears
a little odd that syndicates and joint ventures then fell in between
the terms "partnership" and "association." Yet the Congress
intended that such groups were not associations. Apparently,
then, an association was either a group calling itself an association,
or one formed under an association statute. The dictionary defi-
70. Section 1111(a)(3), 47 Stat. 289 (1932).
71. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 53 (1932).
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nitions of the time are generally consistent with that approach.
At any rate, the importance of the local law characterization by
mere label is again apparent. But there is no guide for marginal
cases. In all the legislative history the importance of the label
"corporation" is also evident. It was assumed that every business
organization operating under a charter bearing the title "corpora-
tion" is a corporation as that term is used in the various statutes
discussed herein.
B. CURRENT CODE PROVISIONS
The relevant Code sections now provide:
4 7701. Definitions.
(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed
or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof -
(1) Person. The term "person" shall be construed to mean and
include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company,
or corporation.
(2) Partnership and partner. The term "partnership" includes a
syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organiza-
tion, through or by means of which any business, financial operation,
or venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this
title, a trust or estate or a corporation; and the term "partner" includes
a member in such a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or organiza-
tion.
(3) Corporation. The term "corporation" includes associations,
joint-stock companies, and insurance companies.7a
The definitions are still circular. "Corporation" includes "as-
sociations"; a "partnership" is a business which is not a "corpora-
tion" (or an association). But nowhere are there criteria for what
is one or the other.
The dependence on something outside these bare "definitions"
is obvious. It may reasonably be assumed that Congress had little
doubt that local law labels would suffice. In later years, the earlier
drafted sections and "definitions" were merely repeated. Yet the
concept of federal characterization for federal income tax pur-
poses was developing. Now, in the name of that principle, almost
any result is possible.
The legislative history and the early laws do show that corpo-
rations were used mainly to provide limited liability and to give
continuity of life to the business form, at least, and perhaps even
to prevent discontinuity of the business itself. Associations seemed
to have the latter characteristic and usually were businesses calling
themselves "association" or organized under an association statute.
Taking the plain words meaning of the statute and whatever
72. See note 67 supra.
73. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(1)-(3).
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legislative history can be found, the conclusion can be reached
that local law characterization was actually intended. Thus, a
partnership under local law is a partnership, and an association
or a corporation under local law is a corporation, for purposes of
the Code's definitions of those terms. To be sure, the vagueness of
the definition and the lack of criteria made it possible to argue
for another conclusion. If any substantial, relevant, and valid
federal policy requires the use of other criteria, of course they
might be imposed upon the Code's circular structure.
C. OTHER LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Other sections of the Code, and their history, may have some
bearing upon the question of what is a corporation for federal
income tax purposes. A number of requests have been made to
Congress to equalize the benefits of the self-employed and the
employed. These requests have met with varying success.
Subehapter R permits certain unincorporated businesses to
elect to be taxed as corporations.74 This provision supposedly
allows a business "to select the form or organization which is
most suitable to its operations without being influenced by Fed-
eral income-tax consideration."7' This section was enacted with
knowledge that the legal, medical and other professions could not
practice in the corporate form and that this innovation would not
help those groups, for it is limited by its terms to enterprises
which are engaged in certain trading activities or in which "capital
is a material income-producing factor."" The enactment of sub-
chapter R probably indicates nothing of how Congress believes
medical and legal groups should be taxed, except to show aware-
ness that a problem exists. But this awareness has existed for a
long time, and Congress has done nothing one way or the other
directly bearing on section 7701. Even if subehapter R is not
evidence of congressional interest in the problem herein discussed,
it certainly does not preclude interpretation of section 7701(a) (3)
to recognize these professional "associations" and "corporations"
as corporations for federal income tax purposes.
The enactment of subehapter S, 7 providing the option for
certain corporations to elect to pass income and losses through to
74. IN. REV. CODE or 1954, § 1361.
75. S. REP. No. 1622, 88d Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1954).
76. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1361(b)(4). This section is really not much
help for most partnerships, however, since a partner of a firm making an
election under § 1361 cannot be an "employee" for purposes of the various
deferred compensation plans for employees. INT. REV. CODE. OF 1954, §
1361(d).
77. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1871-77.
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the shareholders, was intended to give some taxpayers the option
of using the corporate form without having the disadvantages of
taxation as a corporation. This is another indication of legislative
policy to permit some taxpayers to choose their form for tax pur-
poses, by election.
HR 10, intended to provide some tax benefits to self-employed
individuals adopting a pension or profit sharing plan, is additional
evidence of congressional knowledge of and interest in a slight
reduction of the disparity in treatment of the employees of cor-
porations and the "self-employed." 78
Of course HR 10, subchapter S, and subehapter R did not
wholly eliminate the existing inequities, and, indeed, Congress
did not go as far as requested by those sponsoring the bills. Con-
gress perhaps did not want to grant more relief (which seems
unlikely when one looks at the trend); more likely, considering
the practical problems of seeing legislation through to enactment
(including Treasury sponsored restrictions and often general re-
sistance), it could not do better at the time. Moreover, Congress
was aware, during the discussion and eventual approval on Oc-
tober 16, 1962, of HR 10, that the Kintner Regulations, dis-
cussed below, were in effect, and that over 30 states had passed
laws enabling professionals to organize as associations or corpo-
rations. The enactment of HR 10 shows nothing one way or the
other as to any express congressional intent on the treatment of
these professional associations and corporations. Note, however,
that the Treasury Department could have asked for clarification
of their status through legislation, but apparently did not. This
inaction could indicate that the Treasury was too busy with
other legislation, or it may indicate that the Treasury Depart-
ment thought it would be fighting a losing battle.
All of this recent legislative history, therefore, proves nothing
specific on the particular issue before us. However, the trend of
legislation is to give more options and choices to taxpayers re-
garding the form for taxation and to reduce the disparity in
treatment of taxpayers. If this trend were applied to the question
of taxation of professional associations and corporations, the
answer would be taxation according to whatever form the group
adopts, absent any sham problem.
78. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 72(n), 401(a), 401(c)-(g), 404(a)(8),
404(c), 404(f), 405, 503(j). For an excellent comparison of the tax consequences
of HR 10 and corporate pension and profitsharing plans, see Snyder & Weck-
stein, Quasi-Corporations, Quasi-Employees and Quasi-Tax Relief for Pro-
fessional Persons, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 613, 616-34 (1963).
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D. APPLICATION TO THE MODEL CASES
Application of the plain words of the statute, together with
the available legislative history, leads to the conclusion that all
of the five models should be treated as corporations for federal
income tax purposes, unless some good reason or policy appears
to suggest the contrary. Each model calls itself a corporation or
association and is organized under a corporation or association
act. If some of these acts are not exactly like the business corpo-
rations acts of the states involved, neither are they, in substance
or form, exactly like the partnership provisions. Since no com-
pelling policy reason for one result or the other is apparent from
the statute or its history, taxation of these models as corporations
is appropriate, since local law so characterizes each association
or corporation.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
No case has been found holding that a business organized
under a state corporation law, calling itself a corporation, and
actually operating under that form, should be characterized other
than as a corporation for federal income tax purposes.o
Of the many cases under section 7701, some require careful
examination in this article. But first it would be appropriate to
report the findings of one investigator, Professor Joseph T. Sneed,
on the many cases discussing the classification question under
section 7701 and its predecessor sections. 0 Professor Sneed's
investigation was aimed at the classification problem faced by
the oil and gas industry, but this collection of data is helpful
since it was not limited to cases involving that industry.
Professor Sneed finds certain "universal" facts present in all
the cases holding the organization taxable as an association: (1)
two or more persons or corporations pursued a common object,
79. See Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation:
Some Questions and Comments, 17 TAx L. Rav. 25 (1961).
80. Sneed, More About Associations in the Oil and Gas Industry, 38
TEXAS L. REV. 168 (1954). Professor Sneed's method was to "study the cases,
discover from their facts the ones which recur with the greatest frequency
where it is held that an association exists, and prepare a list of these high-
frequency facts to serve as a kind of yard stick against which doubtful busi-
ness organizations may be measured." Id. at 186. His objective was to find
when an organization bears a substantial resemblance to a corporation. He is
critical of attempts to restrict relevancy by using the fewest possible charac-
teristics which distinguish corporations from other business organizations.
Id. at 185.
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with each having a proprietary interest in whatever was to be
achieved by the organization;"' (2) "the organization's purpose
was to carry on a business for profit";82 (3) the death of the asso-
ciates did not terminate the enterprise and the transfer of an
interest in the organization did not terminate it; 3 and (4) some-
one acted as common agent for those associated in the venture
(centralization of management)." In a few cases the facts were
not clear about termination of the enterprise and in others the
interest could not be transferred. The concept "continuity" as
used in his study refers to the life of the enterprise and not to
technical entity continuity." Although he found these "universal"
facts in the cases where the association classification was found,
he points out that in no case was the existence of all of the above
"universal" facts "alone sufficient to justify association classifi-
cation." 8
Professor Sneed's study revealed that centralization of legal
title was the most frequent of the nonuniversal facts. This cen-
tralization was found in the common agent, trustee, or in "some
sort of entity or group apart from the individual association
members."8 Of 84 cases finding an association, legal title to
property was clearly centralized in 78. "[S]trong arguments can
be made that the equivalent of centralized title existed" in two
cases. No indication was given one way or the other in the remain-
ing four cases. Sneed concluded that centralization of title was
important evidence of association status."
The next most frequent, though nonuniversal, fact was "a
cluster of three corporate-like characteristics all of which point
toward continuity of life and centralization of management."89
The three were: "the existence of a body whose function is analo-
gous to that of a board of directors; the authorization in the agree-
ment to issue, or the issuance of, share certificates; and the exist-
ence of a trade name."90
81. Id. at 187.
82. Id. at 188.
83. Ibid.
84. Id. at 189.
85. Id. at 189 & n.68; see id. at 191.
86. Id. at 189.
87. Id. at 190.
88. Ibid.
89. Id. at 190-91.
90. Id. at 191. Professor Sneed prepared the following table showing the
frequency of these three parts of the "cluster":
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Limited liability arrangements were clearly found in 45 cases;
in four liability clearly was unlimited. In 21 cases the matter was
not mentioned; and in 14 the facts were inconclusive.9' He does
not say what was considered to be limited liability, however.
Professor Sneed rightly points out that the low frequency of this
factor was no surprise since the study was not of corporations but
of associations. Normally, businesses get limited liability only
through a corporate charter.
The other nonuniversal facts he analyzed were managerial
succession, formal records, and formal voting procedure.02
Sneed then analyzed his findings, concluding that among the
universal and nonuniversal facts he described, one could find the
"critical" facts for determining whether an association is present.
He decided that while the presence of all these facts would pro-
duce the classification "association," not all the facts need be
present. He then put the facts he discovered into three groups:
(1) centralization of legal title; (2) limited liability; and (3) all
the other facts - miscellaneous corporate characteristics. 3 In
some cases the presence of either centralization of title or limited
liability alone was enough to produce the association classifica-
tion. Therefore, he argued that the combination of either (1) or
(2) with half of the six characteristics under (3) would be an even
more compelling case for classification as association. He carried
his frequency analysis further: "Of the 84 cases examined, only
23 involved organizations which did not have either: (1) both
centralization of title and limited liability, or (2) at least three
of the six miscellaneous corporate characteristics and either cen-
tralization of title or limited liability." 4 However, no case was
found holding the presence of all six of the miscellaneous corpo-
Present Not Present No Indication Uncertain
Board of Directors
or Equivalent 55 15 6 8
Share Certificate 50 28 5 6
Trade Name 48 18 14 6
91. Ibid.
92. Id. at 191-92. He prepared the following table:
Not No
Present Present Indication Uncertain
Managerial Succession 42 4 21 17
Formal Records 20 23 29 12
Formal Voting Procedure 18 20 23 13
93. Id. at 192.
94. Ibid.
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rate characteristics group to be sufficient to create an association.o
As Professor Sneed's study suggests, the courts have been con-
cerned with examining various characteristics and on the basis
of finding certain characteristics, or the lack of them, have made
their characterizations accordingly. The criteria shift somewhat
from case to case, with a court often merely mentioning and dis-
cussing some of the various "facts" and not always examining
them in much depth. Professor Sneed's approach was to find the
facts which occurred most frequently and to conclude that these
facts would be consistent with, or perhaps require, classification
as an association. He did not seek to find the critical facts for
classification as a partnership.
Before considering significant, specific cases, a few more gen-
eralizations can be made. The courts normally cite the regulations
and apply loosely whatever guidance the regulations give. Fur-
ther, the courts seem to pay a lot of attention to the arrangement
among the parties. Lastly, many of the cases deal with trusts
engaging in business. The significance of trust cases will be dis-
cussed more fully below in connection with Morrissey v. Com-
missioner.9" However, the trust was early recognized as a form
for doing business and from the beginning the feeling was that
these organizations should be taxed as associations. Most of the
trust cases turn on whether or not the trust was engaged in busi-
ness, and not so much on whether the criteria of an association
call for a determination of taxation as an association; nevertheless,
recitals of the criteria specified in the regulations appear. Gener-
ally, or perhaps universally, the analysis in the cases is most
superficial.
A. THE MoRRIssEY CASE
Morrissey is the leading Supreme Court case on the issue of
what is an association. The petitioners were trustees of a trust
which owned some land in the City of Los Angeles. The trustees
set up the trust, which sold beneficial interests in the trust evi-
denced by certificates or shares. Exclusive management power
was vested in the trustees who might call a meeting of share-
holders to give a report, but any votes or recommendations of
the shareholders were to be advisory only. The trust was to con-
tinue for 25 years, but was not to end upon the death of a bene-
ficiary or trustee. 7 Under the trust terms, the trustees were said
95. Ibid.
96. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
97. Id. at 347-48.
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to have no power to bind the beneficiaries by "any act, neglect
or default ... ." Any indemnity to a third person or even a bene-
ficiary was to come from trust property only, according to the
trust instrument."" The trust subdivided one-third of the land
and sold it, mostly on installment sales. The trust also had some
activities in operating a golf course on the land.
The Commissioner argued that all business trusts should be
taxed as associations and that this was a business trust, dis-
tinguishing a trust which merely collects rent or engages in modest
activity to liquidate trust property." The taxpayer asserted two
opposing arguments: First, that no association existed unless the
beneficiary had some voice or control over the activities of the
trust; and second, that the trust was not carrying on a business. 00
As to the second argument the Court concluded that the trust was
carrying on a business.1ox
The taxpayer's first argument grew out of an early Supreme
Court decision, Crocker v. Malley.10 2 That case involved the
revenue act of 1913, which imposed a tax on the net income
of "every corporation, joint-stock company or association, and
every insurance company, organized in the United States, no
matter how created or organized, not including partnerships." 03
The Court took the position that the statute was not intended
to include a trust when the beneficiaries were not partners and
had "no joint action or interest and no control over the fund." 04
The Treasury Department thereupon assumed that classification
of a trust as an "association" depended upon the degree of control
given the beneficiaries over the trust management.'
The Morrissey Court rejected this argument by the peti-
tioner,06 pointing to the Court's broader reading of the word
"association" in Hecht v. Malley.'07 That case found that Con-
gress extended the term from covering only organizations organ-
98. Id. at 347.
99. Id. at 349.
100. Id. at 348-49.
101. Id. at 361.
102. 249 U.S. 223 (1919).
103. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II. G(a), 38 Stat. 172 (1913); see text ac-
companying notes 51-56 supra.
104. 249 U.S. at 233-34.
105. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1504 (1920 ed. 1921): "If, however, the cestuis que
trust have a voice in the conduct of the business of the trust, whether through
the right periodically to elect trustees or otherwise, the trust is an association
within the meaning of the statute."
106. 296 U.S. at 351-54.
107. 265 U.S. 144 (1924).
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ized as associations under statutes "to include also organizations
exercising the privilege of doing business as associations at the
common law."'es The earlier, more restrictive reading - busi-
nesses organized under state laws providing for associations -
derived from the use of the words "organized under the laws of
the United States," in the 1909 and 1916 acts.' The 1918 act
omitted these words and the Court accordingly concluded that
a broader definition of "association" should be found - one in-
cluding common law associations as well as those founded in
statute."0o The Court further relied upon broad dictionary defi-
nitions."' The issue of beneficiary control was raised, although
not so clearly, in the Hecht case and was decided against the
trustees."2 Thereafter, the Treasury amended its regulation to
eliminate beneficiary control as a distinction between a trust and
an association."xs
The Court in Morrissey said that the Treasury was entitled
to some leeway in promulgating rules defining the content of the
word association:
As the statute merely provided that the term "corporation" should
include "associations," without further definition, the Treasury De-
partment was authorized to supply rules for the enforcement of the Act
within the permissible bounds of administrative construction. Nor can
this authority be deemed to be so restricted that the regulations, once
issued, could not later be clarified or enlarged so as to meet adminis-
trative exigencies or conform to judicial decision.14
The Court held that the Treasury acted reasonably in changing
its regulation in the wake of the decision in Hecht v. Malley to
take account of the broadened concept of "association" adopted
by the Supreme Court in that case."' The Court did not define
what "administrative exigencies" might also justify a change in
regulations, however.
In analyzing the meaning of "association," the Court pointed
out that "association" implies "associates," or a "common effort
. . . for the conduct of a business enterprise."1 e It found that
while the ordinary trust to hold and conserve property, with some
108. Id. at 155.
109. Id. at 154-55.
110. Ibid.
111. Id. at 157; see note 67 supra.
112. 265 U.S. at 147-48, 158-61.
113. Treas. Reg. 65, arts. 1502, 1504 (1924).
114. 296 U.S. at 854-55.
115. Id. at 355.
116. Id. at 856-57.
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incidental powers, lacks this characteristic of entering into a joint
enterprise, the business trust has as its object the "conduct of a
business and sharing its gains," thus satisfying the term associa-
tion in a broad sense." 7
The Court then proceeded to refine its concept of association
somewhat, to develop criteria for this classification, and to apply
them to the facts of the case. After repeating that the term asso-
ciation means both a business organized under a statute and one
existing at common law,118 the Court enunciated a general test of
resemblance: "The inclusion of associations with corporations
implies resemblance; but it is resemblance and not identity. The
resemblance points to features distinguishing associations from
partnerships as well as from ordinary trusts.""' Next the Court
discussed the importance of corporate forms as conclusive evi-
dence of corporateness: "While the use of corporate forms may
furnish persuasive evidence of the existence of an association,
the absence of particular forms, or of the usual terminology of
corporations, cannot be regarded as decisive."o20 Thus, the use
of the usual terms for and forms of a corporation may suggest or
compel classification as an association; moreover, a trustee may
function as a director, and the trust instrument may serve as
bylaws.'2 '
Next, in the paragraph of the decision most quoted and cited,
the Morrissey Court turned to question, "what, then, are the
salient features of a trust - when created and maintained as a
medium for the carrying on of a business enterprise and sharing
its gains - which may be regarded as making it analogous to a
corporate organization?"122
1. Title
The corporation holds title to the property of the corporation
and the title is not affected by changes in the owners of the cor-
poration. Similarly, trustees provide the same advantage for the
trust, at least during the term of its existence. Although trustees
may change or die, a title-holding mechanism similar to that of
the corporation is found in a provision for succession of trustees. 23
117. Ibid.
118. Id. at 357-58.
119. Id. at 357.
120. Id. at 358.
121. Ibid.
122. Id. at 359.
123. Ibid.
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This characteristic was very prominent in Professor Sneed's fre-
quency study of the cases.
2. Centralized Management
"Corporate organization furnishes the opportunity for a cen-
tralized management through representatives of the members
of the corporation." 24 In the Morrissey situation, the "designation
of trustees" to conduct the business of the trust provided a "simi-
lar scheme, with corresponding effectiveness." 25 Thus the use of
trustees to handle the affairs of the trust business is similar to
the formal corporate structure of shareholders, board of directors,
and officers. The Court did not think it important that the
trustees in this case, or any case, were named in the trust instru-
ment, had power to select their own successors, and therefore
were self-perpetuating; nor did power in the beneficiaries over
selection and tenure of trustees prevent the similarity to the cor-
poration. The Court found the trustee arrangement to be "analo-
gous to that of corporate activities." 2 6
S. Security From Interruption of the Enterprise
The Court found that a corporation is also characteristically
"secure from termination or interruption by the death of owners
of beneficial interests." 2 7 The Court referred to partnerships as
distinguishable in this respect, but found a trust similar to a cor-
poration, since it need not be terminated or subjected to the
problems of a partnership when a beneficial owner dies, or sells
out to a third party.
4. Transfer of Beneficial Interests Facilitated
The Court stated that the corporate form of doing business
"facilitates . . . the transfer of beneficial . . . interests without
affecting the continunity of the enterprise," and also facilitates
"the introduction of large numbers of participants." 2 8 The trust
type of organization was found to have the same characteristic or
advantage. Certainly, the large number of transferable certificates










The Court found that a trust resembled a corporation because
"the trust method also permits the limitation of the personal
liability of participants to the property embarked in the under-
taking."3 o
The Court, applying the above principles, found similarity
or resemblance to a corporation on all counts and, therefore, con-
cluded that the trust arrangement was an association.' The
case does not seem very startling at this late date. Substantial
resemblance is shown between a corporation and the Morrissey
trust arrangement, both in operation and structure. In spite of
shunning the corporation label, the arrangement properly could
be characterized as an association.
A few observations might be in order, however. (1) The Court
was faced with a situation in which the Commissioner wanted
the organization to be classified as an association or corporation.
Since the Court found similarity or resemblance on each point
examined, it had no occasion to comment upon the relative weight
of each point in its decision. (2) While the decision followed the
regulations and gave what has been thought to be a broad charter
to the Treasury with respect to regulations on this question, in
fact the Court's opinion only recognized a regulation that was
altered because of a change in the law through an interpretation
of a statutory change. The Court also recognized that changes
might be made for administrative exigencies, but did not provide
an analysis of what it considered to be proper exigencies. (3) The
Court put considerable stress upon the arrangement as established
in the trust instrument, with certain local law consequences. For
instance, the Court did not look to how the organization operated
in fact on the question of centralized management, but referred
only to the structural arrangement. All of these factors tend to
limit the case somewhat from the rather broad generalizations
found in the opinion.
Note also that the centralization of management criterion is
somewhat limited by companion cases to Morrissey. Swanson v.
Commissioner82 involved the tax characterization of a trust which
owned and operated an apartment house. The beneficial interests
were called "receipts," and were assignable. Two of the three
trustees were the actual beneficiaries and consequently there was
no centralization of management in fact, although the trust in-
130. Id. at 359.
131. Id. at 360.
182. 296 U.S. 862 (1935).
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strument provided that the trustees were to have "complete man-
agement and control of the property."' 3 The Court held the
arrangement taxable as an association: "The limited number of
actual beneficiaries did not alter the nature and purpose of the
common undertaking."'"
Likewise, Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates"M limited
the Morrissey concept of centralized management. In Coleman
three men and the wives of two of them owned real property -
20 apartment houses. They conveyed the properties to themselves
in trust for a period of 15 years. The trustees were given full man-
agement powers and the beneficiaries (who apparently were also
the persons who were trustees) were to have no power. Limited
liability was asserted by the trust instrument. 36 The Court found
an association based upon the Morrissey principle: "The small
number of persons in the trust now before us does not present a
difference in the legal aspect of their enterprise from the stand-
point of the statutory classification."' 37 The Court found central-
ization in the agreement; and the fact that the trustees did not
meet, vote, or keep records, and continued operating exactly as
before, was considered immaterial. 33
Apparently, therefore, the facts on the number and identity
of beneficiaries had no relevance. At least the opinion in the
Coleman case seems to go that far, and the holding of Swanson
implies that the number of trustees and owners and the identity
of each has no relevance to centralization of management.
The Supreme Court's reference in Morrissey to the trust or
corporation form providing security from termination of the enter-
prise also needs some limitation. Obviously, the termination or
continuity of the business enterprise in any meaningful sense in
the business world is a state of fact which has almost nothing to
do with the form of business adopted. Today, and probably at
the time of the Court's decision, no reason exists why any business
operated by a partnership, corporation, or trust would have its
enterprise continuity interrupted by the death, withdrawal, etc.
of a partner, shareholder, or beneficiary.
To be sure, the rights and duties of the parties to the arrange-
ment differ somewhat depending upon whether the arrangement
is a partnership, trust, or corporation. A shareholder, or his estate,
188. Id. at 863.
134. Id. at 365.
135. 296 U.S. 369 (1935).
136. Id. at 370-72.
137. Id. at 872.
138. Id. at 373.
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is left to the uncertain remedy of a shareholder's derivative suit
to determine his rights,' and this rarely could terminate the
enterprise. The trust beneficiary has extensive remedies against
the trustee,'4 0 and is thought to be entitled to a high standard of
care by him.' 4 ' Probably these elements distinguish the trust and
the corporation somewhat, but they are in the same category for
this tax purpose. Similarly, the partner has certain powers of
dissolution and a right to an accounting, 42 but his death or with-
drawal normally would not cause termination of the enterprise
as such, if the articles of partnership provide for continuation.43
Furthermore, the death or withdrawal of a partner causes no ter-
mination of the entity for tax purposes. 44 A technical dissolution
under local law of the old partnership entity and the creation of
a new partnership takes place on such an occasion.145 But it is
difficult to see much of an advantage in using the corporate form
to avoid this, or that continuity is a characteristic of a corpora-
tion in any real, as opposed to merely formal, sense. It is espe-
cially difficult to see that the trust provides better continuity
than the partnership except in the most technical, and seemingly
irrelevant, sense. Clearly, however, the Supreme Court must have
referred to the avoidance of "dissolution" under local law on the
occasions of change in beneficial interests, in adopting and apply-
ing the continuity test.
Finally, the Court's adoption and application of the limited
liability criterion needs some clarification. Limited liability obvi-
ously is a characteristic of most corporations; 4 but it is not
apparent that trusts which are engaged in business can provide
this protection generally for the beneficial owners. A trust en-
139. See, e.g., BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 143-57a (rev. ed. 1946);
HENN, CORPORATIONS §§ 352-83 (1961); LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 346-93 (1959);
STEVENS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONs §H 167-74 (2d ed. 1949).
140. See 2 ScoTT, TRuSTS §§ 197-226.1 (2d ed. 1956, Supp. 1964).
141. Id. § 174.
142. See, e.g., MiNu. STAT. § 323.21 (1961); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
143. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 323.29, .40 (1961); UNFoar PARTNERSHIP
ACT §§ 30, 41-42.
144. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 706(c)(1) provides:
Except in the case of a termination of a partnership and except as
provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the taxable year of a part-
nership shall not close as the result of the death of a partner, the entry
of a new partner, the liquidation of a partner's interest in the partner-
ship, or the sale or exchange of a partner's interest in the partnership.
145. See, e.g., MIN. STAT. § 323.30 (1961); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT§ 31.
146. See, e.g., MNN. STAT. § 300.27 (1961).
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gaged in business will not provide limited liability for the bene-
ficial owners when the owners control the selection or exercise
of the duties of the trustee. 4 7 In that event, the clear agency
relationship will carry liability through to the beneficiaries. This
agency might be expressed in the trust arrangement, or implied
from the operation of the trust and the actual relationship of
the trust to the beneficial owners. 4 8 The liability of trusts and
trustees differs in some other ways from that of a corporation and
its officers. If either a trustee or a corporate officer commits a
tort, he will be personally liable for damages, nothwithstanding
the tort is committed in the course of the business of the trust
or corporation'4  If a tort is committed which is not due to the
personal act of the corporate officer, he will, of course, not be
liable for the damages personally.5 0 The trustee is not so lucky,
however. He will be liable personally for a tort committed in the
trust business even though he did not commit it.'' For this rea-
son, one would not be surprised to find a provision in a trust
instrument providing for reimbursement of the trustee by the
beneficial owners. In contract matters, the trustee avoids per-
sonal liability only when the contract relieves him of personal
liability; he is not treated the same as the corporate officer even
when he makes it clear that he acts on behalf of the trust as
trustee.5 2 Therefore, the limited liability provided by trusts differs
somewhat from the limited liability provided by corporations.
In the Morrissey case the beneficial owners had no control
over the selection, tenure, and actions of the trustee. Perhaps,
therefore, no agency relationship was established so that the
beneficial owners may have had actual, not just asserted, limited
liability' In some states, however, it has been claimed that the
beneficial owners of a business trust would be liable personally
for trust obligations even though they have no control over the
action of the trust. "The basis for imposing liability is that the
use of the trust as a substitute for the corporate device is against
147. BOGERT, 'TUsTS AND TRUSTEES § 294 (2d ed. 1964); 3 Scor, op. cit.
supra note 140, § 274.1.
148. Id. § 274.
149. BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 189, § 112; BOGERT, op. cit. smpra
note 147, § 800; 3 Scor, op. cit. supra note 140, § 276.
150. BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 139, § 112.
151. 3 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 140, § 264.
152. BOGERT, op. cit. 8upra note 147, § 300; 3 SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 140,
§ 262.
153. See 296 U.S. at 347, 358.




public policy, as tending to evade the policy of the law against
limited liability without incorporation."155
While the Court may have been justified in finding limited
liability in the Morrissey case, in many or most business trust
situations, limited liability would not obtain. Furthermore, any
actual, as opposed to asserted, limited liability in the Swanson
and Coleman cases, the companion cases to Morrissey, is question-
able. In Swanson two of the three trustees were the beneficial
owners (as well as the settlors)"'5 and in Coleman apparently the
five settlors were also trustees and beneficiaries.157 It would not
be hard to find agency implied on those facts, and if agency could
be implied there probably would be no limited liability.
Limited liability, therefore, appears to be a slender reed sup-
porting classification of business trusts generally as associations.
Furthermore, the facts of Swanson and Coleman raise the ques-
tion whether actual, rather than only asserted, limited liability
mattered, in terms of the ultimate result.
B. THE PELTON CASE
The case of Pelton v. Commissioner"" concerned the tax classi-
fication of a medical clinic in Illinois. In that case the Commis-
sioner contended that the arrangement was an association, and
the doctors resisted that contention. The business, or medical
practice, was organized as a trust with the beneficial owners as
trustees. A majority of the beneficial owners could alter the ar-
rangement. The trust shares were to be transferable, but the
income of each doctor was determined on the basis of earning
capacity and not upon property contributed.59
The court concluded that the arrangement was an association,
under the Morrissey case and the regulations. The taxpayers had
argued that they could not be an association under local law
since the linois Supreme Court had held that a corporation
could not practice medicine in Illinois, and therefore the clinic
must be a trust or a partnership. The court did not comment on
the logical gap in the taxpayers' argument, but only said that
the organization could be an association under the internal
revenue laws even though technically a partnership under local
law.160
155. 3 Scorr, op. cit. supra note 140, § 274, at 2114.
156. See notes 132-34 mpra and accompanying text.
157. See notes 135-38 supra and accompanying text.
158. 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
159. Id. at 474-75.
160. Id. at 476.
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The questions about centralization of management and limited
liability can be raised again with respect to this case. However,
the court found association status in spite of the small number
of beneficial owners and what appears to be no more than an
assertion of limited liability.'o'
C. THE KINTNER CASE
The now famous case of United States v. Kintnere2 involved a
medical group who executed what they called "articles of associa-
tion" in 1948. Under the terms of the articles, the association was
to continue until the death of the last of the survivors of the
original eight member doctors. The association could be dissolved
by a three-fourths vote of all senior members. Only physicians or
surgeons licensed to practice in Montana were eligible for admis-
sion to membership, but the beneficial interests in the association
were nonassignable. The death or retirement of a member was
not to cause dissolution of the association' 3 An executive com-
mittee of five was to manage the major business of the associa-
tion generally and to fix salaries. Officers chosen by the executive
committee took care of minor details of management.'64 A doctor
employed by the clinic was subject to certain requirements: his
salary was fixed by the executive committee - with no relation-
ship to the number of patients he had or the fees they paid; the
association controlled the hours and place of his employment,
and his vacations; the details of his professional performance, of
course, were not controlled closely; the doctor was limited as to
the fields of medicine in which he could work; and to some extent
patients were selected for the doctor. The control of doctors by
the association was the same, whether older or younger, whether
members of the association or nonmember employees. The clinic
had 38 employees, medical and nonmedical.e 5
The district court did not discuss the issue of limited liability
except to observe that on this point the clinic "more closely re-
sembles a partnership than a corporation."e 6 The opinion of the
161. Apparently the only beneficial owners were also the trustees. Id. at
474. The taxpayers argued to the Seventh Circuit that they had the liability
of partners, but the trust indenture stated that the trustees were not to be
liable in a personal capacity. Id. at 474-75.
162. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), affirming 107 F. Supp. 976 (D. Mont.
1952).
168. Id. at 420.
164. Ibid.
165. Id. at 420-21.
166. 107 F. Supp. at 979.
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court of appeals, affirming the district court's decision, includes
the information that "only the members were to be liable to third
parties for professional misconduct."e7 What that means is not
clear. A note in the Harvard Law Review states that the group
agreed that no member would be liable for another's professional
misconduct.0 8 Perhaps the court meant to say that "only the
member committing misconduct was to be liable for professional
misconduct." Later in the opinion it is said:
Although the Articles of Association disclaim liability to others for
the negligence or lack of skill of the doctors, the Association which con-
tracts with the patients and receives his fees would be responsible direct
[sic] to the patient, even assuming that under the law of joint tort-
feasors the doctors also might be held liable. For, in the last analysis,
the patient deals with doctor and clinic. The authorities recognize joint
and several liability resulting from the concurrent practice of medicine,
whether in association, partnership or otherwise... . It -follows that the
non-liability clause does not stand in the way of considering the associa-
tion before us a corporation ... 139
The court certainly is confusing in this section. Apparently, lim-
ited liability was asserted, although not found, by the court.
Since the laws of Montana precluded the doctors from practic-
ing medicine under the form of a corporation, the Commissioner
argued that Mobile Bar Pilots Ass'n v. Commissioner, holding
that no association would be recognized and service income would
be taxed directly to the pilots, applied. 70 The court distinguished
that case by pointing out that the clinic situation was not similar
to the Pilots situation, since "it would be impossible for petitioner
to engage in the business of piloting as an independent con-
tractor." 71
The Government's other contentions were met with quotations
from Supreme Court cases or the regulations, including the fol-
lowing:
"The term 'association' is not used in the Internal Revenue Code
in any narrow or technical sense. . . . It is immaterial whether such
organization is created by an agreement, a declaration of trust, a
statute, or otherwise. . . ."172
". . . . If an organization is not interrupted by the death of a member
or by a change in ownership of a participating interest during the
agreed period of its existence, and its management is centralized in one
167. 216 F.2d at 420. (Court's italics.)
168. Note, 75 HIAnv. L. REv. 776, 778 (1962).
169. 216 F.2d at 424.
170. 97 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1938).
171. 216 F.2d at 428-24.
172. Id. at 428 (quoting from Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.3797-2 (1948)).
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or more persons in their representative capacities, such an organization
is an association, taxable as a corporation." 73
The Kintner case is significant for several reasons. The Uni-
form Partnership Act was part of Montana law at the time the
case arose, and this arrangement probably constituted a partner-
ship under local law." The court thought local law should not
control, however, and sought to apply the federal definition of
association found in the regulations. Thus, although the clinic
may have been a partnership for most or all purposes under local
law, the parties had given the arrangement such characteristics
by agreement to classify it as an association for federal tax law
purposes.
This case also marks the point where the taxpayer successfully
turned against the Commissioner the earlier cases seeking to
classify doubtful cases as associations, and the regulations point-
ing in the same direction. The taxpayer won, in other words, a
battle which the Commissioner normally pressed; the revenue
and consideration had switched, and so had the arguments of the
parties.
The case has great significance on most of the criteria men-
tioned by the Court in the Morrissey case. First, there was cen-
tralization of management; but not necessarily any more than
a partnership might have acheived in fact, or perhaps no more
than it might achieve by agreement. The court was persuaded
by the arrangement which subjected all to control by the group.
Second, the probable lack of the asserted limited liability also
seems significant. The court's opinion is not clear on this issue,
or even on what it meant by limited liability. But it concluded
that whatever liability or nonliability there was did not prevent
classification as an association. In other words, perhaps the court
found an association even if liability were unlimited. Third, the
continuity of life provisions were unusual, since the term was
limited to the last survivor of the original group of eight member
doctors, but this was sufficient continuity of life to satisfy the
court.
178. Ibid. (quoting from Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.8797-4 (1948)).
174. Id. at 425-26: "The taxpayer concedes that the association is prob-
ably a partnership under Montana state law." See also Smith, The Kintner
Problem, in Proceedings, Third Annual Montana Tax School 39-40 (Mimeo.
1955): "The former partners (who still remain partners under State law) are
employees of the Association and as such may qualify for pension trust bene-
fits.... The burdens of corporate form are all present and at the same time
many of the disadvantages of the partnership form (since the organization is
of necessity a partnership under State law) are likewise present." Mr. Smith
represented the taxpayers in the Kintner case.
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This case was hailed as a great victory for the taxpayers. The
response of the Commissioner to this decision was to amend his
regulations with the so-called "Kintner Regulations," under
which probably even the Kintner group would not be classified
as an association. These regulations will be discussed in the next
section of this article.
D. THE GALT CAsE
Galt v. United States75 was a victory by some Texas doctors
who had adopted the form of an association for their medical
practice. The facts are similar to Kintner - the association had
a board of directors and an executive committee. The executive
committee played a substantial role in many decisions - salary,
fiscal affairs, hours of work, vacations, travel, complaints, conflicts
between doctors, and hiring of doctors. The clinic was depart-
mentalized and each doctor was limited to practice in his depart-
ment. Patients were assigned to doctors and the doctor could
not refuse a patient assigned. The court said, "The associates also
accept full control over their activity and professional work by
the Association, except only for the privilege of confidential com-
munications with a patient."" The court did not explain what
control over professional work was exercised by the association.
Ownership in the association could be transferred, but the associa-
tion and the associates would have a first option to buy at the
offering price. 77
The court concluded that the association provided centraliza-
tion of title, centralization of management, continuity of the or-
ganization, transferability of membership, and limited liability 7"
and therefore it met all the tests of an association under the regu-
lations. To the court, the simple controlling proposition was "that
an association couched in language similar to the language of a
charter of a corporation should be treated for tax purposes in the
same manner that the corporation is treated."'7 How this associa-
tion provided limited liability is difficult to see, although it clearly
adopted the other forms of a corporation short of a charter. Part
of the findings of fact was that "under the Articles, the associates
do not become liable for the indebtedness of the Association or
175. 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959). A complete version of the findings
of fact appears in 59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 73513. The Government's appeal was
dismissed on stipulation of the parties. 257 F.2d 811 (8th Cir. 1958).
176. 59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 73516.
177. Id. at 73515.
178. Id. at 73516-17.
179. 175 F. Supp. at 362.
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of any other associate until the assets of the Association and of
the defaulting associate have been used in full to reduce the in-
debtedness."s 0 That arrangement does not even assert limited
liability, and nothing more is stated about limited liability except
for the conclusion that this association had it. One must therefore
assume that this is an organization without limited liability yet
classified as an association for tax purposes.
E. THE FoREVEN CASE
Foreman v. United States'8' is another medical clinic case. Two
Florida orthopedists formed an association in 1960 using articles
similar to typical articles of incorporation. The association was
to continue in perpetuity. The business of the association was to
be managed by a board of governors who determined the salaries,
hours, working conditions, and vacations of the doctors. Owner-
ship interests in the association were transferable, but the associa-
tion and other associates had a first option. The articles provided
that death, resignation, insolvency, bankruptcy, removal, or re-
tirement of an associate should not cause dissolution.82 Later that
year an agreement was signed with a third doctor providing five
years employment and transfer of ownership interests gradually
to him.1's
The court found that the facts of the case met the criteria of
centralized management, continuity of life, and transferability
of interests more strongly than the facts in Kintner or Galt."4
It is difficult to see how there could have been more centralized
management than in Kintner. In the Foreman case there was no
centralized management in fact; only the formal structure could
provide it in any sense. Obviously, the court was referring to the
structure providing centralized management, rather than actual
centralized management. However, why this structure provided
more centralized management than the Kintner structure is un-
clear. The clinic in the Foreman case probably had more con-
tinuity of life in the formal sense; the life in Kintner was limited
to the life of the survivor of the original eight members, whereas
in Foreman it was perpetual. In addition, since interests were
not transferable in Kintner, Foreman obviously had more formal
transferability through the first option arrangement.
The court observed that there was no limited liability in
180. 59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 73516.
181. 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
182. Id. at 134 n.1.
183. Id. at 135.
184. Id. at 136.
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Kintner, Galt, or Foreman.""9 The court rejected, on grounds of
uniformity from state to state, the Government's argument that
this association could not resemble a corporation since doctors
could not legally form a corporation in Florida.180 The court also
rejected the Government's argument that Mobile Bar Pilots Ass'n
v. Commissioner87 was controlling."8 The Government made,
according to the court, an argument contending that the associa-
tion did "not earn the kind of income normally earned by a cor-
poration," since its income came from personal services primarily.
The court replied:
The fallacy of this argument is readily apparent when one considers
the large number of corporations presently existing in our economy
whose primary income is earned solely from the personal services of
their employees. The corporate tax status of businesses engaged in ad-
vertising or promotion, investigation, sales, contract janitorial or secre-
tarial service, to name a few, has not been seriously questioned to the
Court's knowledge.189
On a factual basis, it is hard to find centralization of man-
agement, continuity of life, and transferability of interests on the
facts of the Foreman case; the only basis for saying that these
characteristics are present is to rely upon the formal, legal struc-
ture adopted by the group. That structure apparently provides
those characteristics, no matter how doubtful it may be that
the group actually has such characteristics.
F. THE CASES APPLIED TO THE MODELS OR HYPOTHETICAL SITU-
ATIONS
1. Professional Association
Referring to the various factors subjected to the frequency
analysis by Professor Sneed, the "universal" facts present in all
the cases holding the organization taxable as an association are
present in the model professional association too: (a) two or
more persons pursue a common object; (b) the objective is to
carry on a business for profit; (c) the death of associates does not
terminate the enterprise (in this respect the Georgia professional
association certainly is stronger than the Kintner association);o90
(d) the transfer of an interest in the organization does not ter-
185. Ibid.
186. Ibid.
187. 97 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1988).
188. 282 F. Supp. at 186-37.
189. Id. at 137.




minate it; and (e) someone acts as common agent of those asso-
ciated in the venture.19 Furthermore, the nonuniversal facts are
present: (a) some sort of entity apart from the members; (b)
clearly centralized legal title; (c) a body analogous to a board
of directors; (d) authority to issue shares; (e) a trade name; and
also, apparently, (f) limited liability.192 How much limited liability
is questionable; but liability is clearly limited in contract matters,
and probably substantially limited in matters of professional
conduct.es Managerial succession, formal records, and formal
voting procedures could also be present.e4
Some questions have been raised about the presence of cen-
tralized management in the case of a professional association.e 5
If the cases are any guide, these associations clearly have central-
ized management. Only in the Galt case is there even a recital of
control over professional decisions.e" Certainly, more centralized
management is present in fact with a larger medical group than
in the Swanson,'17 Coleman,'98 and Foreman"' cases. Further-
more, all the cases seem to say that centralization in fact is not
even considered, but only the structure which provides for a
board of directors making certain decisionsFoo That the board of
directors is composed of a number which is not less than the
number of owners did not seem to matter at all in Swanson, Cole-
man and Foreman.
The existence of continuity of business for such groups has
also been questioned, since they are subject to proceedings for
dissolutionY' One answer is that all corporations are thus sub-
ject, more or less 02 No indication is given in any of the cases
191. See Sneed, More About Associations in the Oil and Gas Industry, 33
TExAs L. REv. 168, 187-89 (1954); text accompanying notes 81-84 supra.
192. See Sneed, supra note 191, at 189-91; text accompanying notes 87-91
Supra.
193. See notes 395-403 infra and accompanying text.
194. Note 92 supra and accompanying text.
195. Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation:
Some Questions and Comments, 17 TAx L. Rxv. 1, 8-13 (1961).
196. Note 176 supra and accompanying text.
197. 296 U.S. at 363; see text accompanying notes 132-34 supra (two of
three trustees were the beneficial owners).
198. 296 U.S. at 370-72; see text accompanying notes 135-37 supra (the
three men and their wives were the trustees and beneficial owners).
199. 232 F. Supp. at 134-35; see text accompanying notes 181-83 supra
(three doctors, three owners).
200. In each case the court talked about the structure and seemed un-
concerned about the actual facts of centralized management.
201. Bittker, supra note 195, at 15-17.
202. See notes 372-73 infra and accompanying text.
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that it matters whether this subjection is more or less. Another
answer is that the early legislative history and cases talk rather
about avoiding discontinuity in the event of death or resignation
of a member.2 o Clearly, the structure of the Georgia professional
association provides that.20 4 Furthermore, Sneed's analysis does
not even rest upon strict entity continuity, but rather upon enter-
prise continunity.2 05 That sort of continuity can be achieved even
by a partnership, and clearly these associations have continuity
to a much greater extent 0
These associations can have only doctors as beneficial owners,
and the association may place certain restrictions upon the trans-
fer of shares. These factors have been cited as reasons suggesting
a lack of the required transferability of interesto 7 An association
was found in the Kintner case even though the shares could not
be assigned2 08 Sneed's analysis does not mention restrictions on
share transfers; he refers to the authority to issue shares, and
certainly that is present in the professional associationo0 Also,
whether restricted or not (note that the shares in Foreman were
"transferable" even though subject to a first option),""o the gen-
eral structure of these associations would make transferability of
beneficial interest easier than for interests in the typical partner-
ship. Under this heading Morrissey talks about the arrangement
facilitating "the transfer of beneficial interests without affecting
the continuity of the enterprises, and also [facilitating] the intro-
duction of large numbers of participants."' That the association
facilitates transfers without discontinuity resulting can hardly be
questioned; the possibility of having a large number of partici-
pants introduced also seems evident. A look at Swanson, Coleman,
and Foreman should also serve to convince one that the actual
number of participants does not seem to be a factor weighed
heavily, if at all.
The limited liability characteristic of these professional associa-
tions has been questioned as a result of the vague wording of part
203. See notes 46 & 127 supra and accompanying text.
204. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
205. See notes 83 & 85 supra and accompanying text.
206. For example, compare the continuity of the professional association
which may be perpetual, with that of the Kintner group. The group was, by
the terms of the articles, to exist only until the death of the survivor of the
original members. 216 F.2d at 420.
207. Bittker, supra note 195, at 17-21.
208. Note 163 supra and accompanying text.
209. Note 90 supra and accompanying text.
210. 232 F. Supp. at 134 n.1; see text accompanying note 182 supra.
211. 296 U.S. at 359; see text accompanying note 128 supra.
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of the enabling statute2 12 Most probably, however, they have
substantial limited liability, much greater than that of a partner-
ship in any event. Furthermore, if there is any dilution of limited
liability, it is not great. 213 Consequently, this factor seems to be
present.
These associations, therefore, appear to have the characteristics
discussed in Morrissey and the other cases to a high degree. As
much centralization of management and continuity of business
is found as in any of the cases discussed herein; certainly there
are shares and they may be transferred more easily than the
Kintner shares, and one might suspect, the Swanson and Coleman
shares, too. Finally, there appears to be more limited liability
than in Swanson, Pelton, Galt, Kintner, or Foreman. Applying
Sneed's frequency analysis, the presence of centralization of legal
title plus the miscellaneous corporate characteristics (board of
directors, etc.) is sufficient to find association status. Further,
limited liability plus the miscellaneous corporate characteristics
would be sufficient. Therefore, applying these tests, the profes-
sional association clearly is an association.
2. Professional Corporation
The case for an association here is even stronger. Much less
question, if any, is raised about the characteristic of limited liabil-
ity. The Minnesota statute originally had the same ambiguity
as the Georgia statute. As originally enacted in 1961, it read:
Sec. 16. [819.16] Relationship to person served. This act does not
alter any law applicable to the relationship between a person furnish-
ing professional service and a person receiving such professional service,
including liability arising out of such professional service. 14
The provision probably meant nothing more than that the confi-
dential relationship is preserved, and, as ought to be obvious, that
a corporate employee remains personally liable for his own torts.
The section as amended in 1963, however, reads as follows:
Sections 319.01 to 819.23 do not alter any law applicable to the
relationship between a person furnishing professional service and a
person receiving such professional service, including liability arising out
of such professional service; provided, however, that nothing contained
in this section shall render a person personally liable in tort for any
act in which he has not personally participated; and provided further,
that nothing contained in this section shall render a director, officer, or
212. Bittker, supra note 195, at 8-13.
213. See notes 395-03 infra and accompanying text.
214. Minn. Sess. Laws Extra Sess. 1961, ch. 1, § 16.
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employee of a professional corporation personally liable in contract for
any contract which he executes on behalf of a professional corporation
within the limits of his actual authority.215
This amendment also has some ambiguities. It is not clear whether
participating in treatment is enough to involve a doctor in per-
sonal liability for his fellow employee's professional negligence,216
or whether either responsibility for the negligence (as respects
the liability of a surgeon) or actual negligence on the part of the
participant must be found. Presumably, either actual negligence
or the imputed negligence under the captain-of-the-ship theory is
required.2 17 Whatever it means, the section does grant substantial
limited liability.
The professional corporation has the further advantage of
bearing the label "corporation." No case can be found where a
"corporation" is classified as other than a corporation for tax
purposes, barring the sham transaction cases2 18 Perhaps it is
sufficient that a business bear the name corporation, under a cor-
poration statute, and bear at least some remote resemblance to
a corporation (whatever that is). The ordinary partnership with
the label corporation would not qualify, but perhaps everything
else will. The lack of cases discussing the point lends some support
to this analysis.
8. Colorado Professional Corporation
No confusing language governs the limited liability of this
group. This corporation is formed as any other corporation. The
rules of civil procedure impose some conditions to ethical use of
the corporate form for practicing law,2 19 but those conditions
should not bear on the classification for tax purposes. This or-
ganization appears to have a strong case for classification as a
corporation for tax purposes.
4. Personal Service Corporation and Manufacturing Corporation
Nothing in these cases suggests any question about the tax
classification of either organization. The only problem case is
Mobile Bar Pilots Ass'n v. Commissioner,2 20 which involved an
215. Mum. STAT. AwN. § 319.16 (Supp. 1964).
216. This is referred to as a middle, but strained interpretation of the
original language of a similar statute. Note, 75 HARv. L. REV. 776, 781 (1962).
217. Ibid.
218. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
219. CoLO. R. Civ. P. 265.
220. 97 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1938).
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attempt to change employees of various employers into an associa-
tion of persons, apart from the status of employees of various
employers, for tax purposes. The case was adequately distin-
guished in Kintner2 and Foreman.22
In conclusion, therefore, the cases support and even appear to
require classification of all five models as associations or corpora-
tions for federal income tax purposes. The opinions in these cases,
however, are addressed to ad hoc situations and do not attempt
to delineate controlling criteria. Morrissey should be read accord-
ingly. Most of the cases find all the characteristics of corporations
present, even though one or more may in fact appear to be miss-
ing. Consequently, no occasion is presented in these opinions for
a relative weighing of the various factors with reference to their
importance. All the opinions suffer from the lack of a discussion
of the relevance of each so-called characteristic or criterion of
corporations. The idea of resemblance is mentioned, but no justifi-
cation beyond that rather general basis for making the classifica-
tion is given. In the cases examined, a striking emphasis is placed
upon the agreement of the parties, with less emphasis given to
local law specifications independent of the relationship of the
parties.
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION -
THE REGULATIONS
A. SCOPE OF THE POWER To ISSUE REGULATIONS
Regulations are the most authoritative of the various forms
of interpretations issued by the Treasury Department.m Adopt-
ing the useful classification of regulations as either "interpreta-
tive" or "legislative,"" clearly the regulations issued under sec-
tion 7701 are not legislative rules, precluding a reviewing court
from substituting its judgment for the Treasury's; rather, these
regulations are interpretative rules? 25 Section 7805, providing
that "the Secretary or his delegate shall prescribe all needful
221. 216 F.2d at 423-24; see text accompanying note 171 supra.
222. See notes 188-89 supra and accompanying text.
223. Each issue of the Internal Revenue Bulletin contains, on page two,
the following passage: "Revenue Rulings and Revenue Procedures reported
in the Bulletin do not have the force and effect of Treasury Department
Regulations. . . ."
224. 1 DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATIsE § 5.03 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as DAVIS].
225. Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the
Income, Estate and Gift Taxes, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 556, 557-58 (1940).
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rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title . . . ,"226
does not seem to grant legislative power to the Treasury, but only
refers to the usual power of an administrative agency to issue
interpretations of the law it enforces.2 2 7
However, even interpretative rules may have the force of law
to the extent that a court will defer to the interpretation by the
adminstrative body and will refrain from exercising its own judg-
ment on the subject matter covered by the regulations. Under
certain circumstances the Treasury Regulations are usually ac-
corded great authoritative weight: "(1) When the regulation
embodies a construction made contemporaneously with the enact-
ment of the statute, (2) when the regulation is of long standing,
and (3) when the statute has been reenacted with the regulation
outstanding."22 8
Absent one or more of those special circumstances, courts
seem to exercise their own judgments as freely as necessary in
the particular caseF 29 Of course, when a court agrees with the
judgment expressed in a regulation, it need only cite the regula-
tion, perhaps with a reference of deference paid to the Treasury's
judgment on the matter. Thus result such statements as:
As the statute merely provided that the term "corporation" should
include "associations", without further definition, the Treasury De-
partment was authorized to supply rules for the enforcement of the
Act within the permissible bounds of administrative construction.230
Or even stronger:
This Court has many times declared that Treasury regulations must
be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the
revenue statutes and that they constitute contemporaneous construc-
tions by those charged with administration of these statutes which
should not be overruled except for weighty reasons.231
When a court does not agree with the judgment expressed in
the regulation, it need only point out that the regulations are
administrative interpretations, and not binding in any way upon
the court. Accordingly: "We think the regulations are in the teeth
of the unambiguous mandate of the statute, are contradictory
of its plain terms, and amount to an attempt to legislate."2 32 The
226. INr. REV. CoDE or 1954, § 7805(a).
227. 1 DAVIs § 5.03, at 800, § 5.04, at 310-11; Surrey, supra note 225, at
558.
228. 1 DAvis § 5.05, at 317.
929. Ibid.
280. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 354-55 (1935).
31. Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948).
232. Helvering v. Sabine Transp. Co., 318 U.S. 306, 311-12 (1943).
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above rather strong characterizations of the clarity of the statute
must be tempered by the knowledge that the Board of Tax Ap-
peals and three of the eight Justices participating came to the
opposite conclusion. 233
Professor Surrey once stated:
Such Regulations constitute the Department's interpretations of the
Revenue Act and serve to guide the personnel of the Bureau and the
taxpaying public in the application of the law. In view of the necessary
brevity of the statutory law and the manifold fact situations to which
it applies, these guides are of some assistance to taxpayers. But they
still remain no more than the Department's construction of the
Revenue Act. Apart from their binding effect upon the personnel of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, they do not as Regulations possess
any authority 234
Proposals to give the Treasury Department more of a role in
legislating through regulations, however desirable if the regula-
tion were uniformly fair minded, face the following objection:
The main difficulty lies . . . in the Treasury's inability, by reason of
its special function as tax-gatherer and protector of the revenues, to
hold an even balance between the interests of the taxpayers and its own
interests as the government's agency for getting money. The Treasury
is inevitably biased in favor of the government, and this is frequently
illustrated by the way in which the tax regulations reach far to the edge
of each twilight zone and often beyond 5
As mentioned above, courts are inclined to give great weight
to rules either published shortly after enactment of the statute
("contemporaneous") or long-standing, or both. An opinion of
the Supreme Court in 1956 furnishes one example of such reli-
ance: "There are persuasive reasons for construing 'debentures'
and 'certificates of indebtedness' in accordance with the Treas-
ury's original interpretation of those terms in this statute's alto-
gether comparable predecessors."23 6 The Court then quoted with
approval the following language from an earlier Cardozo opinion:
"'[A]dministrative practice, consistent and generally unchal-
lenged, will not be overturned except for very cogent reasons if
the scope of the command is indefinite and doubtful.' "237 The
Supreme Court then went on to say:
233. 1 DAvis 3 5.05, at 319.
234. Surrey, supra note 225, at 557.
235. Miller, Responsibilities Which Should Be Met by Congress, in TAx
INSTITUTE, INCOME TAx AmNIsTRATioN 21, 28-29 (1948).
236. United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U.S. 383, 396 (1956).
237. Ibid. (quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288
U.S. 294, 315 (1933)).
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Against the Treasury's prior longstanding and consistent administrative
interpretation its more recent ad hoc contention as to how the statute
should be construed cannot stand. Moreover, that original interpreta-
tion has had both express and implied congressional acquiescence,
through the 1918 amendment to the statute . . . , which has ever since
continued in effect, and through Congress having let the administrative
interpretation remain undisturbed for so many years.2 38
The courts usually give considerable weight to regulations
that have "long standing."239 Sometimes this factor operates in
combination with the "reenactment" rule.240 The courts also give
weight to regulations issued shortly after enactment of a section,
under the label of "contemporaneous" regulations.2 4 1
The Supreme Court has used some rather strong language
concerning a long-standing rule: Treasury regulations and inter-
pretations long continued without substantial change, applying to
unamended or substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to
have received congressional approval and have the effect of law.24 2
Under these circumstances we think that the Regulations have
acquired the force of law. ... Here we have unambiguous regulatory
language, adopted by the Commissioner in the early days of federal
income tax legislation, in continuous existence since that time, and con-
sistently construed and applied by the courts on many occasions....;
However, in some cases the Supreme Court has not followed
long-standing regulations,24 4 and consequently one must conclude
that although such regulations will be given great weight, they
may be set aside where the Supreme Court finds reason on the
merits to do so. The Supreme Court has also referred approvingly
to the doubtful reenactment rule.245 These rules, therefore, often
are entitled to substantial weight, but do not compel one result
or another. Also, cross currents develop, and one rule of interpre-
tation may indicate one result while another rule may suggest the
opposite result.
One of the most relevant points on the problem under consider-
ation in this article is the effect of a change in regulations after
the regulations acquire the status "long standing" and after they
238. 350 U.S. at 896-97.
239. 1 DAvis § 5.06.
240. Id. § 5.06, at 825.
241. Ibid.
242. Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938).
243. Cammarano v. United States, 858 U.S. 498, 510-11 (1959).
244. 1 DAvIs § 5.06, at 328.
245. See 1 DAvis § 5.07, at 331. The rule has been extensively criticized.
E.g., Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARv. L. REV. 398
(1941); Surrey, supra note 225, at 559-61.
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have survived many "reenactments." Several Supreme Court
decisions touch on aspects of this problem. In Helvering v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co.24 6 the Supreme Court held that the Treas-
ury could not retroactively apply an amendment to long-standing
and uniform administrative practice. The Court did not decide,
however, whether the rule could be changed prospectively. 24 7
Later in 1939 the Court did hold that a regulation could be
amended and applied prospectively,"2 but the case is of doubtful
value since the Court apparently assumed that the Treasury was
amending a legislative regulation.
In Helvering v. Reynolds249 the Court upheld a change of
regulations. However, the language of the law itself was changed
and then changed back in 1934 to the original languageoo The
change in regulations came in 193 5 asi The Court treated the 1934
act as a new one and therefore the regulations could be treated
as a contemporaneous interpretation of a new act, rather than as
a change of a long-standing administrative interpretation with
no relevant change in the statutory language 52 The case, conse-
quently, is not conclusive on this issue.
In Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States53 the Supreme
Court did allow a retroactive application of certain regulations on
depreciation. In the eyes of the majority, the regulation was a
clarification of uncertain law" The dissenters, however, found a
consistent administrative practice which was changed by these
regulations, and thus found the retroactive change in the Com-
missioner's position objectionable2?5 The dissenters admitted that
the Code and earlier regulations themselves were inconclusive,
but found the consistent administrative practice in the litigating
positions the Commissioner had taken over a long period of
time." The case certainly does not involve a change in long-
246. 306 U.S. 110 (1939).
247. Id. at 116.
248. Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90.
249. 313 U.S. 428 (1941).
250. Id. at 435-36 (dissenting opinion).
251. Id. at 440 (dissenting opinion).
252. Id. at 443:
No relevant regulation was in force at the time respondent sold the
securities in 1934. The regulation here in question was promulgated
under the very Act which determines respondent's liability. The fact
that the regulation was not promulgated until after the transaction in
question had been consummated is immaterial.
253. 364 U.S. 92 (1960).
254. Id. at 100-04.




standing regulations, however, and has little value as an authority
on that question.
Accordingly, long-standing regulations probably will be given
great weight by the Supreme Court and other federal courts,
particularly where they have been approved consistently over
the years by the courts, including the Supreme Court. The case
for administrative change of long-standing regulations, consistently
followed by the courts, is quite doubtful, for no Supreme Court
case seems to so hold squarely. Normally, a change in directions
in amendments to such regulations would seem to have little
chance for judicial approval, if the Supreme Court's opinions and
holdings are any basis for prediction.
B. THE EARLY REGULATIONS
The regulations issued under the 1894 act257 merely refer to
"corporations, companies, and associations, both resident and
foreign, doing business for profit in the United States," 58 in al-
most exactly the words of the statute. As in the statute, the
regulations specified that "partnerships, as such, are not liable
to taxation of firm or partnership profits or income, but each indi-
vidual member of the partnership shall include . . ."" his share
of the profits in his income. No definition of associations was pro-
vided under the law or the regulations.
The first definition of associations appeared in Regulations
33,o issued under the revenue act of 1913. This rather compre-
257. Regulations and Law Relative to Income Tax (1894) [hereinafter
cited as Treas. Reg. 1894].
258. Treas. Reg. 1894, at 24.
259. Treas. Reg. 1894, at 25.
260. Regulations No. 8S, Law and Regulations Relative to the Tax on
Income of Individuals, Corporations, Joint Stock Companies, Associations,
and Insurance Companies Imposed by Section 2, Act of October 3, 1913 (1914)
[hereinafter cited as Treas. Reg. 33 (1914)]:
Art. 78. "Corporation" or "corporations," as used in these regula-
tions, shall be construed to include all corporations, joint-stock compa-
nies or associations, and all insurance companies coming within the
terms of the law, and such organizations will hereinafter be referred to
as "corporations."
Art. 79. It is immaterial how such corporations are created or
organized. The terms "joint-stock companies" or "associations" shall
include associates, real estate trusts, or by whatever name known,
which carry on or do business in an organized capacity, whether or-
ganized under and pursuant to State laws, trust agreements, declara-
tions of trusts, or otherwise, the net income of which, if any, is distrib-
uted, or distributable, among the members of share owners on the
basis of the capital stock which each holds, or, where there is no capital
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hensive though vague "definition" did not really define the term,
but did indicate the wide intended scope of the words "corpora-
tions, joint-stock companies, or associations" by specifically in-
cluding real estate trusts. The words of the regulation would sup-
port classification of partnerships as corporations, however. In
fact, limited partnerships were characterized under these regula-
tions as corporations?" Partnerships, however, were excluded in
the statute, and the regulations so stated 262
While the regulations of necessity excluded partnerships, they
included limited partnerships in the concept of corporation.2 os
Apparently the limited liability and general resemblance, what-
ever that was, of these organizations to corporations led the draft-
ers of the above-quoted regulation to characterize the limited
partnership as a corporation.
Slight changes in Regulations 33 were made under the Revenue
Acts of 1916 and 1917 by including as corporations business trusts
issuing shares,"' and by substituting the term "common-law
trusts" for "real estate trusts" in the provision defining joint-
stock companies and association?" No doubt this latter change
stock, on the basis of the proportionate share of capital which each has
invested in the business or property of the organization, all of which
joint-stock companies or associations shall, in their organized capacity,
be subject to the tax imposed by this act.
261. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 86 (1914): "Limited partnerships are held to
be corporations within the meaning of this act and these regulations, and in
their organized capacity are subject to the income tax as corporations."
262. Treas. Reg. S3, art. 94 (1914): "Ordinary copartnerships are not, as
such, subject to the tax imposed by this act . . . ."
263. Regulations No. 33 (Revised) Governing the Collection of the In-
come Tax Imposed by the Act of September 8, 1916, as Amended by the Act
of October 3, 1917, art. 62 (1918) [hereinafter cited as Treas. Reg. 33 (rev.
1918)].
264. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 57 (rev. 1918):
. . . Corporation defined. -"Corporation" or "corporations," as
used in these regulations, shall be construed to include all corporations,
joint-stock companies and associations, and all insurance companies
coming within the terms of the law, as well as all business trusts
organized or created for the purpose of engaging in commercial or in-
dustrial enterprises, the capital of which is evidenced by certificates or
shares of interest issued or issuable to members on the basis of which
profits are distributed or distributable. Such organizations will be here-
inafter referred to as corporations.
This section corresponds to Treas. Reg. 33, art. 78 (1914), promulgated under
the 1913 act.
265. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 58 (rev. 1918): "Joint-stock companies and associa-
tions defined.-The term 'joint-stock companies' or 'associations' shall include
associations, common-law trusts, or organizations by whatever name known
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is merely the use of a more general term in place of a more
specific term. Limited partnerships still were taxed as corpora-
tions with, apparently, limited liability still the controlling char-
acteristie1oo The "common-law partnership," in which all owners
had liability for debts of the business, was distinguished, and
not taxed as an association or corporation 67
The regulations promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1918
are called Regulations 45? Y The definition of association, article
1502, is virtually the same as in Regulations 3&2' 9 However, new
provisions appeared distinguishing associations from partnerships
and from trustsY2 0
which carry on or do business in an organized capacity ... ." Article 58 closely
resembles Treas. Reg. 33, art. 79 (1914), promulgated under the 1913 act.
266. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 62 (rev. 1918):
.. . Limited partnerships. - Limited partnerships- that is, partner-
ships having one or more special partners who may share in the profits
of the firm but whose liability for the debts of the company is limited
to the amount of capital invested by such special partner or partners
-are held to be associations within the meaning of the title, and as
such are required to make returns of annual net income and pay any
tax thereby shown to be due. The income received by the members out
of the earnings of such limited partnerships will be treated in their
personal returns in the same manner as if it were dividends on the stock
of corporations and will be subject to the additional or surtaxes in
the hands of the recipient.
This section adds little substance although varying the words of Treas. Reg.
33, art. 56 (1914).
267. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 68 (rev. 1918).
268. Regulations 45 Relating to the Income Tax and War Profits and
Excess Profits Tax Under the Revenue Act of 1918 (1920 ed. 1921) [herein-
after cited as Treas. Reg. 45 (1920 ed. 1921)]. Under this act two editions of
regulations were promulgated, the first edition in 1920 and the 1920 edition
in 1921.
269. See note 265 supra.
270.
ART. 1503. Association distinguished from partnership.-An organi-
zation the membership interests in which are transferable without the
consent of all the members, however the transfer may be otherwise
restricted, and the business of which is conducted by trustees or direc-
tors and officers without the active participation of all the members as
such, is an association and not a partnership. A partnership bank con-
ducted like a corporation and so organized that the interests of its
members may be transferred without the consent of the other members
is a joint-stock company or association within the meaning of the
statute. A partnership bank the interests of whose members cannot be
so transferred is a partnership.
ART. 1504. Association distinguished from trust.-Where trustees
hold real estate subject to a lease and collect the rents, doing no busi-
ness other than distributing the income less taxes and similar expenses
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These regulations represent the first attempt to specify criteria
for classifying organizations as associations, other than by refer-
ence to labels. The trust section was designed to distinguish a
trust actively conducting a business from one used as an invest-
ment entity only. It was designed to reflect the Supreme Court's
decision in Crocker v. Malley,2 7 which held that a trust must
carry on a business, and not merely hold property, for classifica-
tion as an association. The Court also held that the beneficiaries
must have some control over the manner in which the trust
business is conducted? 72 The provision distinguishing associations
from partnerships specifies two criteria for association status:
first, the membership interests are transferable without consent
of all the members, and second, the business of the organization
is conducted by a board of directors, or its equivalent, without
active participation by all of the members. Apparently an organ-
ization must meet both criteria stated to have association status.
Regulations 45 also contain some development of the classifi-
cation of limited partnerships, emphasizing limited liability,
avoidance of dissolution at death of or upon a transfer of interest
by a member, centralization of title, and the ability to sue in
the name of the organization 273 When an organization had all
to the holders of their receipt certificates, who have no control except
the right of filling a vacancy among the trustees and of consenting to
a modification of the terms of the trust, no association exists and the
cestuis que trust are liable to tax as beneficiaries of a trust the income
of which is to be distributed periodically, whether or not at regular
intervals. But in such a trust if the trustees pursuant to the terms
thereof have the right to hold the income for future distribution, the
net income is taxed to the trustees instead of to the beneficiaries....
If, however, the cestuis que trust have a voice in the conduct of the
business of the trust, whether through the right periodically to elect
trustees or otherwise, the trust is an association within the meaning of
the statute.
Treas. Reg. 45 (1920 ed. 1921).
271. 249 U.S. 223 (1919).
272. Id. at 233-34; notes 102-05 supra and accompanying text.
273.
ART. 1505. Limited partnership as partnership. -So-called limited
partnerships of the type authorized by the statutes of New York and
most of the States are partnerships and not corporations within the
meaning of the statute. Such limited partnerships, which can not limit
the liability of the general partners, although the special partners enjoy
limited liability so long as they observe the statutory conditions, which
are dissolved by the death or attempted transfer of the interest of a
general partner, and which can not take real estate or sue in the part-
nership name, are so like common law partnerships as to render imprac-
ticable any differentiation in their treatment for tax purposes. Michigan
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these characteristics, it was to be classified under those regula-
tions as an association. When it lacked all these characteristics, it
was to be classified as a partnership. Doubtful cases were to be
classified as associations. While the details were not spelled out,
apparently an organization with a mixture of association and
partnership characteristics was to be classified as an association.
The original approach under Regulations 33 pushed everything
except a pure partnership into the category of corporations. While
Regulations 45 modified that approach in the case of limited
partnerships having general partners with unlimited liability and
other partnership characteristics, the general approach still swept
as many cases as possible into the corporation category.
Regulations 65 were issued under the Revenue Act of 1924
The sections "association,"275 "association distinguished from
partnership,"27  "limited partnership as partnership,"" and
"limited partnership as corporation"278 are almost identical to
the corresponding articles under Regulations 45. The provision
distinguishing associations from trusts differs somewhat from
the provision under Regulations 45, mainly in the omission of a
requirement of control by beneficiaries for association classifica-
tion?2 70 This revised provision was intended to reflect the decision
and Illinois limited partnerships are partnerships. A California special
partnership is a partnership.
AnT. 1506. Limited partnership as corporation. -On the other hand,
limited partnerships of the type of partnerships with limited liability
or partnership associations authorized by the statutes of Pennsylvania
and of a few other States are only nominally partnerships. Such so-
called limited partnerships, offering opportunity for limiting the liability
of all the numbers providing for the transferability of partnership
shares, and capable of holding real estate and bringing suit in common
name, are more truly corporations than partnerships and must make
returns of income and pay the tax as corporations. The income received
by the members out of the earnings of such limited partnerships will
be treated in their personal returns in the same manner as distributions
on the stock of corporations. In all doubtful cases limited partnerships
will be treated as corporations unless they submit satisfactory proof
that they are not in effect so organized. A Michigan partnership asso-
ciation is a corporation. Such a corporation may or may not be a per-
sonal service corporation....
Treas. Reg. 45 (1920 ed. 1921).
274. Cited as Treas. Reg. 65 (1924).
275. Treas. Reg. 65, art 1502 (1924).
276. Treas. Reg. 65, art. 1503 (1924).
277. Treas. Reg. 65, art 1505 (1924).
278. Treas. Reg. 65, art. 1506 (1924).
279. Treas. Reg. 65 (1924):
ART. 1504. Association distinguished from trust.-Holding trusts, in
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of the Supreme Court in Hecht v. Malley,so which found that
control of the trustees by the beneficiaries was not required.
The provisions issued in Regulations 74,281 under the Revenue
Act of 1928, are almost the same as the Regulations 65 provisions
for "association," 282 "limited partnership as partnership," 2 8 3 and
"limited partnership as corporation."8 The provision distinguish-
ing associations from partnerships5'5 is similar to its predecessor.
The changes in this latter provision do not appear to have any
great significance. Much of the language added was taken from
the section "limited partnership as corporation." A reference to
classification as an association, "even though under State law such
organizations are technically partnerships," only states explicitly
what is otherwise inferred, i.e., that a mere local law label does
not control when the organization resembles an association, what-
which the trustees axe merely holding property for the collection of the
income and its distribution among the beneficiaries, and are not en-
gaged, either by themselves or in connection with the beneficiaries, in
the carrying on of any business, are not associations within the mean-
ing of the law. The trust and the beneficiaries thereof will be subject
to tax as provided in articles 341-347. Operating trusts, whether or
not of the Massachusetts type, in which the trustees are not restricted
to the mere collection of funds and their payments to the beneficiaries,
but are associated together in much the same manner as directors in
a corporation for the purpose of carrying on some business enterprise,
are to be deemed associations within the meaning of the Act, regardless
of the control exercised by the beneficiaries.
280. 265 U.S. 144 (1924); see notes 107-12 supra and accompanying text.
281. Treas. Reg. 74 (1931).
282. Treas. Reg. 74, art. 1312 (1929).
283. Treas. Reg. 74, art. 1315 (1929).
284. Treas. Reg. 74, art. 1816 (1929).
285. Treas. Reg. 74, art. 1313 (1929):
ART. 1313. Association distinguished from partnership.-An organi-
zation, the membership interests in which are transferable and the
business of which is conducted by trustees or directors and officers with-
out the active participation of all the members as such, is an association
and not a partnership. The term "partnership" means only ordinary part-
nerships. Organizations which have a fixed capital stock divided into
shares represented by certificates transferable only upon the books of
the company, which manage their affairs by a board of directors or
executive officers, and which conduct their business in the general form
and mode of corporations are joint-stock companies or associations
within the meaning of the Act even though under State law such
organizations are technically partnerships.
This provision omitted the words italicized in the following phrase from
Treas. Reg. 65 (1924): "the membership interests in which are transferable
without the consent of all the members, however the transfer may be other-
wise -restricted." The words beginning with "The term 'partnership' means
only ordinary partnerships" were added in Treas. Reg. 74 (1931).
858
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ever its name under local law. No similar statement is made
concerning associations classified as partnerships, however. The
provision on trusts2 M0 has some changed language, but seems sub-
stantially the same as its predecessor. Although this provision
picks up some language from Regulations 45,287 the substance
of Regulations 65 is continued,18 with the reference to "absence
of any control by the beneficiaries" a little more direct and
specific.
In Regulations 77, under the Revenue Act of 1932, the sec-
tions on "association," 28 9 "limited partnership as partnership,"290
and "limited partnership as corporation,"29' are the same as the
corresponding provisions of Regulations 74. The section distin-
guishing associations from partnerships2 2 added a word-for-word
986. Treas. Reg. 74, art. 1314 (1931):
ART. 1314. Association distinguished from trust.-Where trustees
merely hold property for the collection of the income and its distribu-
tion among the beneficiaries of the trust, and are not engaged, either
by themselves or in connection with the beneficiaries, in the carrying
on of any business, and the beneficiaries have no control over the
trust, although their consent may be required for the filling of a vacancy
among the trustees or for a modification of the terms of the trust, no
association exists, and the trust and the beneficiaries thereof will be
subject to tax as provided by sections 161-170 and by articles 861-891.
If, however, the beneficiaries have positive control over the trust,
whether through the right periodically to elect trustees or otherwise,
an association exists within the meaning of section 701. Even in the
absence of any control by the beneficiaries, where the trustees are not
restricted to the mere collection of funds and their payment to the
beneficiaries, but are associated together with similar or greater powers
than the directors in a corporation for the purpose of carrying on their
business enterprise, the trust is an association within the meaning of
the Act.
287. See Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1504 (1920 ed. 1921) (quoted in note 270
supra).
288. See Treas. Reg. 65, art. 1504 (1924) (quoted in note 279 supra).
289. Treas. Reg. 77, art. 1312 (1933).
290. Treas. Reg. 77, art. 1315 (1933).
291. Treas. Reg. 77, art. 1316 (1933).
292.
AnT. 1313. Association distinguished from partnership.-An organi-
zation, the membership interests in which are transferable and the busi-
ness of which is conducted by trustees or directors and officers without
the active participation of all the members as such, is an association
and not a partnership. The term "partnership" includes a syndicate,
group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization,
through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or
venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of the Act,
a trust or estate or a corporation; and the term "partner" includes
a member in such a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture or organiza-
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adoption of the new statutory "definition" of "partnership," pro-
vided under the Revenue Act of 1932?"3 Also, the trust provision
was changed to eliminate any reference to or consideration of
control of the trustees by the beneficiaries in determining associa-
tion status?94
A major revision of these regulations was made under the
Revenue Act of 1934, Regulations 86?" The provisions "limited
partnership as partnership"-2 6 and "limited partnership as cor-
poration"9 7 remained substantially the same as under Regulations
77 and before. A general section was added setting forth certain
general rules for making the classification:
AnR. 801-1. Classification of taxables. -For the purpose of taxation
the Act makes its own classifications and prescribes its own standards
of classification. Local law is of no importance in this connection. Thus
a trust may be classed as a trust or as an association (and, therefore,
as a corporation), depending upon its nature or its activities. (See
article 801-3.) The term "partnership" is not limited to the common
law meaning of partnership, but is broader in its scope and includes
groups not commonly called partnerships. (See article 801-4.) The
term "corporation" is not limited to the artificial entity usually known
as a corporation, but includes also an association, a trust classed as an
association because of its nature or its activities, a joint-stock company,
an insurance company, and certain kinds of partnerships. (See articles
tion. Organizations which have a fixed capital stock divided into shares
represented by certificates transferable only upon the books of the
company, which manage their affairs by a board of directors or execu-
tive officers, and which conduct their business in the general form and
mode of corporations are joint-stock companies or associations within
the meaning of the Act even though under State law such organizations
are technically partnerships.
Treas. Reg. 77 (1933). (Italics added to indicate material added by Regula-
tions 77.)
293. See notes 69-71 supra and accompanying text.
294.
ART. 1814. Association distinguished from trust.-Where trustees
merely hold property for the collection of the income and its distribu-
tion among the beneficiaries of the trust, and are not engaged either
by themselves or in connection with the beneficiaries, in the carrying
on of any business, no association exists, and the trust and the bene-
ficiaries thereof will be subject to tax as provided by sections 161-170
and by articles 861-891. Where the trustees are not restricted to the
mere collection of funds and their payment to the beneficiaries, but
have similar or greater powers than the directors in a corporation for
the purpose of carrying on some business enterprise, the trust is an
association within the meaning of the Act.
Treas. Reg. 77 (1933).
295. Treas. Reg. 86 (1935).
296. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-6 (1935).
297. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-5 (1985).
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801-2 and 801-4.) The definitions, terms, and classifications, as set
forth in section 801, shall have the same respective meaning and scope
in these regulations. 8
The above section explicitly states that which was more or less
implied in earlier regulations - that local law labels alone do
not control. The above regulation also contains what must surely
be a great overstatement: "local law is of no importance in this
connection." Reference to local law is necessary in applying the
tests developed in the regulations, and consequently that refer-
ence cannot be deemed to be "of no importance," or irrelevant.
This statement could only mean that the criteria for determina-
tion of the classification are developed only under the internal
revenue law, and are not found in local law. But even so limited,
the statement on its face is still ludicrous. The first sentence is
likewise overstated: "For the purpose of taxation the Act makes
its own classification and prescribes its own standards of classifi-
cation." Where? In the terse "definitions" which contain hardly
more than a list of labels? In the legislative history, which seems
only to refer to local law labels? And where do the criteria stated
in the regulations come from, if not from local law? Nevertheless,
it clearly is reasonable to say that local law labels alone do not
control, and that the same criteria for classification shall apply
from state to state. The trouble is that the criteria have to come
from somewhere - and they are not found in the statute. Pre-
sumably the Treasury fashioned these criteria from general ob-
servations concerning the various forms of doing business. But
those general observations necessarily refer to local law in a
general, if not specific, way.
Regulations 86 continue the broad concept of association that
seems to be the theme of the early statutes and regulations.2"
298. Tress. Reg. 86, art. 801-1 (1935).
299. Treas. Reg. 86 (1935):
AnR. 801-2. Association. -The term "association" is not used in
the Act in any narrow or technical sense. It includes any organization,
created for the transaction of designated affairs, or the attainment of
some object, which, like a corporation, continues notwithstanding that
its members or participants change, and the affairs of which, like corpo-
rate affairs, are conducted by a single individual, a committee, a board,
or some other group, acting in a representative capacity. It is imma-
terial whether such organization is created by an agreement, a declara-
tion of trust, a statute, or otherwise. It includes a voluntary association,
a joint-stock association or company, a "business" trust, a "Massachu-
setts" trust, a "common law" trust, an "investment" trust (whether of
the fixed or the management type), an inter-insurance exchange operat-
ing through an attorney in fact, a partnership association, and any other
type of organization (by whatever name known) which is not, within
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The definition emphasizes continuity of life and centralized man-
agement. Presumably the continuity of life test depends not on
actual facts, but rather upon whether the form of business organ-
ization created avoids discontinuity upon the death, withdrawal,
etc. of an owner.o00 Also, presumably, centralized management is
created by the form of the arrangement, and not by the way the
owners act.
The extensive provision distinguishing associations from
trustse mentions several characteristics of corporations: holding
the meaning of the Act, a trust or an estate, or a partnership. If the
conduct of the affairs of a corporation continues after the expiration
of its charter, or the termination of its existence, it becomes an associa-
tion.
300. See notes 46, 85, 127 & 139-44 supra and accompanying text.
301. Treas. Reg. 86 (1935):
ART. 801-3. Association distinguished from trust. -The term "trust,"
as used in the Act, refers to an ordinary trust, namely, one created by
will or by declaration of the trustees or the grantor, the trustees of
which take title to the property for the purpose of protecting or con-
serving it as customarily required under the ordinary rules applied in
chancery and probate courts. The beneficiaries of such a trust gen-
erally do no more than accept the benefits thereof and are not the
voluntary planners or creators of the trust arrangement. Even though
the beneficiaries do create such a trust, it is ordinarily done to con-
serve the trust property without undertaking any activity not strictly
necessary to the attainment of that object.
As distinguished from the ordinary trust described in the preceding
paragraph is an arrangement whereby the legal title to the property
is conveyed to trustees (or a trustee) who, under a declaration or agree-
ment of trust, hold and manage the property with a view to income
or profit for the benefit of beneficiaries. Such an arrangement is de-
signed (whether expressly or otherwise) to afford a medium whereby
an income or profit-seeking activity may be carried on through a substi-
tute for an organization such as a voluntary association or a joint-stock
company or a corporation, thus obtaining the advantages of those
forms of organization without their disadvantages.
If a trust is an undertaking or arrangement conducted for income
or profit, the capital or property of the trust being supplied by the
beneficiaries, and if the trustees or other designated persons are, in
effect, the managers of the undertaking or arrangement, whether the
beneficiaries do or do not appoint or control them, the beneficiaries are
to be treated as voluntarily joining or cooperating with each other in
the trust, just as do members of an association, and the undertaking or
arrangement is deemed to be an association classified by the Act as
a corporation.
By means of such a trust the disadvantages of an ordinary partner-
ship are avoided, and the trust form affords the advantages of unity
of management and continuity of existence which are characteristic
of both associations and corporations. This trust form also affords the
advantages of capacity, as a unit, to acquire, hold, and dispose of
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title, engaging in business, centralized management (representa-
tive management), continuity of existence, ability to sue and be
sued, and limitation of liability. The regulation also mentions
several less important characteristics which, when present, "serve
to emphasize the fact that an organization possessing them should
be treated as a corporation"302 but are not necessary for classifica-
tion as a corporation. These minor characteristics include: desig-
nation of officers, use of a seal, issuance of certificates of beneficial
ownership, holding of meetings, use of a "charter" or "by-laws,"
and existence of some control by beneficiaries over the affairs of
the corporation. While the definition of association requires only
continuity of life and representative management, the trust sec-
tion refers to "unity of management" and "continuity of exist-
ence" as the critical factors. Presumably the different words refer
to the same concepts. The trust section also mentions the other
property and the ability to sue and be sued by strangers or members,
which are characteristic of a corporation; and also frequently affords the
limitation of liability and other advantages characteristic of a corpora-
tion. These advantages which the trust form provides are frequently
referred to as resemblance to the general form, mode of procedure, or
effectiveness in action, of an association or a corporation, or as "quasi-
corporate form." The effectiveness in action in the case of a trust or of
a corporation does not depend upon technical arrangements or devices
such as the appointment or election of a president, secretary, treasurer,
or other "officer," the use of a "seal," the issuance of certificates to
the beneficiaries, the holding of meetings by managers or beneficiaries,
the use of a "charter" or "by-laws," the existence of "control" by the
beneficiaries over the affairs of the organization, or upon other minor
elements. They serve to emphasize the fact that an organization pos-
sessing them should be treated as a corporation, but they are not essen-
tial to such classification, for the fundamental benefits enjoyed by a
corporation, as outlined above, are attained, in the case of a trust, by
the use of the trust form itself. The Act disregards the technical distinc-
tion between a trust agreement (or declaration) and ordinary articles
of association or a corporate charter, and all other difference of detail.
It treats such a trust according to its essential nature, namely, as an
association. This is true whether the beneficiaries form the trust or, by
purchase or otherwise, acquire an interest in an existing trust.
The mere size or amount of capital invested in the trust is of no
importance. Sometimes the activity of the trust is a small venture or
enterprise, such as the division and sale of a parcel of land, the erec-
tion of a building, or the care and rental of an office building or apart-
ment house; sometimes the activity is a trade or business on a much
larger scale. The distinction is that between the activity or purpose for
which an ordinary strict trust of the traditional type would be created,
and the activity or purpose for which a corporation for profit might
have been formed.
302. Ibid.
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specified characteristics of corporations. Just which combinations
of factors will lead to association classification is not clear, but
clearly certain combinations do.
The partnership section under Regulations 86 is a little clearer:
ART. 801-4. Partnerships. -The Act provides its own concept of a
partnership. Under the term "partnership" it includes not only a part-
nership as known at common law but, as well, a syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture, or other unincorporated organization which carries on
any business, financial operation, or venture, and which is not, within
the meaning of the Act, a trust, estate, or a corporation. On the other
hand the Act classifies under the term "corporation" an association or
joint-stock company, the members of which may be subject to the
personal liability of partners. If an organization is not interrupted by
the death of a member or by a change in ownership of a participating
interest during the agreed period of its existence, and its management
is centralized in one or more persons in their representative capacities,
such an organization is an association taxable as a corporation. As to
the characteristics of an association, see also articles 801-2 and
801-3.3
In these definitions limited liability is not required for associa-
tion classification. It is not even mentioned under the association
section; is mentioned only as sometimes present in trusts classified
as associations;' 4 and, according to the partnership section, is
not found in the typical association or joint-stock company. How-
ever, limited liability is characteristic of corporations and appears
to be the most significant, perhaps only important, factor men-
tioned in the section "limited partnership as corporation."s" Al-
together Regulations 86 attempt a more systematic, detailed set
of rules for making classifications. The characteristics used are
found in earlier regulations, although not so highly developed. It
803. The article continues:
The following examples will illustrate some phases of these distinc-
tions:
(1) If A and B buy some acreage for the purpose of subdivision,
they are joint adventurers, and the joint venture is classified by the
Act as a partnership.
(2) A, B and C each contributes $10,000 for the purpose of buying
and selling real estate. If A, B, C, or D, an outside party (or any
combination of them as long as the approval of each participant is not
required for syndicate action), takes control of the money, property
and business of the enterprise, and the syndicate is not terminated on
the death of any of the participants, the syndicate is classified as an
association.
Treas. Ieg. 86, art. 801-4 (1935).
804. Note 294 supra.
305. Treas. Ieg. 86, art. 801-5 (1935).
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would be difficult to say that any real change of emphasis can
be found in Regulations 86, except possibly for the clear state-
ments on the relevancy of the local law labels.
Regulations 94, under the Revenue Act of 1936, continue the
provisions of Regulations 86.s0 However, language added to the
second paragraph of the trust article emphasizes the importance of
the instrument in classifying an organization as an association.sor
Regulations 101, under the Revenue Act of 1938, continue
these provisions unchanged.s08 Likewise, Regulations 103, under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, continue unchanged most of
the relevant provisions of Regulations 101.09 While Regulations
103 contain no provision entitled "limited partnership or corpora-
tion," two new sections appear entitled "limited partnerships"310
and "partnership associations."311 These new sections continue
association classification of limited partnerships when the follow-
ing elements are present: no interruption of the "organization"
806. Treas. Reg. 94, art. 1001-1 to -6 (1986).
307. Treas. Reg. 94, art. 1001-3 (1936): "The nature and purpose of a
cooperative undertaking will differentiate it from an ordinary trust. The
purpose will not be considered narrower than that which is formally set
forth in the instrument under which the activities of the trust are conducted."
808. Treas. Reg. 101, art. 901-1 to -6 (1939).
309. Treas. Reg. 103, §§ 19.8797-1 to -4 (1940).
810. Treas. Reg. 103 (1940):
SEC. 19.3797-5. Limited partnerships.-A limited partnership is
classified for the purpose of the Internal Revenue Code as an ordinary
partnership, or, on the other hand, as an association taxable as a cor-
poration, depending upon its character in certain material respects. If
the organization is not interrupted by the death of a general partner
or by a change in the ownership of his participating interest, and if
the management of its affairs is centralized in one or more persons act-
ing in a representative capacity, it is taxable as a corporation. For
want of these essential characteristics, a limited partnership is to be
considered as an ordinary partnership notwithstanding other character-
istics conferred upon it by local law.
The Uniform Limited Partnership Act has been adopted in several
states. A limited partnership organized under the provisions of that
Act may be either an association or a partnership depending upon
whether or not in the particular case the essential characteristics of
an association exist.
311. Treas. Reg. 103. (1940):
SEC. 19.8797-6. Partnership associations.- A partnership association
of the type authorized by the statutes of several states, such, for
instance, as those of the State of Pennsylvania . . . , having by virtue
of the statutory provisions under which it was organized, the character-
istics essential to an association within the meaning of the Internal
Revenue Code, is taxable as a corporation.
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upon the death or transfer of interest of a general partner, and
centralization of management in someone, or some group in a rep-
resentative capacity.
The relevant portions of Regulations 111, applicable only to
years beginning after December 31, 1941, are identical to Regula-
tions 103.312
C. APPLICATION OF THE EARLY REGULATIONS TO THE MODELS
The personal service corporation and the manufacturing cor-
poration would obviously be treated as corporations under all the
early regulations. First, the early regulations do not question
classification of groups with a corporate charter. Second, these
two corporations have every characteristic mentioned in the
regulations.
The Colorado professional corporation has an equally certain
classification as a corporation - differing only in that this corpo-
ration may not ethically do business unless it complies with state
supreme court rules.s13 However, nothing in the early regulations
has anything to do with that difference.
The professional corporation also would be classified as a cor-
poration under the early regulations because of its corporate
charter. Furthermore, the professional corporation has all the
characteristics of an association or corporation as stated in the
regulations. The group certainly is not an ordinary partnership,
or limited partnership. Limited liability is an important charac-
teristic of corporations, according to the early regulations, and
is prominent, for example, in Regulations 45."M Apparently, lim-
ited liability is a critical fact in the classification of limited
partnerships under those regulations as a partnership or as
a corporation." 5 Limited liability is also mentioned under
Regulations 86316 and following versions 317 However, explicit
mention of limited liability in connection with classification
of limited partnerships stopped with Regulations 103&318 Perhaps
it remained a factor by inference, however. That the precise na-
ture of the extent of limited liability of a professional corporation
312. See Treas. Reg. 111, §§ 29.3797-1 to -6 (1943).
313. CoLO. R. Civ. P. 265.
314. Treas. Reg. 45, arts. 1505-06 (1920).
315. Ibid.
316. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-3 (1935).
317. Treas. Reg. 94, art. 1001-3 (1936); Treas. Reg. 101, art. 901-3 (1939);
Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.3797-3 (1940); Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.8797-3 (1943).
318. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.3797-5 (1940).
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is not yet known3'9 seems of no great significance. The regulations
do not refer to degrees of limited liability. Since the limitation of
liability for the professional corporation is as great or almost as
great as the limitation of liability for the manufacturing corpora-
tion,320 for instance, this characteristic is present.
Centralization of management is also a characteristic of the
professional corporation.3 2 1 This factor remained prominent since
Regulations 45, which stated: "the business of which is conducted
by trustees or directors and officers without the active participa-
tion of all the members as such." 3 2 2 Regulations 86 made the
following change: "the affairs of which, like corporate affairs, are
conducted by a single individual, a committee, a board, or some
other group, acting in a representative capacity." 2 The concept
of representative capacity appeared also in Regulations 103 and
following.324 The concept of centralization of management as used
in these regulations seems more to refer to what centralization
the form of organization provides and not to who actually wields
the power in a business enterprise. The limited partnership, the
trust, and the corporation all seem to have someone or a group
acting in a capacity other than principals, apparently thus meet-
ing the requirement of centralization of management in these
early regulations. The professional corporation has this charac-
teristic. The board would, no doubt, have control over all aspects
of the business of the corporation, whether involving professional
decisions or not. The extent to which a particular corporation's
board controls the details of performance by all employees will
vary, of course, and likely should not be considered in determin-
ing whether the characteristic centralization of management is
present.2
Regulations 45 also refer to transferability of interest, in the
section entitled "association distinguished from partnership," in
these terms: "An organization the membership interests in which
are transferable without the consent of all the members, however
the transfer may be otherwise restricted . "326 1The concept is
also referred to in the sections on "limited partnership as corpora-
319. See notes 214-17 supra and accompanying text.
320. Ibid.
321. See notes 195-200 supra and 382-87 infra and accompanying texts.
322. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1503 (1920).
323. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-2 (1935).
324. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.3797-2 (1940); Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.3797-3
(1943).
325. See text accompanying notes 382-87 infra.
326. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1503 (1920 ed. 1921).
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tion" in the words: "providing for the transferability of partner-
ship shares ... .""3 This concept apparently disappears under
Regulations 103 and following, but mention of the issuance of
certificates to beneficiaries as a minor characteristic of corpora-
tions is found in the section, "association distinguished from
trust.""*8 Therefore, transferability is of doubtful importance in
the early regulations, but as used in those regulations, the pro-
fessional corporation has transferability. Even if subject to a
first offer to the corporation or other shareholders, the shares are
still more transferable than a partnership interest, for the transfer
does not require the consent of all participants.32 This character-
istic of a corporation, therefore, also is present.
Another characteristic of corporations found in the early regu-
lations is the so-called continuity of life characteristic.sso When
a partner dies or transfers his interest, the business will likely go
on, of course, just as the business of the corporation goes on when
a shareholder dies or transfers his interest. Apparently, there-
fore, the sort of continuity considered for classification purposes
is not the factual one of whether or not the business continues,
but rather the formal continuity lost when the partner dies or
transfers his interest, causing a technical dissolution of the old
partnership and the creation of a new one.s33 As one indication
that this change has substance, a new partner will not be per-
sonally liable on the debts of the old partnership .332
The professional corporation is not subject to dissolution upon
the occurrence of the events which would provide grounds for the
dissolution of a professional association. The statute merely pro-
vides for the suspending or revoking of the certificate of regis-
327. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1506 (1920 ed. 1921); Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-5
(1935); Treas. Reg. 74, art. 1316 (1929); Treas. Reg. 77, art. 1816 (1933);
Treas. Reg. 94, art. 1001-5 (1936).
828. E.g., Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.8797-8 (1940).
329. Note 270 rupra.
330. Entity continuity is mentioned in Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1505 (1920 ed.
1921) ("Such limited partnerships, . . . which are dissolved by the death or
attempted transfer of the interest of a general partner, . . ."). The concept
is also mentioned in Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-2 (1935), and following regula-
tions (". . . which, like a corporation, continues notwithstanding that its
members or participants change . . ."), and in Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-3
(1935) ("the trust form affords the advantages of . . . and continuity of
existence . . ."). Finally Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-4 (1985), also mentions it
("if an organization is not interrupted by the death of a member or by a
change in ownership of a participating interest . . .").
331. UNwoRo t PARTNERSHEp ACT §§ 30, 31 & 42.
332. UNonat PARTNERs=e ACT § 17.
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tration"3 3 Even dissolution would not be an unusual restriction
on the life of a corporation,33" and it would be safe to say that
few professional corporations will ever be dissolved involuntarily
or have their certificates of registration revoked, whether or not
the grounds for involuntary dissolution occur for a time." 5 The
professional corporation, therefore, appears to have continuity
of life as that concept is used in the early regulations.
Two other characteristics of corporations mentioned in these
regulations are centralization of title,"0 and the ability to sue in
the name of the organization 3 7 Professional corporations obvi-
ously have these characteristics. 3 The professional corporation
has, therefore, every corporate characteristic, major and minor,
mentioned in the early regulations, as well as the further charac-
teristic of corporateness, the corporate charter.
The professional association also has each of the characteristics
mentioned in the regulations except the corporate charter. Be-
cause of the more doubtful extent of limited liability conferred on
a professional association,"* this characteristic may be present in
a diminished form. Yet, arguably, however the courts ultimately
define the extent of its limited liability, the professional associa-
tion form still provides substantial limited liability, even though
confined to debt only. Limited debt liability could have substan-
tial significance in the acquisition of extensive equipment, or of
a clinic building. One could further argue and predict that these
associations will be given, and indeed already have, substantial
limited liability in the area of professional negligence 4 o
Whether the limited liability characteristic is present in full,
almost in full, or only in part is not important. The professional
association has so many other characteristics of a corporation
that its classification as a corporation for tax purposes is clear
even without limited liability. The early regulations never sug-
gested that an organization had to have anywhere near all the
corporate characteristics discussed. Under the earliest regula-
tions mere use of the name "association" and formation of the
enterprise under an "association" statute was enough to compel
333. MMr. STAT. § 319.12 (1961).
334. See note 373 infra.
835. See text accompanying notes 369-76 infra.
336. E.g., Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-3 (1935).
337. E.g., ibid.
338. Professional corporations are covered by the Minnesota Busines Cor-
poration Act., MNx. STAT. M 300.08(2), .08(4) (1961).
389. See text accompanying notes 896-98 infra.
340. See text accompanying notes 395-403 infra.
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association classification.341 Under Regulations 45, association
status required only (1) membership interests which were trans-
ferable without the consent of all the members, however the
transfer was otherwise restricted; and (2) conduct of the business
of the association by trustees or directors and officers without
the active participation of all the members as such.3 * Obviously
both requirements are present for the professional association.
Under another section of Regulations 45 distinguishing limited
partnerships and corporations, 343 again the professional associa-
tion would be classified as a corporation and not as a partnership.
All the mentioned characteristics are present - limited liability,
transferability of shares, capacity to hold real estate, and the
ability to bring suit in the common name.
Regulations 86 and those following mention the factors of
continuation of the organization even though its members change,
and management is by a group acting in a representative ca-
pacity344 - almost the same factors as in the earlier regulations.
Apparently, continuity of life is substituted for transferability of
interest in the section defining "association."3 45 Limited liability
is not even mentioned in that section. Also, these regulations ap-
parently give effect to agreements by the parties defining the
structure of the organization. Local law is flexible enough con-
cerning centralization of management and transferability of in-
terests, and perhaps even as to continuity of life, so that these
characteristics could be provided by a trust instrument, by part-
nership articles, or by articles of association. Of course, local law
is not quite so flexible with regard to limited liability, centraliza-
tion of title, and the capacity to sue in the name of the organiza-
tion. Whether such agreements by the parties can limit a charac-
teristic that is normally present, such as the transferability and
limited liability characteristics of corporations, is not discussed. In
conclusion, the professional association would be characterized as
an association under these early regulations, applied at face value.
The early regulations seem to be consistent with what little
guidance the statutes and the legislative history provide, and the
cases tend to follow the regulations generally and to sweep doubt-
ful cases into the association category. These regulations received
explicit approval in the cases generally, and in particular in the
841. Treas. Reg. 83, art. 58 (rev. 1918).
342. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1503 (1920 ed. 1921).
343. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1506 (1920 ed. 1921).




Morrissey group of Supreme Court cases.34 Since these regula-
tions are largely consistent, and therefore long standing, since
they were issued contemporaneously with many of the sections
they interpret, and since they received uniform approval by the
courts, it would be safe to say that they acquired the status of
"force of law" in the sense that the courts gave them great weight.
Any later changes in the regulations must therefore be viewed in
the light of this long history of the early regulations and the
acceptance they found in the courts.
D. THE "KITNER" REGULATIONS
United States v. Kintnerse was an important victory for tax-
payers who longed for the tax advantages of the corporate form,
but were not permitted to adopt it. At first the Internal Revenue
Service announced it would not follow the Kintner decision.s*
Later the service announced its position was changing and a rul-
ing would be issued redefining the criteria for classifying an asso-
ciation for tax purposes as a corporation.3" Regulations were
proposed in 19593ro and final regulations, the so-called "Kintner"
Regulations, were proclaimed in 1960.** From the beginning,
clearly a more appropriate title for these regulations would be
the "anti-Kintner" Regulations.
The regulations begin with a statement of standards to be
followed:
(b) Standards.-The Internal Revenue Code prescribes certain
categories, or classes, into which various organizations fall for purposes
of taxation. These categories, or classes, include associations (which
are taxable as corporations), partnerships, and trusts. The tests, or
standards, which are to be applied in determining the classification in
which an organization belongs (whether it is an association, a partner-
ship, a trust, or other taxable entity) are determined under the Internal
Revenue Code. Sections 301.7701-2 to 801.7701-4 set forth these tests,
or standards, which are to be applied in determining whether an
organization is (1) an association (see § 301.7701-2), (2) a partnership
(see § 301.7701-3), or (3) a trust (see § 301.7701-4).
(c) Effect of local law.-As indicated in paragraph (b) of this
section, the classes into which organizations axe to be placed for pur-
346. See notes 114-15 supra and accompanying text.
347. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954); see notes 162-74 supra and accompany-
ing text.
848. Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 Cum. Buue. 598.
349. Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 Cuox. Bum,. 886.
350. 24 Fed. Reg. 10450 (1959).
351. Treas. Reg. H§ 301.7701-1 to -11 (1960), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 CuM.
BuLL. 409 (amended by, T.D. 6797, 1965 INT. REV. Bua,. No. 9, at 38).
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poses of taxation are determined under the Internal Revenue Code.
Thus, a particular organization might be classified as a trust under the
law of one State and a corporation under the law of another State.
However, for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, this organization
would be uniformly classed as a trust, an association (and, therefore,
taxable as a corporation), or some other entity, depending upon its
nature under the classification standards of the Internal Revenue Code.
Similarly, the term "partnership" is not limited to the common law
meaning of partnership, but is broader in its scope and includes groups
not commonly called partnerships. See § 1.761-1 of this chapter (In-
come Tax Regulations) and § 301.7701-8. The term "corporation" is
not limited to the artificial entity usually known as a corporation, but
includes also an association, a trust classed as an association because
of its nature or its activities, a joint-stock company, and an insurance
company. Although it is the Internal Revenue Code rather than local
law which establishes the tests or standards which win be applied in
determining the classification in which an organization belongs, local
law governs in determining whether the legal relationships which have
been established in the formation of an organization are such that the
standards are met. Thus, it is local law which must be applied in
determining such matters as the legal relationships of the members of
the organization among themselves and with the public at large, and
the interests of the members of the organization in its assets. 852
These provisions do a good job of resolving the problem of
where one looks for the criteria for determining the classification
of an organization, and also avoid the absurd "local law is of no
importance" position taken, at least in those words, in the pre-
ceding regulations. 5 These provisions point to federal standards,
while relying upon local law to determine whether the particular
characteristic is present in the case. For example, limited liability
is one of the standards, but obviously one must consult local law
to determine whether limited liability exists in the particular case.
The section intended to set forth the criteria for classification
of a business organization as an association begins as follows:
§ 301.7701-2 AssocIATIoNs. - (a) Characteristics of corporations. -
(1) The term "association" refers to an organization whose character-
istics require it to be classified for purposes of taxation as a corporation
rather than as another type of organization such as a partnership or a
trust. There are a number of major characteristics ordinarily found in a
pure corporation which, taken together, distinguish it from other organ-
izations. These are: (i) Associates, (ii) an objective to carry on business
and divide the gains therefrom, (iii) continuity of life, (iv) centralization
of management, (v) liability for corporate debts limited to corporate
property, and (vi) free transferability of interests. Whether a particular
organization is to be classified as an association must be determined by
352. Treas. Reg. § 801.7701-1(b) to -(c) (1960), T.D. 6508, 1960-2 Cua.
BuLL. 412.
353. See note 298 supra and accompanying text.
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taking into account the presence or absence of each of these corporate
characteristics. The presence or absence of these characteristics will de-
pend upon the facts in each individual case. In addition to the major
characteristics set forth in this subparagraph, other factors may be
found in some cases which may be significant in classifying an organ-
ization as an association, a partnership, or a trust. An organization will
be treated as an association if the corporate characteristics are such
that the organization more nearly resembles a corporation than a part-
nership or trust. See Morrissey et al. v. Commissioner (1985) 296 U.S.
844 . . . .85
There seems to be some change in emphasis here. Under the early
regulations, the intent was to sweep doubtful cases into the
association classification. Therefore, one found statements such
as the following in Regulations 45: "In all doubtful cases limited
partnerships will be treated as corporations unless they submit
satisfactory proof that they are not in effect so organized."355
This provision stayed in the regulations until Regulations 103,
in which more neutral language was used,56 although approxi-
mately the same tests as before were specified.
1. Continuity of Life
Continuity of life is the first characteristic of corporations
discussed under the Kintner Regulations:
(b) Continuity of life. - (1) An organization has continuity of life
if the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expul-
sion of any members will not cause a dissolution of the organization.
On the other hand, if the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement,
resignation, or expulsion of any member will cause a dissolution of
the organization, continuity of life does not exist. If the retirement,
death, or insanity of a general partner of a limited partnership causes
a dissolution of the partnership, unless the remaining general partners
agree to continue the partnership or unless all remaining members agree
to continue the partnership, continuity of life does not exist. See
Gleneder Textile Company (1942) 46 B.T.A. 176 (A., C.B. 1942-1, 8).
(2) For purposes of this paragraph, dissolution of an organization
means an alteration of the identity of an organization by reason of a
change in the relationship between its members as determined under
local law. For example, since the resignation of a partner from a gen-
eral partnership destroys the mutual agency which exists between such
partner and his copartners and thereby alters the personal relation
between the partners which constitutes the identity of the partnership
itself, the resignation of a partner dissolves the partnership. A corpora-
tion, however, has a continuing identity which is detached from the
854. Treas. Reg. § 801.7701-2(a) (1960), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 Cua. BurLL.
418.
855. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1506 (1920 ed. 1921).
856. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.8797-5 (1940).
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relationship between its stockholders. The death, insanity, or bank-
ruptcy of a shareholder or the sale of a shareholder's interest has no
effect upon the identity of the corporation and, therefore, does not
work a dissolution of the organization. An agreement by which an or-
ganization is established may provide that the business will be contin-
ued by the remaining members in the event of the death or withdrawal
of any member, but such agreement does not establish continuity of life
if under local law the death or withdrawal of any member causes a
dissolution of the organization. Thus, there may be a dissolution of the
organization and no continuity of life although the business is con-
tinued by the remaining members.
(3) An agreement establishing an organization may provide that
the organization is to continue for a stated period or until the com-
pletion of a stated undertaking or such agreement may provide for the
termination of the organization at will or otherwise. In determining
whether any member has the power of dissolution, it will be necessary
to examine the agreement and to ascertain the effect of such agreement
under local law. For example, if the agreement expressly provides that
the organization can be terminated by the will of any member, it is
clear that the organization lacks continuity of life. However, if the
agreement provides that the organization is to continue for a stated
period or until the completion of a stated transaction, the organization
has continuity of life if the effect of the agreement is that no member
has the power to dissolve the organization in contravention of the
agreement. Nevertheless, if notwithstanding such agreement, any mem-
ber has the power under local law to dissolve the organization, the
organization lacks continuity of life. Accordingly, a general partnership
subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Partnership Act
and a limited partnership subject to a statute corresponding to the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act both lack continuity of life.3 57
This provision differs considerably from the earlier provision.
For one thing, the meaning of continuity of life is spelled out in
great detail, whereas the earlier formulation was as simple as
"which are dissolved by the death or attempted transfer of the
interest of a general partner"55 and "which, like a corporation,
continues notwithstanding that its members or participants
change . . . .""' The point clearly is made that the concept of
continuity is a technical, entity, identity concept, apparently hav-
ing nothing to do with whether the "business" in fact carries on.
The entity interpretation of the continuity of interest criterion
has some merit, if this criterion is to be used at all in these classi-
fication problems. The only real determinants of whether a busi-
ness continues on the occasions specified are not the legal forms
at all, but rather entirely such factors as who died, who remains,
what the relative contribution of each may have been or will be,
357. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1960).
358. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1505 (1920 ed. 1921).
359. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-2 (1935).
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and the general health of the business. It is most doubtful that
the form has anything to do with continuity of the business in
the real, ordinary sense. The parties to a partnership agreement,
for example, may agree to carry on the business,3 10 and it will
not, therefore, have to be liquidated or sold but may continue
with a minimum of disruption. The partnership continues for tax
purposes."e Arguably, from all this, since continuity of life has
nothing to do with the form used, it should not be considered in
classifying organizations into one form or another. Or possibly
one should look to the actual facts; if continuity appears, one
finds a characteristic of corporations. However, the latter ap-
proach requires extensive fact finding, probably not justified for
this purpose. On the other hand, continuity is a technical, entity
concept, and is arguably relevant to the classification issue be-
cause corporations appear to have continuity of the entity, and
partnerships in their natural state do not.
One who approaches the classification issue factually, looking
for certain facts that appear when a corporation is found, would
probably conclude that continuity is irrelevant, since it depends
on factors quite apart from whether there is corporateness. Obvi-
ously, a small business has the same chance for continuing in
business whether it operates under the form of a corporation or
the form of a partnership. To say that today one form provides
more actual continuity than the other simply makes no sense.
Perhaps the situation was otherwise when the question of classi-
fication for tax purposes first arose. But today no practical differ-
ence exists for the prediction of which form will make survival
more likely. Consequently, any factual justification of the con-
tinuity criterion must be rejected.
The technical entity approach to continuity of life remains -
assuming for the moment the relevance of the continuity criterion.
Some consequences differ depending on the form used. A "dissolu-
tion" of a partnership takes place at the will of a partner, when
he dies or when his interest is otherwise transferred.3 6 2 Although
the old partnership is dissolved, under the articles a new partner-
ship probably is created without the business missing a breath.
The withdrawing partner, however, as a result of the dissolution
and notice to creditors, has no liability for debts incurred after
the dissolution,63 and the new partner has no personal liability for
860. UNIFonM PARTNERSHIP AcT & 41.
861. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 708.
3862. Umyoimt PARTNERSHIP AcT§ 31.
863. CRANE, PARTNERSHip § 81 (2d ed. 1952).
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debts of the business incurred before he became a partner.6' The
corporation entity, in contrast, continues unchanged upon such
occasions. Furthermore, the rights of the parties and their powers
over one another vary somewhat on these occasions. The partner
has a right to an accountinge' - a substantial bundle of rights -
while the shareholder has only the uncertain remedy of a deriva-
tive suit - ordinarily not a substantial bundle of rights.Y6" The
shareholder will have a limited access to the books and records,
of course.
All these considerations might lead one to conclude that the
criterion of continuity of life is not valid. The first difference,
liability for debts, is only a question of whether there is personal
liability or not, and when it is cut off. The second may be a
characteristic of corporations by itself - that is, the particular
rights of the beneficial owners with respect to the other owners
and those managing the business - and not a reason to support
the relevance of the general criterion, continuity of life. The more
the concept is examined, the softer it appears. Thus, one questions
its relevance to the classification issue. The relevance is nowhere
expressed in the regulations except by a reference to "pure" cor-
porations having it.
Even if continuity of life in one form or another is relevant,
how important is it? The legislative history to the early revenue
acts suggests there was once some importance. But if continuity
of life was an important advantage in the early days to use of
the corporate form, is it today? Considering the continuity that
may be achieved under the partnership form, who would counsel
a client to use the corporate form because of the advantage of
continuity of life? Another difficulty is that the court in Kintner
found continuity of life in that situation.ST presumably in the
agreement between the members. But the agreement could not
provide any more continuity than a partnership agreement could
provide. If the Kintner group was a partnership under local law,
it was still probably subject to dissolution, notwithstanding the
agreement. If it was a partnership, therefore, the Kintner group
had no continuity as defined in the Kintner Regulations. The
question remains, what continuity did it have? One answer is
that the agreement provided continuity, and it is that type of
364. Id. § 88.
365. U~uroRm PARTNERSHIP ACT § 22.
366. See 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE CoRPORATIONs §§ 8.07-.08 (1958), for some
examples of what can happen to a minority shareholder and the uncertainty
of his remedies.
367. 216 F.2d at 422-23.
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continuity rather than entity continuity that the court had in
mind. Professor Sneed's analysis used a similar approach. Ap-
parently, therefore, that concept in the Kintner Regulations is
quite different from the concept of continuity in Kintner and
the concept of avoiding discontinuity in the early regulations.
In summary, continuity appears at the most a rather minor
technical characteristic, if relevant at all.
If the technical entity approach of the Kintner Regulations
is adopted, the effect on the various models must be examined.
The closely-held personal service corporation will no doubt have
the continuity required under the regulations, no matter how
stable or unstable the relationship of the people concerned may
be. The professional association statutes,.36  and of course the
professional corporation statutes, 6 9 provide for continuation of
the entity with no technical dissolution upon the death, insanity,
retirement, etc. of a member. Some questions have been raised
about whether such organizations really have the required con-
tinuity, since the state is given the power to dissolve the associa-
tion or revoke the certificate of registration of the corporation
for failure to comply with certain requirements - for instance,
failure to expel a member who has been disqualified to practice,
or inability or failure to purchase shares coming into the hands
of an unqualified shareholder.37 o It has also been suggested that
under these provisions a member's death, bankruptcy, or retire-
ment may imperil the life of the professional association or cor-
poration.371 The objection is mostly a matter of conjuring up
difficulties of no great substance. Actual dissolution is most
unlikely to come from these provisions. First, there seldom will
be cause for the dissolution, since normally there will be a buy-out
agreement, or other provision made to avoid disqualifying events.
Second, even in the rare case of cause for the dissolution, such a
drastic remedy obviously will be taken only as a last resort, after
considerable negotiation and opportunity to remove the difficulty
providing cause for dissolution. Third, nothing in the early regu-
lations, the Kintner Regulations, or the cases even suggests that
the continuity looked for, or sought to be avoided, depends upon
the presence of such a remedy. Clearly, the concept refers to
368. E.g., GA. CODE AN. § 84-4309 (Supp. 1963).
369. E.g., Muhm. STAT. § 319.05 (1961) provides for general applicability
of Minnesota law on corporations. MuNm. STAT. § 301.04(2) (1961) states that
the duration of a corporation may be perpetual.
370. Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation:
Some Questions and Comments, 17 TAx L. REv. 1, 15-17 (1961).
371. Id. at 16.
1965] 677
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
continuity upon, for instance, the death or other withdrawal of
the owner of a beneficial interest rather than the state's theo-
retical power to dissolve completely the business upon the occur-
rence of some relatively unlikely event. The concept properly
applied, therefore, concerns an occasion that rather automatically
causes dissolution, not a remote possibility of dissolution as a
result of subsequent proceedings brought by the state. Fourth,
the state's power to dissolve a corporation is not an unusual one,
even if infrequently invoked. Any corporation is subject to that
power under certain typical statutory provisions.07 A multitude
of provisions specify, and cases find, power to dissolve for various
reasons.373 In these instances the provision for dissolution is not
self-executing, but the dissolution occurs only upon conclusion
of a judicial proceeding brought by an officer of the state. The
shareholders may, of course, dissolve the corporation for any
reason, and it is not unusual to do so when a deadlock is reached
on important questions. The insolvency of a corporation may
not cause technical dissolution, but the creditors may obtain al-
most the same rights they would obtain under a technical dis-
solution.87 5 Consequently, the insolvency of a corporation may
be considered a de facto, or practical dissolution. Every corpora-
tion, therefore, is subject to voluntary and involuntary dissolu-
tion. Some corporations, which involve the public interest, are
subject to dissolution for specified reasons that usually apply only
to the particular class of corporations.
Arguably, a "pure" or average corporation is not subjected to
even the threat of dissolution for such things as are specified by
the professional association and corporation statutes, and there-
fore these organizations lack continuity to some extent. 7" How-
ever, that assertion begs the question. Nothing in the statute,
legislative history, the early regulations, or the cases makes a
"pure" corporation, whatever that may be, the model for corpo-
rateness. The professional corporation and association provisions
are well within the range of typical regulatory provisions ap-
plicable to corporations in which the public has a greater than
average interest. Furthermore, the professional corporation pro-
372. See, e.g., Mmsx. STAT. § 801.49 (1961).
378. For example, failure to make reports or pay taxes, or the commission
of a crime are reasons for dissolution. 16A FLETcHER, PivATE CORPORATIONS
§§ 8045, 8052 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1962). See generally id. § 6690, 7999, 8036,
8045-46, 8052-57, 8065, 8067, 8069 & 8072.
374. 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONs § 9.03, at 170 (1958).
375. 16A FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 373, § 7967, at 10-11.
376. Bittker, spra note 370, at 15.
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vision is for revocation of the certification of registration, not
for dissolution. In any event, these professional corporations
and associations do have substantial continuity upon the events
which normally cause automatic dissolution of a partnership,
since any dissolution which can occur is not likely, nor automatic,
nor immediate.
2. Centralization of Management
The Kintner Regulations provide:
(c) Centralization of management.-(1) An organization has central-
ized management if any person (or any group of persons which does
not include all the members) has continuing exclusive authority to
make the management decisions necessary to the conduct of the busi-
ness for which the organization was formed. Thus, the persons who
are vested with such management authority resemble in powers and
functions the directors of a statutory corporation. The effective operation
of a business organization composed of many members generally de-
pends upon the centralization in the hands of a few of exclusive au-
thority to make management decisions for the organization, and there-
fore, centralized management is more likely to be found in such an
organization than in a smaller organization.
(2) The persons who have such authority may, or may not, be
members of the organization and may hold office as a result of a selec-
tion by the members from time to time, or may be self-perpetuating
in office. See Morrissey et al. v. Commissioner (1935) 296 U.S. 344 ....
Centralized management can be accomplished by election to office, by
proxy appointment, or by any other means which has the effect of con-
centrating in a management group continuing exclusive authority to
make management decisions.
(3) Centralized management means a concentration of continuing
exclusive authority to make independent business decisions on behalf
of the organization which do not require ratification by members of
such organization. Thus, there is not centralized management when the
centralized authority is merely to perform ministerial acts as an agent
at the direction of a principal.
(4) There is no centralization of continuing exclusive authority to
make management decisions, unless the managers have sole authority
to make such decisions. For example, in the case of a corporation or a
trust, the concentration of management powers in a board of directors
or trustees effectively prevents a stockholder or a trust beneficiary,
simply because he is a stockholder or beneficiary, from binding the
corporation or the trust by his acts. However, because of the mutual
agency relationship between members of a general partnership subject
to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Partnership Act, such a
general partnership cannot achieve effective concentration of manage-
ment powers and, therefore, centralized management. Usually, the act
of any partner within the scope of the partnership business binds all
the partners; and even if the partners agree among themselves that the
powers of management shall be exclusively in a selected few, this agree-
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ment will be ineffective as against an outsider who had no notice of it.
In addition, limited partnerships subject to a statute corresponding to
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, generally do not have centralized
management, but centralized management ordinarily does exist in such
a limited partnership if substantially all the interests in the partnership
are owned by the limited partners.377
These provisions differ considerably from the early regulations
and cases. In some of the cases the requisite centralization of
management was found even when all of the beneficial owners
were active in the management. 78 Furthermore, although the
earliest regulations refer to the business being conducted by less
than all the members or owners, 79 the later regulations put em-
phasis on the representative capacity of those who conduct the
businesss3 0 not the relative number of persons involved. This
language of the later regulations also seems more consistent with
the cases which found centralized management without regard
to whether less than all the owners were involved in management.
Moreover, the later regulations are more consistent with the Kint-
ner case, where in all probability the group was a partnership
under local law, and therefore, theoretically all the owners could
be involved in management. The centralized management of the
preceding regulations and cases, therefore, seems to depend upon
whether the parties adopted a form which necessarily involves
technical or formal delegation, such as provided by the trust and
corporation forms, or whether they have in fact adopted central-
ized management in their governing articles as a way of estab-
lishing their internal relationships. One finds no general support
for Regulation section 301.7701-2(c) (4), which states that a part-
nership cannot achieve centralized management, because any
partner can bind the others even if he has agreed not to do so.
Although centralized management in fact is a function of size,
the centralized management discussed under the early regulations
and cases is apparently not dependent upon size. Consequently,
it is difficult to square the observation that size is a likely indica-
tion of centralized managements3 8 with the whole theory of the
Kintner Regulations, that the concept is a highly formal one.
A greater problem is to find the relevance of the concept of
centralized management to the classification problem. It seems
377. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-9(c) (1960).
378. Commissioner v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates, 296 U.S. 369 (1935);
Swanson v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 362 (1935); Foreman v. United States, 32
F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
379. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1503 (1920 ed. 1921) (quoted in note 270 supra).
380. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-2 (1935) (quoted in note 299 supra).
381. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (1960).
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very doubtful that the form of business used has anything to do
with real centralized management, which obviously is a function
of size, and apart from size depends entirely upon the personali-
ties of the various participants and their relative power in the
organization. The more technical definition of centralized man-
agement may have some value as a way of describing some dif-
ferences in the various forms of doing business, but these differ-
ences can be reduced by arrangement between the owners. The
approach of the Kintner Regulations has the advantage of being
easy to apply to particular cases (partnerships can never have
centralized management; apparently trusts always do), but these
regulations are inconsistent with the early regulations and cases
which did find centralized management in the agreements be-
tween the participants.
On the question of whether professional associations and cor-
porations have centralized management, it has been argued that
the traditional responsibility of each professional to his patient
or client makes centralized management impossible,3 " and fur-
ther, that the professional's responsibility to a state licensing or
regulating board interferes with centralized management.83 The
objection asserts that centralized management is not concerned
with housekeeping details alone, but must involve professional
decisions, and on these professional decisions centralized man-
agement cannot be achieved.
What might be housekeeping functions, in contrast to the pro-
fessional decisions, that supposedly cannot be subjected to cen-
tralized management? Normally a professional association or
corporation would set up standard procedures for determining
what patients or clients will be accepted and how they will be
assigned to professionals; in the case of a medical practice, con-
sideration might be given to what lab tests and other procedures
will be done in the office, how they will be done, what tests will
be referred out, how consultations will be handled, how records
are to be kept, what fees are to be charged, and what salaries
are to be paid. Management might also be responsible for hiring
and firing nurses and clerical personnel; perhaps even the hiring of
doctors would be entrusted to a management committee, or board
of directors, but not necessarily if the group is small. Setting of
salaries probably would in fact be negotiated in a small group;
in a larger group the board of directors might actually set salaries.
All of those matters might be characterized as housekeeping de-
tails, or they might be said to be management functions of im-
882. Bittker, supra note 870, at 14.
383. Ibid.
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portance in a professional organization. Handing over that much
of the affairs of the group to a representative managing group is
considerable centralization of management. Nothing in the cases
or the early regulations, or in the Kintner Regulations, suggests
that more is required. It is argued, however, that the nature of
the professional relationship places so many decisions of a man-
agement character outside the authority of the management group
as to substantially remove the requisite centralization. Since the
statutes explicitly preserve the professional relationship and re-
sponsibility, it is said that the legislature intended the profes-
sional to make important decisions by himself, in disregard of a
judgment of a board of directors, if necessary."'
The assertion that these groups have no control over profes-
sional decisions is not necessarily true and not in accord with
the facts. A board of directors of a professional association or
corporation may have, and may exercise, considerable control
over professional decisions. Since an association may become liable
for the professional acts of its members, it certainly has the
authority to control those acts. In routine matters the manage-
ment does not care greatly about how professional decisions are
made, so long as the quality is generally acceptable and the pro-
ductivity sufficient. But in the important, unusual case, when
professional judgment is important, management may very well
become involved. Normally, the professional would call in his
colleagues, or his senior, to discuss important matters of profes-
sional judgment. A difficult decision about whether to operate,
whether to use a dangerous or experimental method, would clearly
be within the authority of the board, if it wishes to exercise that
authority, and the decision might very well be made by the
board. After all, the liability of the group is involved in these
professional decisions. Whether the board does act will vary from
group to group and from case to case. In some groups, professional
centralized management in fact will be heavy, in others light.
Also, whether a board, or an executive or management committee
of a partnership, exercises such authority is almost entirely a
matter of personality, power, and relationship of those concerned.
Such professional, centralized management is not unusual in law
firms, as anyone who has practiced law should know.
However, centralization in fact is not what is required for
corporateness. The Kintner Regulations look for centralization
in the form of the organization as specified under local law; the
cases look as well to the grant of authority in the agreement of
884. See Note, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 776, 782 (1962).
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the parties. Both searches for centralized management are di-
rected toward authority, not how the group works in day to day
activities. The search for centralized management is illusive
enough without sinking into such a bog of facts.
Since centralization of management is a shaky basis for classi-
fying professional or any other groups for tax purposes, it serves
no useful purpose to put too much strain on the concept if it is
to be used. The Kintner Regulations adopt a technical approach
to the question with the view that a partnership cannot have
centralized management. The technical approach has utility, for
it avoids a search for the facts, and the highly technical approach
of the Kintner Regulations even provides some basis for election
of tax classification. Even if the regulations are valid on this
point, the professional association or corporation appears to have
centralized management because the law provides for a board
of directors to have authority to manage the affairs of the group.
If the regulation is not valid, then such a group may achieve
centralization by contract, and the professional associations and
corporations have centralization a fortiori. Some rulings support
the analysis that these groups have technical centralized man-
agement. Revenue Ruling 61-178 3" held a physician to be an
employee of a business corporation rather than an independent
contractor for social security and withholding tax purposes. The
ruling observed that this employee-physician is subject to super-
vision "as to the manner in which his services are to be per-
formed."1ase In rulings on the tax status of professional groups,
the service has stated that control over general policies and gen-
eral standards is sufficient."' If the concept of centralized man-
agement is to be used for classification, control over general
policies, procedures, and standards should be sufficient. An ex-
ploration into how much the board tells the doctor to do is not
required by law, regulation, cases, or reason. A slight difference
in degree of actual control should not be elevated to a compelling
policy reason for classification one way or the other.
8. Limited Liability
The Kintner Regulations provide:
(d) Limited liability. - (1) An organization has the corporate
characteristic of limited liability if under local law there is no member
who is personally liable for the debts of or claims against the organiza-
385. 1961-2 Cnut. BuLL. 153.
886. 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 154.
387. Ibid.; Special Ruling, March 2, 1961 (Colony Medical Group), 2 CCH
PENsIoN PLAN GumE (2d ed.) [ 12927 (1962).
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tion. Personal liability means that a creditor of an organization may
seek personal satisfaction from a member of the organization to the
extent that the assets of such organization are insufficient to satisfy
the creditor's claim. A member of the organization who is personally
liable for the obligations of the organization may make an agree-
ment under which another person, whether or not a member of the
organization, assumes such liability or agrees to indemnify such mem-
ber for any such liability. However, if under local law the member
remains liable to such creditors notwithstanding such agreement, there
exists personal liability with respect to such member. In the case of
a general partnership subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform
Partnership Act, personal liability exists with respect to each general
partner. Similarly, in the case of a limited partnership subject to a
statute corresponding to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, personal
liability exists with respect to each general partner, except as provided
in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph.
(2) In the case of an organization formed as a limited partnership,
personal liability does not exist, for purposes of this paragraph, with
respect to a general partner when he has no substantial assets (other
than his interest in the partnership) which could -be reached by a credi-
tor of the organization and when he is merely a "dummy" acting as
the agent of the limited partners. Notwithstanding the formation of
the organization as a limited partnership, when the limited partners
act as the principals of such general partner, personal liability will
exist with respect to such limited partners. Also, if a corporation is a
general partner, personal liability exists with respect to such general
partner when the corporation has substantial assets (other than its
interest in the partnership) which could be reached by a creditor of
the limited partnership. A general partner may contribute his services,
but no capital, to the organization, but if such general partner has sub-
stantial assets (other than his interest in the partnership), there exists
personal liability. Furthermore, if the organization is engaged in finan-
cial transactions which involve large sums of money, and if the general
partners have substantial assets (other than their interests in the part-
nership), there exists personal liability although the assets of such
general partners would be insufficient to satisfy any substantial portion
of the obligations of the organization. In addition, although the general
partner has no substantial assets (other than his interest in the partner-
ship), personal liability exists with respect to such general partner
when he is not merely a "dummy" acting as the agent of the limited
partners.388
This section appears reasonable. The personal liability of a
partner for obligations of the partnership is imposed by operation
of law; it cannot be avoided by agreement between the partners.
Although some of the cases are a little fuzzy, limited liability,
whenever present, is recognized as a characteristic of corporate-
ness.*8 9 It was so recognized in the early legislative history.390
388. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1960).
389. Notes 130, 146-55 apra and accompanying text.
390. See note 46 aupra and accompanying text.
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Although the early regulations do not go into much detail on
limited liability, this provision in the Kintner Regulations seems
consistent with them. Interestingly, however, the Kintner group
of doctors asserted limited liability, but in fact probably had none.
Unquestionably, a partner's liability is without limit for the
torts and debts of the partnership, including torts and debts of
the partnership arising out of the conduct of the partnership's
business by another partner or an employee of the partnership.s9e
Likewise, the limited liability of a corporate shareholder is clear
- he is not personally liable for any debt or tort arising out of
the conduct of the corporation's business.39 2 If a tort is commit-
ted by another employee, he will not have to worry about his
personal assets being jeopardized. If he commits the tort himself,
however, he remains personally liable even though the corpora-
tion is also liable. 93 But his liability does not arise out of his
status as shareholder; it comes from his position as the tortfeasor.
The professional corporation apparently does enjoy limited
liability.' Some questions have been raised, however, as to
whether the professional association enjoys limited liability."5 The
difficulty arises out of provisions such as Section 7 of the Georgia
Professional Association Statute, quoted and discussed above.""
Clearly, a shareholder has limited liability for the debts of such
an organization.3 97 However, it is argued, section 7 subjects the
doctor-shareholder to unlimited liability for the most significant
risks of the professional business, and gives him immunity from
only the less substantial risks. It follows, the argument goes, that
the degree of limited liability required by the regulations is not
present. 9" This argument includes the assertion that section 7
changes nothing with respect to a professional's liability for the
torts of the corporation caused by the professional negligence of
other doctor-employees of the association.
Section 7 also raises the problem whether the doctor-member
of an association would be liable to a patient or client for the
391. UmFoRm PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 13, 15.
392. MINN. STAT. § 301.19 (1961).
393. See generally BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONs § 112 (rev. ed. 1946).
394. See text accompanying notes 214-17 supra.
395. Bittker, supra note 370, at 8-13.
396. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-4307 (Supp. 1963); see text accompanying notes
8-24 supra. The provision is extensively discussed in Grayck, Professional
Associations and The Kintner Regulations: Some Answers, More Questions,
and Further Comments, 17 TAX L. REV. 469, 473-98 (1962).
397. GA. CODE Aww. § 84-4307 (Supp. 1963); see text accompanying note
22 supra; Bittker, supra note 370, at 8-13.
398. Bittker, supra note 370, at 8-13.
1965] 685
86MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:603
failure to achieve his promised cure or resultses - seemingly not
an important point as these cases are rare. However, if the doctor-
employee of a professional corporation is liable on certain war-
ranties, it is not as a shareholder, but rather as an employee.
Consequently, his limited liability as a shareholder is not im-
paired.400
The most probable interpretation of section 7 is that the pro-
fessional who is a member of an association merely retains his
common law liability for torts he personally commits. This narrow
construction does not affect the limited liability of the doctor as
shareholder or as employee, and seems most consistent with the
language of the provision. The most prominent difficulty with
this interpretation is that the legislature is not likely to restate
what is already law in such a statute.
Another interpretation might be that the statute saves certain
forms of personal liability, such as liability for failure to produce
a promised result or vicarious liability for the negligence of an
assistant under the doctor's control.4 o' If the statute was intended
to add anything to the normal liabilities of an employee, this is
the most plausible interpretation. However, such liabilities would
attach not because the professional is a shareholder, but rather
because he is a person who is practicing a particular profession.
A nonshareholder-employee might be liable on a warranty for
cure, and for negligence of an assistant. This language, if it adds
anything, clarifies the liability of the professional employee on
these grounds, but has nothing to do with his status as a share-
holder and consequently cannot be said to diminish limited lia-
bility of shareholders. Furthermore, the evidentiary and financial
responsibility policies served by those rules of vicarious liability
are served just as well by imputing the negligence of the assistant,
for example, to the group.
A further possible interpretation of provisions like section 7
is that the professional retains liability for any tort of a colleague
if he participated in rendering any services out of which the tort
arose, whether or not he is himself to blame.4 0 2 In other words if
a doctor, without negligence, participates in treatment of a pa-
tient, and another doctor in the group is negligent in the course
of the treatment, both are personally liable, while a third doctor
who did nothing on the case would not be liable. This would be
a strained interpretation with no apparent justification for its
399. Bittker, supra note 370, at 10; Note, 75 HARY. L. REv. 776, 781 (1962).
400. Id. at 781 n.86.




different treatment of the two blameless doctors.
Finally, the suggestion has been made that the words and
intent of section 7 go all the way by preserving the liability of
partners in all tort matters arising out of professional services.o3
The statute itself does not seem to so state; such an intent is
doubtful; and such a holding by any high court of a state is most
unlikely.
The relevance of the limited liability criterion is apparent.
Perhaps in most cases today it is the only criterion of corporate-
ness that has any practical significance. Though not required for
corporate classification, 40 4 no one should make the mistake of con-
cluding that it is, therefore, less important than other character-
istics. 405 Rather, limited liability is ordinarily the only substantial
reason, outside of tax considerations, for selecting the corporate
form, and its presence is strong evidence that a corporation or
association is present .406 The professional corporation operates
under a much clearer provision on limited liability and, therefore,
probably has that characteristic. Consequently, both professional
associations and professional corporations appear to have limited
liability, as that concept is used in the regulations and the cases.
4. Free Transferability of Interests
The Kintner Regulations provide:
(e) Free transferability of interests. - (1) An organization has the
corporate characteristic of free transferability of interests each of
its members or those members owning substantially all of the interests
in the organization have the power, without the consent of other mem-
bers, to substitute for themselves in the same organization a person
who is not a member of the organization. In order for this power of
substitution to exist in the corporate sense, the member must be able,
without the consent of other members, to confer upon his substitute
all the attributes of his interest in the organization. Thus, the charac-
teristic of free transferability of interests does not exist in a case in
which each member can, without the consent of other members, assign
only his right to share in profits but cannot so assign his rights to
participate in the management of the organization. Furthermore, al-
403. Bittker, supra note 370, at 9-10.
404. For instance, it was not present in the Kintner case, and yet the
group was classified as an association. In addition, see Professor Sneed's analy-
sis of these factors. Sneed, More About Associations in the Oil and Gas
Industry, 33 TExAS L. REv. 169, 191 (1954).
405. But see, e.g., Note, 12 SAnt. L. REv. 746, 758-59 (1960).
406. Almost any so-called corporate characteristic- centralized manage-
ment, transferability of shares, division of profits with preferences to cer-
tain owners for income or assets in liquidation, etc.- can be imparted to a
partnership by agreement.
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though the agreement provides for the transfer of a member's interest,
there is no power of substitution and no free transferability of interest
if under local law a transfer of a member's interest results in the dis-
solution of the old organization and the formation of a new organization.
(2) If each member of an organization can transfer his interest to a
person who is not a member of the organization only after having
offered such interest to the other members at its fair market value,
it will be recognized that a modified form of free transferability of in-
terests exists. In determining the classification of an organization, the
presence of this modified corporate characteristic will be accorded less
significance than if such characteristic were present in an unmodified
form.407
Transferability in the above quoted regulations is not con-
sistent with the concept as it appears in the cases and preceding
regulations. Transferability as discussed in the cases may be
created by agreement of the parties notwithstanding the local
law of transferability of beneficial interests. 0 Regulations 45
spoke of "an organization the membership interests in which are
transferable without the consent of all the members, however
the transfer may be otherwise restricted .... "40 Rather than an
emphasis on less than all the owners consenting to transfer, the
Kintner Regulations require that each member be able by himself
to transfer his entire interest, or substantially all of his interests,
which must include his right to participate in management. Be-
cause of this requirement and also the specification of no free
transferability upon dissolution of the old organization, a part-
nership cannot possibly have this characteristic under the Kintner
Regulations. The latter specification, which, more simply stated,
says that no continuity means no transferability, is a non sequitur.
No reason is offered for this limitation. Furthermore, no logic
seems to support saying on one hand that a partnership agreement
can never provide transferability but that restrictions in corpo-
rate bylaws or in a buy-out agreement can take it away.
Also, the regulation recognizes a first option arrangement as
providing transferability in a modified form. There was never
such a limitation or restriction of the concept in earlier regula-
tions; and the provision in Regulations 45 is rather specific in
suggesting that other restrictions are of no importance in weigh-
ing whether there is transferability.
The relevance of transferability to corporateness is doubtful
today. On the one hand, partnership interests can be easily
transferable while, on the other, closely held corporation stock
407. Treas. Reg. § 801.7701-2(e) (1960).
408. See text accompanying notes 158-59, 177 & 181-82 supra.
409. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1503 (1920 ed. 1921).
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is notoriously untransferable. The provision in the regulations
that a partnership has no transferability when a transfer causes
technical dissolution is wholly arbitrary and unsupported. A part-
nership can make its interests transferable by agreement. The
truth of the suggestion that free transferability is ludicrous for
most professional groups""o depends on how one defines his con-
cept of transferability and then upon how he applies it.
A further suggestion is that the restrictions on qualifications
of a shareholder in a professional corporation or association and
the inevitable buy-out agreement limit transferability. The pro-
fessional corporation and association statutes do provide for trans-
ferability, however, within the group of licensed physicians in the
state concerned. Therefore, the shares are transferable so far as
local law is concerned, absent special provisions or arrangements.
Whether the parties themselves adopt a contract which provides
a first option in the corporation and then in other shareholders
should not bear on transferability if one applies the concept in
a technical rather than practical fashion. At least a modified
form of transferability is present. In an example, the Kintner
Regulations once recognized transferability in what is called a
modified form.411 The example has now been deleted, however, by
410. Bittker, supra note 370, at 17.
411. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) Example (1) (1960), T.D. 6503, 1960-2
Cu. BuLL. 418, provided:
Example (1). A group of seven doctors forms a clinic for the purpose
of furnishing, for profit, medical and surgical services to the public.
They each transfer assets to the clinic, and their agreement provides
that except upon complete liquidation of the organization on the vote
of three-fourths of its members, no member has any individual interest
in its assets. Their agreement also provides that neither the death,
insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, nor expulsion of a mem-
ber shall cause the dissolution of the organization. Under the applicable
local law, on the occurrence of such an event, no member has the power
to dissolve the organization. The management of the clinic is vested
exclusively in an executive committee of four members elected by all
the members, and under the applicable local law, no one acting without
the authority of this committee has the power to bind the organization
by his acts. Members of the clinic are personally liable for all debts
of, or claims against, the clinic. Every member has the right to transfer
his interest to a doctor who is not a member of the organization, but
he must first advise the organization of the proposed transfer and give
it the opportunity on a vote of the majority to purchase the interest
at its fair market value. The organization has associates and an objec-
tive to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom. While it
does not have the corporate characteristic of limited liability, it does
have the characteristics of centralized management, continuity of life,
and a modified form of free transferability of interests. The organization
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the amendments to the regulations4* discussed below. Since the
shares of professional corporations and associations are transfer-
able without consent of all members, even if subject to a first
option arrangement, transferability is present in the sense that
that concept has been applied. If a factual test is applied, on the
other hand, few closely held corporations have transferability.
The Kintner Regulations made some changes in the wording
of the partnerships and trusts classification sections. In each case
the basic change is to remove references to specific criteria (lim-
ited liability) in these sections and to refer to the general tests
stated for classification of organizations for tax purposes. The
partnership section is expanded somewhat to illustrate situa-
tions which are not partnerships, generally forms of joint own-
ership of property without carrying on a business.4 13  The
limited partnership section" and the partnership association
will be classified as an association for all the purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code.
412. Treas. Reg. § 801.7701-2(g) (1965), T.D. 6797, 1965 INT. REV. BuLL.
No. 9, at 40.
413.
§ 801.7701-3 PARTNEmsPs. - (a) In general. - The term "part-
nership" is broader in scope than the common law meaning of partner-
ship and may include groups not commonly called partnerships. Thus,
the term "partnership" includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture,
or other unincorporated organization through or by means of which
any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which
is not a corporation or a trust or estate within the meaning of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. A joint undertaking merely to share
expenses is not a partnership. For example, if two or more persons
jointly construct a ditch merely to drain surface water from their prop-
erties, they are not partners. Mere co-ownership of property which is
maintained, kept in repair, and rented or leased does not constitute
a partnership. For example, if an individual owner, or tenants in com-
mon, of farm property lease it to a farmer for a cash rental or a share
of the crops, they do not necessarily create a partnership thereby.
Tenants in common, however, may be partners if they actively carry
on a trade, business, financial operation, or venture and divide the
profits thereof. For example, a partnership exists if co-owners of an
apartment building lease space and in addition provide services to the
occupants either directly or through an agent.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (1960).
414. Treas. Reg. § 801.7701-8(b) (1960):
(b) Limited partnership.- (1) In general.-An organization which
qualifies as a limited partnership under State law may be classified for
purposes of the Internal Revenue Code as an ordinary partnership or
as an association. Such a limited partnership will be treated as an asso-
ciation if, applying the principles set forth in § 301.7701-2, the organi-
zation more nearly resembles a corporation than an ordinary partner-
ship or other business entity.
Two examples on limited partnerships follow this provision.
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section 15 merely state a test of resemblance to a corporation. The
trust provisions41e were rewritten to omit the specific tests and to
415. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c) (1960):
(c) Partnership associations.-The laws of a number of States
provide for the formation of organizations commonly known as part-
nership associations. Such a partnership association will be treated as
an association if, applying the principles set forth in § 301.7701-2, the
organization more nearly resembles a corporation than the other types
of business entities.
416. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4 (1960):
TausTs.- (a) Ordinary trusts.-In general, the term "trust" as
used in the Internal Revenue Code refers to an arrangement created
either by a will or by an inter vivos declaration whereby trustees take
title to property for the purpose of protecting or conserving it for the
beneficiaries under the ordinary rules applied in chancery or probate
courts. Usually the beneficiaries of such a trust do no more than accept
the benefits thereof and are not the voluntary planners or creators of
the trust arrangement. However, the beneficiaries of such a trust may
be the persons who create it and it will be recognized as a trust under
the Internal Revenue Code if it was created for the purpose of pro-
tecting or conserving the trust property for beneficiaries who stand in
the same relation to the trust as they would if the trust had been cre-
ated by others for them. Generally speaking, an arrangement will be
treated as a trust under the Internal Revenue Code if it can be shown
that the purpose of the arrangement is to vest in trustees responsibility
for the protection and conservation of property for beneficiaries who
cannot share in the discharge of this responsibility and, therefore, are
not associates in a joint enterprise for the conduct of business for profit.
(b) Business trusts.- There are other arrangements which are
known as trusts because the legal title to property is conveyed to
trustees for the benefit of beneficiaries, but which are not classified as
trusts for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code because they are not
simply arrangements to protect or conserve the property for the bene-
ficiaries. These trusts, which are often known as business or commercial
trusts, generally are created by the beneficiaries simply as a device
to carry on a profit-making business which normally would have been
carried on through business organizations that are classified as corpora-
tions or partnerships under the Internal Revenue Code. However, the
fact that the corpus of the trust is not supplied by the beneficiaries is
not sufficient reason in itself for classifying the arrangement as an
ordinary trust rather than as an association or partnership. The fact
that any organization is technically cast in the trust form, by convey-
ing title to property to trustees for the benefit of persons designated
as beneficiaries, will not change the real character of the organization
if, applying the principles set forth in §M 801.7701-2 and 301.7701-3,
the organization more nearly resembles an association or a partner-
ship than a trust.
(c) Certain investment trusts.-,An "investment" trust of the type
commonly known as a management trust is an association, and a trust
of the type commonly known as a fixed investment trust is an associa-
tion if there is power under the trust agreement to vary the investment
of the certificate holders. See Commissioner v. North American Bond
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describe various forms of trust, ordinary trusts, business trusts,
certain investment trusts, and liquidating trusts.
5. The "Calculus" of the Kintner Regulations
While recognizing the factors of associates, an objective to
carry on business and divide the gains therefrom, continuity of
life, centralization of management, limited liability, and free
transferability of interests, the regulations do not recognize ex-
plicitly such factors as centralization of title 7 and ability to sue
and be sued in the corporate name.418 These factors seem at least
as important as all the factors mentioned in the regulations except
limited liability. Furthermore, in deciding whether an organiza-
tion is an association or a partnership, the Kintner Regulations
do not consider the factors of either associates or an objective
to carry on business and divide gains, since they are common to
both associations and partnerships. 19
Trust (C.C.A.2d 1941) 122 F.2d 545, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 701. How-
ever, if there is no power under the trust agreement to vary the invest-
ment of the certificate holders, such fixed investment trust shall be
classified as a trust.
(d) Liquidating trusts. -Certain organizations which are commonly
known as liquidating trusts are treated as trusts for purposes of the
Internal Revenue Code. An organization will be considered a liquidat-
ing trust if it is organized for the primary purpose of liquidating and
distributing the assets transferred to it, and if its activities are all
reasonably necessary to, and consistent with, the accomplishment of
that purpose. A liquidating trust is treated as a trust for purposes of
the Internal Revenue Code because it is formed with the objective of
liquidating particular assets and not as an orzanization having as its
purpose the carrying on of a profit-making business which normally
would be conducted through business organizations classified as corpo-
rations or partnerships. However, if the liquidation is unreasonably pro-
longed or if the liquidation purpose becomes so obscured by business
activities that the declared purpose of liquidation can be said to be
lost or abandoned, the status of the organization will no longer be that
of a liquidating trust. Bondholders' protective committees, voting
trusts, and other agencies formed to protect the interests of security
holders during insolvency, bankruptcy, or corporate reorganization pro-
ceedings are analogous to liquidating trusts but if subsequently utilized
to further the control or profitable operation of a going business on a
permanent continuing basis, they will lose their classification as trusts
for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code.
417. See text accompanying notes 87-88 supra.
418. See note 273 supra and accompanying text.
419. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1960):
(2) Since associates and an objective to carry on business for joint
profit are essential characteristics of all organizations engaged in busi-
ness for profit (other than the so-called one-man corporation and the
sole proprietorship), the absence of either of these essential character-
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A key section provides the rules for weighing the various cri-
teria deemed relevant under the regulations:
(3) An unincorporated organization shall not be classified as an
association unless suck organization has more corporate characteristics
than noncorporate characteristics. In determining whether an organiza-
tion has more corporate characteristics than noncorporate character-
istics, all characteristics common to both types of organizations shall
not be considered. For example, if a limited partnership has centralized
management and free transferability of interests but lacks continuity of
life and limited liability, and if the limited partnership has no other
characteristics which are significant in determining its classification,
such limited partnership is not classified as an association. Although
the limited partnership also has associates and an objective to carry on
business and divide the gains therefrom, these characteristics are not
considered because they are common to both corporations and part-
nerships. 0
This section introduces the novel test of whether the organization
has more corporate characteristics than noncorporate character-
istics. Previously, the inquiry was whether the organization re-
sembled a corporation. 1 Furthermore, the weighing is done in
a very mechanical manner; each criterion has the same weight,
and apparently one has to show three out of four characteristics
to find corporate existence.
Here the Kintner Regulations are the most objectionable. First,
factors just as relevant as some of the rather thin criteria specified
istics will cause an arrangement among co-owners of property for the
development of such property for the separate profit of each not to
be classified as an association. Some of the major characteristics of a
corporation are common to trusts and corporations, and others are
common to partnerships and corporations. Characteristics common to
trusts and corporations are not material in attempting to distinguish
between a trust and an association, and characteristics common to
partnerships and corporations are not material in attempting to dis-
tinguish between an association and a partnership. For example, since
centralization of management, continuity of life, free transferability of
interests, and limited liability are generally common to trusts and
corporations, the determination of whether a trust which has such
characteristics is to be treated for tax purposes as a trust or as an
association depends on whether there are associates and an objective
to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom. On the other hand,
since associates and an objective to carry on business and divide the
gains therefrom are generally common to both corporations and part-
nerships, the determination of whether an organization which has
such characteristics is to be treated for tax purposes as a partnership
or as an association, depends on whether there exists centralization of
management, continuity of life, free transferability of interests, and
limited liability.
420. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1960). (Emphasis added.)
421. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
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are omitted; second, all criteria are weighted equally; third, it
takes three out of four to find corporate classification. Why two
out of four noncorporate characteristics requires classification as
a partnership, rather than as an association, is not explained.
Nowhere is justification given for applying each criterion as
though it had weight equal to the others. The approach of this
section of the Kintner Regulations is not supported by either the
cases or the early regulations. The cases and Professor Sneed's
article make it clear that some factors are more important than
others. Since some factors seemingly are more important than
others, this section of the regulations should be discarded, even
if all the details on each criterion are accepted.
6. Summary of Application of the Kintner Regulations to the
Model Cases
For the reasons explained above the Kintner Regulations ap-
pear to be unsupported in many details by the early regulations
and the cases. They represent a great change in the regulations,
quite a step from both the earlier regulations and the cases, which
had a strong sweep toward association classification. Consequent-
ly, they represent an attempted change in the law through regula-
tions which should not be accepted without justification. But
even if the Kintner criteria are adopted, the professional corpo-
ration and association should and would be classified as associa-
tions under the provisions, if reasonably applied. These regulations
are almost entirely keyed to local law, and these professional
corporation and association acts do provide the required charac-
teristics under a technical, local law approach.
E. THE AMENDMENTS TO THE KINTNER REGULATIONS
The Kintner Regulations put great emphasis on local law.
Apparently the local law application of any criterion would not
be altered greatly by any agreement between the owners, at least
not one to create corporateness; but some indication is given that
a somewhat diluted form of corporateness would result from a
buy-out agreement. Nothing indicates that an agreement could
increase the corporateness of, for instance, a partnership. All
these matters are left to implication, however, and the general
impression one gets is that local law is applied without much
attention to anything else. As a result, the professional groups
took the Kintner Regulations as an invitation to change local
law and therefore sought legislation which would provide the
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local law to give their professional groups the characteristics of
a corporation when adopting the form of a professional association
or professional corporation.
The amendments to the Kintner Regulations, discussed in this
section, provide the reaction of the Internal Revenue Service.
Amendments to the Kintner Regulations were proposed122 and,
after more than a year, were adopted on February 2, 1965.2 The
early cases and regulations, on the whole, tended to sweep organ-
izations into the association category by reference to corporate
characteristics found in local law, or in the agreements themselves.
The Kintner Regulations moved somewhat in the other direction
by heavily emphasizing local law and the use of a three-out-of-
four approach in weighing criteria for corporateness. The amended
regulations represent a strong further sweep toward classification
of certain groups as partnerships. The primary method is to refer
to anything in local law, agreements, legal relationships of the
members among themselves and with the public, and ethics of a
professional group, which, however slightly, differs from a typical
business corporation, and then to magnify that slight difference
into a rule compelling classification as a partnership.
The amendments to the Kintner Regulations attempt to dis-
pose of the relevance of labels in the classification problem:
Nevertheless, the labels applied by local law to organizations, which
may now or hereafter be authorized by local law, are in and of them-
selves of no importance in the classification of such organizations for
the purposes of taxation under the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, a
professional service organization, formed under the law of a State
authorizing the formation by one or more persons of a so-called profes-
sional service corporation, would not be classified for purposes of taxa-
tion as a "corporation" merely because the organization was so labeled
under local law. See Morrissey et al. v. Commissioner . . . , 296 U.S.
344 (1935). The classification in which a professional service organiza-
tion belongs is determined under the tests and standards set forth in
§§ 301.7701-2, 301.7701-3, and 301.7701-4.424
To relegate local law labels to nothingness in the classification of
organizations may be an overstatement. The classification is
made, whatever set of criteria are applied, on rather technical
grounds. It is doubtful that the label itself is less relevant and
weighty than some of the criteria applied. Furthermore, that the
label "corporation" has no relevance, as the proposed regulation
asserts, is quite doubtful. First, the statutory language refers to
492. 28 Fed. Reg. 13750 (1963) (J§ 301.7701-1(d), 7701-2(g), (h)).
423. 30 Fed. Reg. 1116 (1965).
424. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1965).
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corporations in a way that makes one think Congress merely
intended to have us look to whether a state had issued a charter
labeled "corporation" to the organization. 425 Second, the legisla-
tive history reinforces the view that businesses having a corporate
charter were to be classified as corporations, and that the classifi-
cation problem related to businesses without corporate charters. o
Third, the cases provide no clue that the corporate label is irrele-
vant - no cases hold that a "corporation" is a partnership, for
instance4 7 All these arguments, of course, assume that no at-
tempt has been made to create a sham organization or a sham
statute, such as a mere relabeling of the Uniform Partnership Act
as the "Business Corporation Act." Fourth, in view of the tech-
nical approach of the regulations, the local law label may be just
as good an indication as the other criteria, particularly where the
organization has the label "corporation." Fifth, the Kintner
Regulations, before amendment, did not purport to have anything
to do with the classification of corporations which, absent such
regulations, would not be in doubt; they apparently were wholly
concerned with what is an association, an association taxable as
a corporation. This provision is intended to pass all those points
and to make the label of no weight in the classification.
1. Continuity of Life
The amendment to the Kintner Regulations relating to con-
tinuity of life of professional service organizations is as follows:
(2) A professional service organization does not have continuity
of life within the meaning of paragraph (b) of this section if the death,
insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, expulsion, professional
disqualification, or election to inconsistent public office of any member
will [in fact] (determined without regard to any agreement among the
members) cause under local law the dissolution of the organization. A
business corporation has a continuing identity as an entity which is not
dependent upon a shareholder's active participation in any capacity in
the production of the income of the corporation. Furthermore, the
interest of a shareholder in an ordinary business corporation includes
a right to share in the profits of the corporation, and such right is not
legally dependent (determined without regard to any agreement among
the shareholders) upon his participation in the production of the cor-
poration's income. However, the interest of a member of a professional
service organization generally is inextricably -bound to the establishment
and continuance of an employment relationship with the organization,
and he cannot share in the profits of a professional service organiza-
tion unless he also shares in the performance of the services rendered
425. See note 46 supra.
426. See text at 611-25 supra.
427. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
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by the organization. For purposes of this paragraph, the term "employ-
ment relationship" is used to describe such active participation by the
member and is not restricted to the common-law meaning of such term.
If local law, applicable regulations, or professional ethics do not permit
a member of a professional service organization to share in its profits
unless an employment relationship exists between him and the organ-
ization, and if in such case, he or his estate is required to dispose of
his interest in the organization if the employment relationship ter-
minates, the continuing existence of the organization depends upon the
willingness of its remaining members, if any, either to agree, by prior
arrangement or at the time of such termination, to acquire his interest
or to employ his proposed successor. The continued existence of such
a professional service organization is similar to that of a partnership
formed under the Uniform Partnership Act, whose business continues
pursuant to an agreement providing that the business will be continued
by the remaining members after the withdrawal or death of a partner
(see paragraph (b) of this section), and is essentially different from the
continuity of life possessed by an ordinary business corporation. Con-
sequently, such a professional service organization lacks continuity
of life.428
[The material in italics was added to the regulations as proposed;
the material in brackets appeared in the proposed regulation, but
was omitted in the regulation as adopted.]
This section makes up in length what it lacks in logic and in
consistency with precedent. The reliance in the section as pro-
posed upon what will in fact occur with respect to continuity is
an entirely new concept in the regulations. The early regula-
tions, 4 29 the Kintner Regulations,4 30 and the cases4 31 do not rely
upon or even consider what happens to the continuity of the
business "in fact," but rather look to the continuity of the entity
as a more or sometimes less technical concept. Whether looking
at strict entity continuity, or to the Kintner Regulations, or at
provisions by the organization to carry on the business as did the
Kintner court, the authorities did not consider what might have
happened "in fact," if some of the principals died, etc. This "in
fact" test requires a prediction concerning what would happen
if one of the specified events occurs. Obviously, the entity will
not end or be dissolved on any of the specified events, for the
statute provides it will continue.432 The proposed regulation,
therefore, must refer to the remote possibility of dissolution if
one of the specified events occurs, and if the organization does
nothing to correct the situation. Since the whole thrust of other
428. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(2) (1965).
429. See text accompanying note 300 supra.
430. See text accompanying notes 357-61 supra.
431. See text accompanying notes 202-06 supra.
482. GA. Con AN. § 84-4309 (Supp. 1963).
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authorities is against considering what happens "in fact," this
sentence was completely out of line with the cases and earlier
regulations. Furthermore, there is no apparent reason for chang-
ing the test. Presumably, if changed for one sort of corporation,
it would be changed for all; there is no obvious reason why such
a factual approach would be used for professional groups, and
not for other businesses. The omission of "in fact" from the final
regulation and the addition of "under local law" may cure the
defect described if the language does not mean "might possibly
cause . . . the dissolution . . . ."
The next sentence states, "A business corporation has a con-
tinuing identity as an entity which is not dependent upon a
shareholder's active participation in any capacity in the produc-
tion of the income of the corporation."'" This statement may de-
scribe correctly how people look at large corporations, and, of
course, is also true of any corporation in the technical entity
meaning of continuing identity. But the assertion is not true, in
the factual sense, of a closely held corporation, whose continuance
depends greatly upon both the type of business and the individ-
uals concerned; such a corporation may, or may not have such
"continuing identity." The second sentence is obviously inconsist-
ent with the approach taken in the cases and the early regulations,
if it refers to continuing identity in the factual sense; because, so
applied, almost any closely held corporation would lack con-
tinuity, whether the business renders personal services or not. But
the second sentence probably refers to the entity concept, espe-
cially since the words "as an entity" were added to the language
as originally prepared.
The third sentence - "Furthermore, the interest of a share-
holder in an ordinary business corporation includes a right to
share in the profits of the corporation, and such right is not
legally dependent (determined without regard to any agreement
among the shareholders) upon his participation in the production
of the corporation's income"434 - seems true on its face, although
the relevance to the classification question is not apparent. Some
limitations must be observed, however. No shareholder, as a
shareholder, has a right to a dividend or, except in unusual cases,
to compel the declaration of a dividend or to compel liquidation. 43 5
Also, stock in personal service corporations rarely has any sub-
stantial value. Therefore, while the statement seems true in a
limited sense, if it intends to suggest that what the professional re-
433. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(2) (1965).
434. Ibid.
435. 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONs § 8.08, at 111 (1958).
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ceives as a shareholder depends legally, or technically, upon what
his contribution was in services, then the statement is objection-
able as inconsistent with the concept of a shareholder. If it refers
to the practical connection between income of the professional
and what he gets out of the corporation in any form, the state-
ment is then objectionable as inconsistent with the technical,
entity concept of continuity adopted in the Kintner Regulations
and even in these amendments.
The fourth sentence seeks to distinguish the professional cor-
poration from the "ordinary business corporation" by saying,
"However, the interest of a member of a professional service
organization generally is inextricably bound to the establishment
and continuance of an employment relationship with the organ-
ization, and he cannot share in the profits of a professional serv-
ice organization unless he also shares in the performance of the
services rendered by the organization."" Obviously, the prac-
tical connection between the shareholder of a closely held corpo-
ration and his active participation in the business as an employee
is very close, but that relationship does not really make the pro-
fessional service corporation different. Furthermore, the relevance
of this observation in the amended regulation is obscure. How is
the classification for tax purposes affected, especially where no
practical difference exists between the closely held corporation
and the professional service corporation? Note also that literally
part of the fourth sentence is a false statement; i.e., "he cannot
share . . . ." In fact the professional service corporation member
can share in the profits of the organization whether he actively
participates or not; indeed, it is not unusual for a member of a
professional group to share in the profits when he is disabled or
retired. The general point made in the fourth sentence has no
relevance, therefore, and is inconsistent with the test prescribed
for other types of organizations in section 301.7701-2(b).
Next, the regulations talk about continuing existence depend-
ing upon willingness of the remaining members to acquire the
interest of a member, or his estate, when the member is required
by "local law, applicable regulation, or professional ethics" to
dispose of the interest in the organization.4 3 7 Of course, this view
is quite inconsistent with the entity concept of the Kintner Regu-
lations; in no sense does the entity terminate just because a
member becomes disqualified, dies, etc. Transferability of inter-
est, if anything, is involved here. The continuity of the entity
cannot be said to be affected just because of some remote chance
486. Treas. Reg. § 801.7701-2(h)(2) (1965).
437. Ibid.
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of dissolution after judicial proceeding if an association does not
acquire the interest of the dead or disqualified member. The
possibility is remote, and in fact the disqualification or death
itself has no immediate impact on the continuity of the organiza-
tion. Therefore, neither the earlier regulations nor reason justifies
this portion of the amended regulation.
The next sentence of this section is remarkable:
The continued existence of a professional service organization is similar
to that of a partnership formed under the Uniform Partnership Act,
whose business continues pursuant to an agreement providing that the
business will be continued by the remaining members after the with-
drawal or death of a partner (see paragraph (b) of this section), and is
essentially different from the continuity of life pursued by an ordinary
business corporation. 8
No statement is made of how the existence of the professional
service organization is similar to that of a partnership. Since the
partnership does dissolve upon the death, etc., of a member, and
since the professional service corporation does not, more than a
bare assertion is needed to demonstrate similarity. Likewise, the
"essentially different" nature of the continuity of life is elusive,
to say the least. This sentence is contrary to the Kintner Regula-
tions, the cases, and early regulations. No justification is provided.
Since partnerships do have continuity of life in one sense, the
Kintner Regulations emphasized local law, which provides for
technical dissolution of the partnership as the means for the
finding that partnerships do not have the continuity of a corpora-
tion.439 However, the Minnesota professional service corporation
statute provides continuity with no technical dissolution. No dis-
solution is specified, but the certificate of registration may be
revoked upon the occurrence of an extraordinary event, after
public hearing and an opportunity for judicial appeal.440 Literally,
the professional associations may have continuity even under
the amended provision, since the facts asserted - concerning
participation in profits - are not generally true. However, the
whole section is intended to deprive these groups of continuity,
and, therefore, it might be concluded they do not have continuity
if this section is valid.
2. Centralized Management
Concerning the centralized management criterion, the amended
regulations provide:
488. Ibid.
439. See text accompanying notes 357-59 supra.
440. MNx. STAT. § 319.12-.14 (1961).
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(3) In applying the rules of paragraph (c) of this section, relating
to centralization of management, a professional service organization
does not have centralization of management where the managers of a
professional service organization under local law are not vested with
[lack] the continuing exclusive authority to determine any one or more
of the following matters: (i) the hiring and firing of professional mem-
bers of the organization and its professional and lay employees, (ii)
the compensation of the members and of such employees, (iii) the con-
ditions of employment-such as working hours, vacation periods, and
sick leave, (iv) the persons who will be accepted as clients or patients,
(v) who will handle each individual case or matter, (vi) the professional
policies and procedures to be followed in handling each individual case,
(vii) the fees to be charged by the organization, (viii) the nature of the
records to be kept, their use, and their disposition, and (ix) the times
and amounts of distributions of the earnings of the organization to its
members as such. Moreover, although a measure of central control
may exist in a professional service organization, the managers of a
professional service organization in which a member retains traditional
professional responsibility cannot have the continuing exclusive au-
thority to determine all of the matters described in the preceding sen-
tence. Instead, such measure of central control is no more than that
existing in an ordinary large professional partnership which has one
or more so-called managing partners and in which a member retains
the traditional professional autonomy with respect to professional deci-
sions and the traditional responsibility of a professional person to the
client or patient. Such measure of central control is essentially different
from the centralization of management existing in an ordinary business
corporation. Therefore, centralization of management does not exist in
such a professional service organization. 4
[Material in brackets appeared in the amendment as proposed,
but was omitted in the final regulations; the words in italics were
added to the original proposal.] This provision, in all its detail,
is considerably different from the concept as developed in the
cases and the early regulations. It is even quite different from the
concept of centralized management in the original Kintner
Regulations.
In one sense both partnerships and corporations can achieve
a factual sort of centralization of management, depending upon
the personal relationships of the people involved. In a partner-
ship one partner may be, for all practical purposes, an assistant
or an employee of another partner, in the sense that his work is
closely directed. Of course, the same thing may happen in a
corporation. Moreover, the opposite can be true - the corporate
employee may be subject to no particular supervision on any
matter of importance. Therefore, if centralized management is
sought as a criterion for distinguishing partnerships and corpora-
tions, a technical, conceptual approach is necessary rather than
441. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(3) (1965).
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a factual description of the relationship of the parties. In the
technical sense, both professional partnerships and professional
corporations may have professional employees, obviously, and
control these employees to some extent. Such an employee may
be given considerable freedom in his professional decisions, or
he may be closely supervised. No particular difference distin-
guishes the partnership and the corporate form in this respect,
whether or not the organization is a professional group. Tech-
nically, the relationship of the members of a partnership differs
somewhat from that of the shareholders of a corporation. The
partners have certain rights as more or less equals, while local
law imposes a hierarchy upon a corporation - shareholders, board
of directors, and officers. Of course, either the partnership or the
corporation can modify, by agreement, the structure it would
otherwise have under local law, but the technical difference is
present. Presumably, professional corporations and associations
have the same technical structure as other corporations.
The amended regulation, however, starts with an enumeration
of functions which must be centralized in fact. Note that if any
one function on the list is not centralized, there is not centraliza-
tion. This extreme position, this contrived test, is an absurdity.
Nowhere has centralization been defined in such strict, narrow
terms and the all-or-nothing approach is not justified.
The regulation also places emphasis on centralization of "the
professional policies and procedures to be followed in handling
each individual case," further saying that "the managers of a
professional service organization in which a member retains tra-
ditional professional responsibility cannot have" centralization.4
Of course, there is no reason in law why there could not be con-
trol over the professional decisions of the professional employee.
Normally, no control is exercised, just as any highly trained em-
ployee seldom is closely supervised, particularly in a personal
service business. That proposition hardly needs support. And if
such control does not exist, in fact, for one reason (such as de-
sirable delegation of authority) or another (such as "professional
ethics"), it is difficult to understand how centralization, as that
term seems to be used as a technical term, is diluted. The profes-
sional independence that is referred to has most of its vitality
only in the independence from lay control; nothing in law pre-
vents one professional from employing and controlling another.
Furthermore, even if it were relevant to examine the extent




has the required centralization of control over important matters
such as salaries, employment of professional personnel, disposi-
tion of conflicts of interest, or assignments of work. The whole
point of setting up clinics - and these existed long before the
present controversy - is to obtain efficiency through specializa-
tion; this goal could not be reached without centralization of
management in a significant amount. In examining the impor-
tance of the relationship of the professional to the client, no par-
ticular difference can be found in whether the professional is an
employee of a partnership or a partner. Furthermore, one can
find examples of the practice of medicine by hospitals, clinics, and
group health organizations, many of which are clearly corpora-
tions. The relationship to the client is the same.
The Internal Revenue Service has recognized sufficient cen-
tralization in a medical group in a ruling issued to the Colony
Medical Group.44 The regulation's statement that "such measure
of central control is essentially different from the centralization
of management existing in an ordinary business corporation" 4
is most doubtful, and the more logical comparison would seem
to be with a closely held corporation, perhaps in a personal serv-
ice business. Note also that, in fact, a great deal of decentraliza-
tion exists in corporations, particularly in determinations by
personal service corporations as to how the personal service shall
be rendered. The "essentially different" statement is another
example of several unfounded and unsupported assertions of fact
in these amended regulations.
In conclusion, this section of the proposed regulations is com-
pletely out of tune with the cases and preceding regulations. It
is a rather obvious attempt to exalt any tiny factual difference
into a universal principle on the classification question. Under
the amended regulations, professional corporations and associa-
tions apparently do not have centralized management.
S. Limited Liability
The amendments treat limited liability as follows:
(4) A professional service organization has the corporate character-
istic of limited liability within the meaning of paragraph (d) of this
section only if the personal liability of its members, in their capacity as
members of the organization, is no greater in any aspect than that of
shareholder-employees of an ordinary business corporation. If under
443. Special Ruling, March 2, 1961 (Colony Medical Group), 2 CCH
PENSION PLA GuIDE (2d ed.) 12927 (1962).
444. Treas. Reg. § S01.7701-2(h)(3) (1965).
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local law and the rules pertaining to professional practice, a mutual
agency relationship, similar to that existing in an ordinary professional
partnership, exists between the members of a professional service organ-
ization, [the liability of a professional person to the clients or patients
of the professional service organization is more extensive than the per-
sonal liability of a shareholder-employee of an ordinary business cor-
poration to its customers or patrons, the professional service] such
organization lacks the corporate characteristic of limited liability.445
[Material in brackets appeared in the amendment as proposed,
but was omitted in the final regulations; the words in italics were
added to the original proposal.]
Justification was, of course, impossible for the proposition
that any difference in liability, however slight, between the
liability of the shareholder-employee of a business corporation
and the professional shareholder-employee of a professional cor-
poration required the conclusion that the latter has no limited
liability. Such a strange notion has no foundation anywhere. At
the least, it is obvious that if there is a substantial difference in
the liability of the professional employee-shareholder of a pro-
fessional corporation and of the partner, the former has limited
liability. The arguments have been discussed above concerning
whether the liability of an employee of a professional corpora-
tion differs much, if any, from the employees of other corpora-
tions. The liability, or limitation thereof, was concluded to be
the same."
Furthermore, the proposed regulation confused the limited
liability of shareholders with the personal liability of employees.
The employee of any corporation is liable for his own negligence.
The corporation is liable also under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. The professional employee may have a personal liability
more extensive than the ordinary employee of a corporation, but
only as a professional, not as an employee."1 This greater liability
- perhaps for the negligence of an assistant, perhaps for a promise
to cure - arises out of his professional duties, not out of his
capacity as a corporate or noncorporate employee. The words
added in the final form of the amendment apparently cure this
defect. Consequently, there will be limited liability unless there
is the liability of a partner.
The Colorado professional corporation should have a strong
case for limited liability, even under the amended regulation.
Likewise the Minnesota professional corporation has a strong
case. One remedy to the problem raised by the proposed amend-
445. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(4) (1965).
446. See text accompanying note 400 supra.
447. See text accompanying notes 400-02 supra.
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ment might be state legislation to make it clear that the personal
liability of shareholder-employees of professional corporations is
no greater in any respect than that of shareholder-employees of
an "ordinary business corporation."
4. Transferability of Interest
The last criterion discussed in the amendments to the Kintner
Regulations is transferability of interest. The amendment as
adopted states:
If the right of a member of a professional service organization to
share in its profits is dependent upon the existence of an employment
relationship between him and the organization, free transferability of
interests within the meaning of paragraph (e) of this section exists only
if the member, without the consent of other members, may transfer
both the right to share in the profits of the organization and the right
to an employment relationship with the organization."
This section may say that where membership is not necessarily,
as a matter of local law, dependent upon the existence of an em-
ployment relationship, there can be transferability of interest.
So far as the enabling law requires, the stockholder of a profes-
sional corporation or association need be only a member of the
same profession; he need not be an employee.449 A disabled or
retired employee might well be allowed to retain his stock. An
estate of a shareholder is even allowed to retain stock for some
time4o Consequently, these groups do not seem to be disqualified
for transferability by this section.
On the other hand, if the section means a relationship between
ownership and employment exists as a practical matter, then the
distinction between professional and other corporations seems
contrived. When one compares the closely held corporation and
448. Treas. Reg. § 3O1.7701-2(h)(5)(i) (1965). The proposed amendment
stated:
The right of a member of a professional service organization to share
in its profits is generally dependent upon the existence of an employ-
ment relationship between him and the organization. In such case, free
transferability of interests within the meaning of paragraph (e) of this
section exists only if the member, without the consent of other mem-
bers, may transfer both the right to share in the profits of the organi-
zation and the right to an employment relationship with the
organization.
28 Fed. Reg. 18752 (1963). The only difference seems to be that the
amendment as adopted avoids the factual assertion in the proposed version.
449. GA. CoDE ANN. § 84-4310 (Supp. 1963); MAx. STAT. ANN. § 319.18
(Supp. 1964).
450. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-4310 (Supp. 1963); MiNr. STAT. AN. § 319.19
(Supp. 1964).
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the professional service corporation, no relevant differences ap-
pear on this count. The closely held corporation, especially in a
personal service business, is likely to have identity of shareholders
with principal employees, as a matter of fact.
An interesting point is that if the shareholder-employee had
the right to transfer both the right to share in profits and an
employment relationship, there would be diminution of central-
ization of management under the amended regulations. With
such principles, it is hard to win.
The amendment to the regulations next discusses the com-
monly found right of first refusal, when found in a professional
corporation:
The corporate characteristic of free transferability of interests exists
in a modified form within the meaning of paragraph (e)(2) of this sec-
tion when a shareholder in an ordinary business corporation can trans-
fer his interest in such corporation only after having offered such
interest to the other shareholders at its fair market value. In such a
case, the so-called right of first refusal applies only to an interest which
is a right to share in the profits, the assets, and the management of the
enterprise. However, if the interest of a member of a professional service
organization constitutes a right to share in the profits of the organiza-
tion which is contingent upon and inseparable from the member's con-
tinuing employment relationship with the organization, and the transfer
of such interest is subject to a right of first refusal, such interest is
subject to a power in the other members of the organization to deter-
mine not only the individuals whom the organization is to employ, but
also who may share with them in the profits of the organization. The
possession by other members of the power to determine, in connection
with the transfer of such an interest, whom the organization is to
employ is so substantial a hindrance upon the free transferability of
interests in the organization that such power precludes the existence
of a modified form of free transferability of interests. Therefore, if a
member of a professional service organization who possesses such an
interest may transfer his interest to a qualified person who is not a
member of the organization only after having first offered his interest
to the other members of the organization at its fair market value, the
corporate characteristic of free transferability of interests does not
exist.4 51
451. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(5)(ii) (1965). The proposed amendment
read:
(ii) Although a so-called right of first refusal in connection with
the transfer of the interest of a shareholder of an ordinary business
corporation may not prevent a modified form of transferability of
interests within the meaning of paragraph (e) of this section, such right
of first refusal applies only to the right to share in the profits and
assets of the enterprise. The interest of a member of a professional
service organization, however, constitutes a right to share in the profits
of the organization which, in addition, generally is contingent upon
and inseparable from the member's continuing employment relation-
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The amendment as adopted does talk in terms of condition (if),
rather than asserting what generally is the case, as did the pro-
posed regulation. This language may provide some ray of hope
if the word inseparable means inseparable under local law, and
not inseparable under the agreement between the parties, or even
inseparable in fact, or as a practical matter.
The right of first refusal is difficult to see as a great hindrance
to transferability. The right of first refusal may be regarded
either as a veto power or as the normal way to dispose of stock
by having the corporation acquire it. If merely a veto power,
then normally it would not be exercised, and consequently the
the stock would be transferable. If the corporation normally
acquires the shares when offered, or on certain occasions, then
the liquidity of the investment in those shares is preserved, and
the interests of transferability are thereby well served.
The first option provision is extremely common in smaller cor-
porations -indeed almost the rule, and therefore, normal cor-
porate practice. The courts, indeed, have gone so far as to give
effect to a bylaw which vested the stock of a director or employee
immediately in the directors or trustees when the director or
employee left the firm.452
If the amendment is aimed at organizations which are subject
to a local law tying the employment relation to stockholding by
requiring that all stock be owned by active employees, then such
groups will not have transferability if the amendment is valid.
On the other hand, other groups with no such local law restric-
tion, as for instance the professional corporation and professional
associations herein discussed, will have transferability. If, how-
ever, the amended regulation is aimed at groups which do, by
agreement, limit stock ownership to active employees only, then
ship with the organization. If the transfer of such an interest is subject
to a right of first refusal, the other members of the organization have
the power to determine not only the individuals who may share in
the profits of the organization, but also the individuals whom the
organization is to employ. The possession by other members of such
power to determine whom the organization is to employ in connection
with such a transfer is incompatible with the free transferability of a
member's interest. Therefore, if a member of a professional service
organization may transfer his interest to a qualified person who is not
a member of the organization only after having first offered his interest
to the other members of the organization, the corporate characteristic
of free transferability of interests does not exist.
28 Fed. Reg. 13752 (1963). No great change is apparent from proposed to
final amendment.
452. Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951).
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the scope of the regulation is quite broad and would cause diffi-
culty for many professional corporations and associations. At
the extreme, if the amended regulation purports to refer to
whether employment is - as a practical matter, if not by agree-
ment - tied to stock ownership and vice versa, then many more
professional corporations and associations will be affected, if the
regulations are valid. The transfer of shares and the employment
relationship are legally separate. On the other hand, the practical
relationship between ownership and employment obviously exists
for many closely held corporations. The corporation has the power
to determine who will be its employees whether or not by means
of a right of first refusal. Consequently, the only reasonable in-
terpretation of the amended regulation is that it is aimed at the
first case stated, a situation in which local law requires stock to
be held only by active employees.
However, the amended regulation is not consistent with earlier
regulations and the cases which draw no such distinction. The
dispositive point perhaps should be that under local law the stock
of a professional corporation would be more transferable than a
partnership interest in a similar organization. There would be
fewer local law complications, such as technical dissolution, right
to an accounting, different right of creditors and different liability
of partners, and probably different vote required. Thus, even an
organization which is required to have stock held by only active
employees has more transferability than a partnership. Depend-
ing upon how the amended regulation is interpreted, professional
corporations and associations may have transferability, or a
modified form of transferability, under the regulations.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The various versions of the statute and legislative history
suggest Congress probably intended, in the beginning, to classify
business organizations according to local law for federal income
tax consequences. This classification was apparently to be made
by local law label, so long as the label was not a sham. It was
recognized that the difference in form of organization under local
law could result in different consequences to businesses similar
in all respects except for the formal structure under local law.
It was recognized that personal service corporations were so like
partnerships that, for a brief period, they were treated as part-
nerships for tax purposes; but it was decided to revert to taxing




The courts, largely following the regulations, tended to classify
borderline groups as associations. The courts looked to the agree-
ment governing the relationship of the parties in finding charac-
teristics which supported classification of these groups as associa-
tions. In all the medical cases litigated, the groups have been
classified as associations. Clearly the professional corporation and
professional association would be classified under these cases
as corporation and association for federal income tax purposes.
For 50 years the regulations consistently tended to classify
borderline cases as associations. At one point Congress reversed
this tendency for certain groups strongly resembling partnerships.
The regulations spoke of various factors as indicators of corpo-
rateness, and seemed to emphasize local law in discussing these
indicators, although without explicitly rejecting the agreement
of the parties as relevant. Under this long line of regulations,
classification of professional associations and corporations would
clearly be as corporations. This long-standing regulatory ap-
proach to the classification question was abruptly changed in
the wake of the Kintner case by the publication of the Kintner
Regulations which seemed to place ultimate reliance on the sig-
nificance of local law in applying each criterion of corporateness,
and which reject the use of the agreement between the parties as
a source of corporate characteristics, although not as a source of
diluting corporate characteristics. Nevertheless, classification of
professional associations and corporations would probably be as
associations and corporations, rather than as partnerships, under
these regulations, because these groups seem to have the required
characteristics for corporateness. Finally, in the recent amend-
ments to the Kintner Regulations, the Internal Revenue Service
has pushed to an extreme and suggests that professional associa-
tions and corporations are partnerships, rather than associations
and corporations, for federal tax purposes. Thus, the system is
changed from the pre-Kintner regulations sweeping all doubtful
cases into the association category, to a more neutral position in
the Kintner Regulations based on heavy reliance on local law, and
finally to the amended Kintner Regulations sweeping all "doubt-
ful" cases (or at least professional associations and corporations)
into the partnership category. These amendments grasp for any
distinction between what they refer to as typical business corpora-
tions and professional groups. Then the thin distinction is magni-
fied into a universal indication of the absence of corporateness.
These amended regulations appear to use local law, professional
ethics, and the agreement governing the relationship of the parties,
wherever possible, to deny classification as association or corpora-
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tion; but, on the other hand, they ignore the agreements between
the parties when they attempt to impute a corporate character-
istic to the organization in its natural form under local law. When
practicalities detract from corporateness, they are emphasized;
when they tend to support the presence of a corporate character-
istic, they are ignored.
Under these amendments, professional associations and corpo-
rations would probably be classified as partnerships. The Kintner
Regulations and the amendments require better than two out of
four of the corporate characteristics for classification as an asso-
ciation or corporation; the presence of only two out of four re-
quires classification as a partnership.
The Kintner Regulations in some respects are inconsistent with
the earlier regulations and with the cases; the amended regula-
tions are almost wholly inconsistent with them. If the principles
of the amendments were applied to the entire classification sys-
tem, not just to professional groups, the result would probably
be that no closely held, personal service organization could be
a corporation for federal income tax purposes. Since that broad
change of approach to the problem probably was not intended,
the result appears to be a special set of rules -not entirely con-
sistent with the general rules - for classification of professional
groups. Why these groups require special, discriminatory-in-
application, rules is not readily apparent.
All these systems of classification seem to apply, rather shal-
lowly, certain differences between corporations and partnerships,
without an examination of the relevance of the differences for
federal income tax consequences. Where this application is a result
of mere adoption of the local law classification, it is understand-
able as consistent with what was probably the legislative intent;
but the relevance of the highly strained and extreme distinctions
drawn under the amended Kintner Regulations is less evident.
Whereas the cases and the regulations appear to give more weight
to, for instance, limited liability, the Kintner and amended
Kintner Regulations weigh each "characteristic" the same, and
omit certain characteristics which once were used to justify clas-
sification of groups as associations.
Of course, nothing in the statutes compels a court to take one
view or the other on this classification question. With a wide
possible range of interpretations of the statutory "definitions"
that might be considered by a court, or by one who predicts what
a court might do, or by one who suggests what a court should do,
it is necessary to develop a framework for deciding which clas-
sification system should be followed in these cases. The issue is:
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How should professional associations and corporations, as de-
scribed earlier in this article, be classified for federal income tax
purposes?
The case for classifying these groups as partnerships depends
upon several contentions, but primarily upon the alleged adverse
revenue consequences. The revenue question, however, has sev-
eral aspects. One aspect is the matter of whether less revenue
will be collected as a result of classifying these groups as associa-
tions rather than as partnerships. The only self evident truth
is that the revenue considerations will vary in different circum-
stances. Less revenue will be collected when the recipient of
deferred income paid from a pension or profit sharing plan (either
the employee or his beneficiary) is in a lower marginal tax
bracket; the same amount of revenue will be collected when the
taxpayer is in the same marginal tax bracket at the time of re-
ceipt as the employee was in the year in which the benefit was
earned; and more revenue will be collected when the recipient is
in a higher tax bracket than was the employee when the benefit
was earned. It is not readily evident which of these situations
prevails overall. Some of the benefits are earned in years when the
employee is in a low bracket. By retirement time his income
from all sources may be much higher. Even if the income is earned
at a time of fairly high personal service income, income from
investments may become substantial in later years. Obviously,
therefore, there will not be a revenue loss in all cases.
Furthermore, there will be an immediate, if temporary, increase
in the tax paid by many professional groups changing from the
partnership to the corporation form. If the partnership has been
operating on a taxable year that is not a calendar year, income
from the partnership has been reported for the calendar year
during which the partnership year ends, thus causing a deferral
of taxation of partnership income. When the group changes to
the corporation form, the salaries paid to the doctor employees
will be taxable in the year received, not later, and consequently
there will be both acceleration and bunching of income, with con-
siderably greater tax paid, and paid sooner, as a result.
At least it is apparent that in the arithmetic of national finance,
the alleged adverse effect will not be great. After all the economy
withstood a substantial tax cut without suffering. Furthermore,
just one revenue ruling, such as the recent ruling on deductibility
of treble damage judgments, may have revenue consequences of
about the same magnitude.
Another aspect of revenue considerations is the deferral of
recognition of income which will clearly result through the typical
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pension and profit sharing plan adopted by professional associa-
tions and corporations. The impact of this deferral is not likely
to be great in any particular year, however, because the transition
of these groups to association form, and then the implementation
of full pension and profit sharing benefits are likely to consume
many years. Also, a large number of professional groups, perhaps
more than half, never will change. In any event the income will
be reported sooner or later.
The relevance of either the assumed revenue loss or the effect
of deferral of income to this classification problem is doubtful.
They are not supposed to control the deciding of particular tax
cases, and they should not be considered when there is as much
history - legislative, judicial, and administrative - as in the
instant case to provide the basis for decision. To change a long
standing rule merely because the revenue considerations have
changed does not seem to be a proper use of the power to promul-
gate interpretative regulations.
Another reason advanced to justify the amended regulations
is that doctor and lawyer groups have always been taxed as part-
nerships and, therefore, Congress intends to continue to tax them
as partnerships. Besides the obvious non sequitur, the first diffi-
culty with this argument is that some medical groups have
long been operated in the form of associations. The prospect of
the application of the amended regulations to those groups serves
to put the consistency matter in issue rather clearly and to rebut
the factual assertion. The second difficulty is that Congress has
evidenced absolutely no intention to restrict these groups to one
form or another for federal income tax purposes. The congres-
sional form and intent never included, or froze into the tax law,
state-created bars to the practice of professions in the corporate
form.
It has been stated that although doctors and lawyers could
change their forms of organization enough to be classified as cor-
porations or associations, both the professional association dis-
cussed herein and some professional corporations have not changed
enough. The regulations go far beyond this reasonable, if not
persuasive, position. But a position on the classification issue
depends on how one reads the authorities, and why. If you start
with the Kintner Regulations as gospel, ignore the previous
decades of cases and regulations, assume ultimate construction
of these enabling statutes in the least helpful way, and then apply
the Kintner Regulations in as hostile a manner as possible, you
can logically defend the conclusion that these groups are not
associations. Whether the doctors and lawyers have arranged for
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enough legislative change to enable these groups to achieve asso-
ciation or corporation classification for tax purposes, can also be
answered either historically or in terms of the relevant policy
considerations. Herein it is argued that history strongly supports
the classification of these groups as associations, and that policy
reasons require association classification where elected by the
group through adopting the association or corporation form under
local law. Why the answer should rather be found in a harsh read-
ing of some regulations which are in many respects inconsistent
with the cases and the long-standing regulations preceding, is
not clear.
Another reason given for denying the corporateness of some
organizations is that the state laws have as their sole object the
changing of the federal tax treatment of these groups. Presum-
ably, such reasoning also asserts that something is sinister about
that objective, and apparently assumes that compelling reasons
are present for continuing the traditional classification of these
particular groups for tax purposes. The last point is dealt with
above. The sinister character of these acts is not apparent. These
acts do not affect just federal taxation, but also affect local taxa-
tion, and presumably in the same way as the federal revenue is
affected. The argument is that the federal courts should not recog-
nize this blatant attempt to change the federal tax consequences
to taxpayers by a mere change of state law.
Another way of looking at the matter is that Congress left
the matter of form of business to the states, in spite of the result-
ing differences in taxation of otherwise identical businesses; the
statutes enacted are well within the range of that delegation;
the states have only acted to remove a traditional bar to doctors
and lawyers using the corporate form; these statutes have sub-
stantial local law effects, on the same technical level as the ad-
mitted differences in corporations and partnerships; and these
statutes do have local law tax consequences of the same quality
as the federal tax consequences (and if harmful for federal pur-
poses, harmful for state revenue purposes also).
Consequently, it might be argued, the more appropriate role
for the federal courts is to recognize these state acts for federal
income tax purposes, as Congress no doubt intended, and not to
jump to the conclusion that something is sinister and wrong with
the removal of a state created bar to practicing law and medicine
in the corporate form. If federal tax consequences gave the final
push to the state decision to change what were, at most, emo-
tionally based prohibitions, so what? Federal tax consequences,
and in some cases limited liability, are about the only substantial
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considerations in choosing the form for doing business, as a result
of decades of lawyer ingenuity in removing the other differences.
The states, not surprisingly, are finally recognizing this fact and
allowing professional groups, as other businesses, to elect federal
tax consequences by their choice of the local law form for doing
business.
Presumably, the tax base is not significantly involved in this
controversy since the income of the business, with quite minor
exceptions, will be taxed eventually. Deferred compensation bene-
fits under an employment contract, pension benefits, and profit
sharing benefits all will eventually be included in someone's in-
come. Although total exclusion from the tax base is allowed for
qualified sick pay and for funds spent on such fringe benefits as
group life insurance, these benefits are rather minor and are not
important enough in revenue effect to be considered.
There seems to be a lack of discussion of the effect of the incor-
poration of these groups on the progressive character of our in-
come tax, and the policies served by a progressive tax. Concerning
revenue considerations, the discussion set forth above applies. On
the level of policies served by progression, it is difficult to see
how those revenue considerations are so compelling, if of any
merit at all, as to justify different treatment of two groups of
"businessmen" in the business of rendering personal services,
assuming both groups desire to be classified as associations or
corporations. Furthermore, the tax system may be too progressive
for personal service income, and yet too riddled with exceptions
available to corporate executives and owners, but not to partners.
Finally, the attitude of the Internal Revenue Service might be
attributed to a belief that the provisions of the Code on fringe
benefits are too liberal, and also have been abused. If so, the
remedy is not to deny these benefits to one group of businessmen,
while allowing the other groups to retain those benefits. The
answer is to attempt reform of the basic provisions applicable
to all.
The case for classifying these groups as associations and cor-
porations, as intended by their owners, is simple enough. The
classification for tax purposes was intended by Congress to be
primarily a local law classification, even if subject to some federal
limits. Since the cases and regulations for 50 years tended to
classify doubtful groups as associations, that classification system
acquired the force of law. The recent attempts to change the law
by regulation should not receive favor by the courts. Furthermore,
these professional businesses are entitled, so far as federal tax
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law is concerned, to choose whatever local law form the states
will tolerate. Other businesses may decide whether to adopt the
partnership form or the corporation form, and no good reason
has been given to deny this choice to those who are in the busi-
ness of rendering personal services in the medical or legal fields.
Stated another way, there is no good reason for treating these
businesses differently than other businesses for federal income tax
purposes. At stake is the basic element of fairness and equality
that should be used in the application and administration of the
federal tax laws. The change proposed by the amended Kintner
Regulations is one - hazarding a prediction - that Congress
would never adopt. Furthermore, for nontax reasons pensions
and profit sharing plans are desirable and worthy of some tax
benefits. These plans provide incentive for these employer-owners
to fund their own retirement through such plans, rather than
leave retirement funding to chance. Providing tax incentives to
this worthy objective is a legitimate use of the tax laws.
The above analysis calls for a framework to allow these bene-
fits to doctors and lawyers, if they are willing to adopt the appro-
priate business form, rather than a framework that seems to deny
it. In coming to this conclusion no difficulty should be raised by
the observation that many will not be able to obtain these bene-
fits - for instance those employed by corporations who have no
such plans or those not eligible for coverage under plans adopted.
Some day that inequity may be rectified. Therefore, a framework
should be adopted consistent with allowing these professional
groups to organize under local law as associations and corpora-
tions. The framework could be that vague one developed under
the cases and pre-Kintner regulations. Classification of these
groups as associations and corporations would seem to follow
easily.
On the technical level, the reenactment and long-standing rules
do give considerable weight to the earlier approach leading to
classification of groups as associations. There is no clear authority
that the Commissioner can change interpretative rules that have
survived many reenactments and that have received "the force of
law" by courts adopting the criteria they provide.
But if the Commissioner should be able to change the approach
taken in such regulations, the question remains: when, or in other
words, for what reasons? Certainly there is merit in consistency
in such regulations. Once a position is taken and widely adopted
by the courts, it is best to continue the approach, because it is
desirable for taxation rules to have good predictability of result,
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especially on the basic question of what form a business organiza-
tion shall have for federal income tax consequences. If change
occurs, a period of great turmoil results. Good reasons are needed
to support such a change, and minor shifts in revenue advantage
are not good enough reasons.
If changes are to be made, the Internal Revenue Service should
be respectful of the authorities - legislative history and declara-
tions, and the decided cases of the courts. Sometimes the regula-
tions do have to be changed. The Clifford Regulations are an ex-
ample. But they were bottomed on the Clifford case, and served
the great need of providing detailed rules for predicting conse-
quences of certain very common arrangements.
The Kintner Regulations, although representing some change
of emphasis, do have some utility as a framework for deciding
these cases by assuming a reasonable, not a strained and hostile,
interpretation of those regulations. The technical, local law ap-
proach of those regulations has merit. The criteria of the cases and
pre-Kintner regulations were not founded on practicality, and
in that respect the Kintner Regulations are no worse. They do
provide some ease of application, some predictability. Serious
reservations remain concerning the weight of each of the Kintner
Regulations criteria. Clearly, in the cases and the pre-Kintner
regulations, not all these criteria are of equal importance. Yet the
Kintner Regulations make them equal. Clearly, limited liability
is of greater importance and has greater weight than the other
criteria; perhaps this importance could be reflected by giving that
criterion double weight, if a fairly mechanical system must be
used. Another advantage to using the Kintner criteria is that they
were partly designed to settle the troublesome problem of classi-
fication faced by the oil and gas industry. It would not be de-
sirable to unsettle that area by throwing out the Kintner criteria
entirely, and it is not necessary to do so since medical and legal
groups setting up to do business under the professional corpora-
tion and association acts could qualify under the Kintner Regula-
tions, reasonably interpreted, as associations. While approving
the Kintner Regulations might seem to be a slight compromise
with the history of the pre-Kintner regulations and cases, it can
be defended as a useful and fair compromise. More important, it
can also be defended as a return to what Congress probably
intended originally, to let local law determine the form of busi-
ness and to let tax classification normally follow. The pre-Kintner
regulations and the cases were not necessarily well balanced or
justified in their tendency to classify all doubtful cases as
associations.
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The amendments to the Kintner Regulations, on the other
hand, have no support historically, are not a balanced, fair ap-
proach to the prdblem, and discriminate against certain profes-
sional groups without justification. Consequently, a court need
not follow such changes unless the Commissioner convinces it
that compelling reasons of legislative policy justify the change,
and that the court is a better forum for the legislative change
than the legislature. That should be the burden of the Internal
Revenue Service in these cases.
The Kintner Regulations, before amendment, are a good illus-
tration of the proper exercise of the power to change interpre-
tative regulations, if it exists, since they more faithfully interpret
the original intent of Congress, since they aid predictability, and
since they have the practical value of avoiding excursions into
a morass of facts.

